police force and an oversight commission for the implementation of the accords. The New York Agreement (September 1991) stipulated the purification of the armed forces based on a review of personnel conducted by the Ad Hoc Commission and the reduction of the armed forces, the specifics of which were to be determined. Additionally, the agreement provided for the creation of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) as the party responsible for ensuring the implementation of all political agreements.19 COPAZ was to be composed of two government representatives, including a member of the armed forces, two FMLN representatives, and one representative of each party or coalition in the Legislative Assembly, while the archbishop of San Salvador was given observer status. Although COPAZ was given no executive powers, the agreement did require that the commission be consulted on all matters relating to the implementation and oversight of the peace agreements. COPAZ was also given the power to draft preliminary legislation related to the agreements.
The Chapúltepec Accords were signed on January 16, 1992, in Mexico City. The accords resolved the remaining and most contentious issues of the negotiations, those concerning the armed forces, and reaffirmed agreements reached during the past two years. Chapter I upheld the agreements stipulated in the Mexico Agreement, which effectively restructured the armed forces. Among the principles addressed in the Chapúltepec Accords were adherence to democratic values, respect for human rights, subordination of the armed forces to constitutional authorities, and national defense. The language in the accords required the armed forces to be “obedient, professional, apolitical, and non-deliberative” in their service and “respect to the political order determined by the sovereign will of the people and all political or social changes generated by that will, in accordance with democratic procedures consistent with the Constitution.”20 The accords also defined the role of the armed forces as one of national defense, as opposed to internal security: “National defense, the responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat”; they further specified that “the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces.”21 To that end, the parties agreed to changes to the education and training of the armed forces to focus on human rights, respect for democracy, and the subordination to civilian authorities, including the president’s authority to appoint civilians to the post of defense minister. Although the accords themselves did not specify the extent of the reduction of the armed forces agreed to in the New York Agreement, the Chapúltepec Accords did acknowledge that a plan had been submitted to the secretary general. With regard to purification, the duties and responsibilities of the Ad Hoc Commission were detailed. Finally, the National Guard, Treasury Police, National Police, Rapid-Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs), and “civil defence units”—all those organizations most responsible for gross human rights violations—were to be abolished, and the National Intelligence Department was to be replaced with a State Intelligence Organization, subordinate to civilian control.
Chapter II provided for the creation of a new civilian police force, the National Civilian Police (PNC), as a separate entity from the armed forces, placing the armed forces and police under the authority of different ministries. Under the accords, the PNC became the only armed police body with national jurisdiction. The accords further distinguished the role of the national police from that of the armed forces by defining public security as “a service provided by the State to its citizens, free from all political considerations of politics, ideology or social position or any other discrimination; respect for human rights; the effort to prevent crime; and the subordination of the force to the constitutional authorities.”22 Additionally, the PNC’s leaders were required to be civilians. In an effort to further distinguish the police from the military, the police were no longer permitted to reside in barracks and were permitted to carry only small arms. A new national public security academy was created to train recruits, and a basic level of education was established for recruits. A limited number of former members of the National Police and the FMLN were allowed to join the PNC provided they met specified criteria. Additionally, it was the designated role of the PNC to protect the right of assembly and demonstration, adding, “citizens’ exercise of their political rights may not be impaired by police activities.”23 This provision underlined police responsibility to protect the rights of the citizenry rather than the rights of the state.
Chapters III and IV addressed judicial and electoral reform, reaffirming the agreements reached in the Mexico Agreement. The Chapúltepec Accords specifically addressed the National Judiciary Council’s independence from the state, the role of the Judicial Training School in improving the professional training judges and attorneys, and the responsibilities of the PDDH. Chapter IV, which addressed electoral reform, was a single paragraph reaffirming the Mexico Agreement. The accords did stipulate that COPAZ appoint a special commission to propose necessary electoral reforms. Both chapters lacked specificity and were the least developed sections of the accords; the former was a single page and the latter was a single paragraph. The lack of specificity and the extent to which the reforms were left to domestic actors became a serious issue during implementation.
Chapter V addressed the socioeconomic issues of the peace accords. During the negotiations, the FMLN had been primarily concerned with military and institutional reform. Although the FMLN had based its armed struggle on battling socioeconomic injustices, the social and economic aspects of the peace accords were left until the end of the negotiations and were very limited in scope. The neoliberal policies adopted by the ARENA government were not subject to negotiation.24 This was the position of the Cristiani administration and the FMLN, which was far more concerned about the military and human rights issues, never contested this position. According to FMLN negotiator Rubén Zamora, “The moment the FMLN agreed that we were going to negotiate with the ARENA government, the socioeconomic model was out of the discussion. Maybe we could do something on secondary issues, but the basic thing was to get to the table. This is the basic tenet of negotiations. People go to negotiate, not to sacrifice themselves.”25 According to Teresa Whitfield, it was “remarkable that socioeconomic issues even were the subject of a substantive agreement.”26 Nicaragua’s experience, however, had demonstrated the danger of failing to make provisions for ex-combatants after demobilization. As such, the accords addressed five main issues: land transfer; increase and ease of loans to the agricultural sector; small business and microenterprise; reforms to permit external aid directed to community development; and measures to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programs. The accords also reaffirmed the commitment to privatization as a means to spread wealth to workers.27 The land transfer program was intended to facilitate the reintegration of members of the FMLN and their supporters into society. Thus, the economic measures agreed to in the peace accords were specifically focused on rebuilding former conflict zones and the reintegration of FMLN forces through land transfer and improved access to credit—not on addressing fundamental issues of poverty and inequality.28
The accords also created the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation (Foro) and the National Reconstruction Plan (PRN). The purpose of the Foro was to address those socioeconomic issues not discussed in the accords, including wages, labor standards, and privatization. The Foro was to be composed of high-level government officials, specifically those with the authority to make decisions, and business and labor representatives. The terms of the Foro as specified in the accords were vague, as were the structure and issues to be addressed by the Foro. The accords required the PRN to be designed by the government within thirty days of signing the agreement for submission to the FMLN for review and comment. The National Reconstruction Plan was to focus on the reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society, development of former conflict zones, issues of job creation, increase in production of basic foodstuffs, promotion of agricultural development, guarantee of basic social services, and development or redevelopment of basic infrastructure.29
Chapter VI specifically addressed the reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society and had two main components: the reintegration of former combatants and the legalization of the FMLN as a political party. As such, the accords provided for the freedom to conduct business attributed to political parties, such as canvassing for new members,
