a treaty of protection with the Somali of that region. These Italian pioneers were not the first Europeans to visit all the regions included in their explorations: in 1883 a party of Englishmen had reached the Shebelle from Berbera despite difficulties with the Aden authorities; and between 1886 and 1892 the Swayne brothers had surveyed much of the country between the northern coast and the Shebelle River. But unlike their Italian colleagues, these British explorers did not enter into protectorate agreements with the clansmen they encountered.
More orthodox conventions were established with the Filonardi Company as it began to extend its jurisdiction. The coastal Somali, however, did not always welcome the new rulers. In October 1893, at Merca, as Filonardi and his companions were about to board the Italian warship on which they were travelling, having successfully signed a treaty with the leaders of the town, one of the party was attacked and mortally wounded. In reprisal, twelve Somali elders were taken prisoner and the city heavily bombarded. There were other occasions also when the Italian warships plying Eritrea, Aden, Zanzibar, and the Benadir ports found that such methods had a salutary effect and facilitated the Company’s gradual expansion. But in 1896, after only three years of existence, the Company’s slender financial resources proved inadequate and it was forced to wind up its affairs. By the end of the year, in addition to Itala, six other stations had been opened: two, Giumbo and Warsheikh, were like Itala mere outposts with no Italian official; but at Brava, Merca, Mogadishu, and Lugh there were now Italian Residents in command.
The collapse of Filonardi’s Company followed the resounding Italian rout at the battle of Adowa which decisively shattered Italy’s ambiguous claim to a protectorate over Ethiopia. Italy managed, however, to retain her Eritrean colony, and despite the furore at home which greeted the news of Menelik’s victory, she still clung optimistically to her new Somali possessions. Indeed, with the help of the small flotilla of warships stationed in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, preparations were being made to defend the Benadir against a possible Ethiopian attack. And attempts were also being made to extend Italian influence inland. In November 1896, without waiting for the consent of the Sultan of the Geledi, a party led by Cecchi, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, set off to reconnoitre the left bank of the Shebelle River. The expedition ended disastrously at Lafole where its members were ambushed by Somali clansmen, only three of the seventeen Italians escaping with their lives.
This set-back did not, however, deter the Italian government which interpreted the situation as calling for an intensification of the work of ‘pacification’. Consequently, until a new company could be found to assume the burden of administering the Benadir, Giorgio Sorrentino, commander of the cruiser Elba, was appointed as Special Commissioner to restore order, and more native troops were hurriedly shipped to the coast from Massawa. By November 1897, Sorrentino’s reprisals for the incident at Lafole had convinced the Sultan of the Geledi of the wisdom of accepting the new colonizers and the Special Commissioner’s mission was complete. Six months later, despite the continued lack of enthusiasm in Italy for further colonial adventures, the ‘Benadir Company’ was ready to take over where Filonardi had left off. Like its predecessor, however, this new organization soon found that it had neither the means nor the resources to conduct the undertaking profitably, and succumbed in 1905 when the Italian government at last realized that if anything was to be made of the Benadir, it would have to assume direct responsibility.
The acquisition by Italy of her two northern Somali protectorates and her lease of the southern Benadir ports, although she was at first hardly in a position to assert her authority, naturally raised the question of how the frontiers between these and Britain’s Somaliland Protectorate should be drawn. The issue was in fact much wider than this for it also included the more important question of how much territory Italy had gained as protector of Abyssinia, on her interpretation of the Ucciali treaty which Britain accepted but France contested. Interest was focused mainly on Harar and Zeila. France sought to divert the lucrative trade from Harar to the ports of her new colony. Britain endeavoured, within the scope of her limited interests on the Somali coast, to keep the trade flowing along the ancient caravan route to Zeila in her Protectorate. Italy, in her turn, regarded Harar as part of her Abyssinian protectorate and coveted Zeila, the natural outlet of Harar’s trade.
Italian interest in the Harar–Zeila area was emphasized as early as 1890 when the Italian government expressed concern about the possible consequences at Harar of a punitive expedition in the British Protectorate against the ‘Ise clan. In September of this year, Menelik wrote to the King of Italy pointing out that the Amharic version of the Ucciali treaty allowed him to make use of the Italian government in his relations with foreign powers but did not compel him to do so. The Italian government replied by dispatching Count Antonelli to take the matter up with the Emperor. Another object of Antonelli’s visit was to induce Menelik to address a circular letter to the powers defining the ancient boundaries of Abyssinia. This remarkable document was dispatched and received in 1891: in Somaliland it claimed ‘the Province of Ogaden, the Habar Awal, the Gadabursi, and the ‘Ise’ (the last three Somali peoples being clans with whom Britain, and in the case of the ‘Ise, France also, had treaties of protection). The letter also contained the challenging declaration: ‘Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator.’
Nevertheless, it was as protector of Abyssinia that Italy entered into negotiations with Great Britain over their respective boundaries. In March of 1891 an Anglo-Italian protocol was signed which defined the boundary between East Africa and Italian Somaliland, and the Italian government proceeded to press for a further delimitation between her and Britain’s Somali territories. At the time Britain was not as anxious as Italy to settle this matter and consequently embarked upon delaying tactics. However, in May 1894 a protocol was signed defining the respective spheres of influence.
By this time Menelik had succeeded in giving some colour to his claims over Somali clans advanced in his circular letter of 1891. The conquest of Harar in 1887 had been followed by the subjugation of the turbulent local Oromo peoples. These achievements encouraged the Abyssinians to turn their attention towards their Somali neighbours. From Harar, Ras Makonnen’s forces began foraging not only amongst the ‘Ise, Gadabursi, and Habar Awal clans, but also to the east and south-east amongst the Somali of the Haud and Ogaden. This placed the British Protectorate authorities in an awkward position, especially after a small Abyssinian force had opened a post in 1891 at Biyo Kaboba on the British side of the Protectorate’s western border. Italy insisted that all negotiations with Abyssinia should proceed through her, and Britain accepted this position protesting vainly to the Italians as incident followed incident. Although the clans concerned turned to the Protectorate authorities for support, nothing effective was done, despite the fact that the Abyssinian pressure could easily have been countered with little cost in arms. The possibility of arming the Somali to protect themselves was raised, and inevitably dismissed.
This unwillingness to honour fully the terms of the Anglo-Somali protectorate treaties, however distasteful to the local British authorities, was of course consistent with the official British attitude towards the Somali coast. The effect was to strengthen Abyssinia’s hand, and Italy’s as Abyssinia’s protector, although there was now growing British scepticism as to Italy’s real influence with Menelik.7
The negotiations which led to the 1894 Anglo-Italian Protocol discussed a possible surrender of the ‘Ise and Gadabursi clans along with the port of Zeila to the Italians in exchange for Italian concessions in their northern Somali protectorates. In the event, however, this course was not followed, and the decision eventually agreed to, amounted to a recognition that the Ogaden lay within the Italian sphere,8 and the Haud in the British. Three years later Britain was severely to curtail her newly defined rights in the Haud.
The treaties of 1897 with Ethiopia
The Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896 completely destroyed the Italian claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia: the irksome treaty of Ucciali had served Menelik well. The Christian state of Ethiopia to which Menelik’s
