in the future, become Ethiopian subjects. Moreover, the adroit form of words adopted by Rodd, is consistent with the terms of the original Anglo-Somali treaties of protection which it will be recalled did not, in fact, cede Somali territory to Britain. The treaty also – and this was essential – did not in any way compromise the Italian claims agreed to between Britain and Italy in 1894.
The eventual effect, of course, clearly envisaged by Rodd and his government of this unilateral withdrawal or curtailment of protection by Britain, was to place the Somali clansmen concerned in a position in which they would not be able to maintain their independence from Ethiopia. It was merely a matter of time before Ethiopia followed up her spasmodic thrusts and transformed her infiltration among the Somali into a definite occupation. This contingency was clearly provided for in the third annex to the treaty which stipulated that the clans on each side of the new British Protectorate frontier should have access to the grazing areas and ‘nearer wells’ both within and outside the British sphere; during such migratory movements they were to be under the jurisdiction of the appropriate territorial authority. However, Rodd and the other British officials concerned thought that the Ethiopians would be slow to take advantage of what they had in effect already gained; it was considered that in practice things would continue much as they were with the Haud remaining as a sort of buffer zone used by the British clans only temporarily for grazing. The effects of the gradual adoption of agriculture by the western Somali clans were not envisaged, for this process had hardly yet started. A more serious objection which might more reasonably have been anticipated was the effect of the centuries’ old trend of population movement away from the highly eroded north towards the centre and Haud. This gradual drift of population was to bring increasing numbers of British protected Somali into what was now effectively the Ethiopian sphere.
These and other more immediate objections to the effects of the treaty were, however, of only local importance, and although there were protests in England as well as misgivings amongst the local Somali Coast administrators, these carried little weight in the face of the imperatives of imperial strategy. From this wider point of view, given Britain’s secondary interest in Somaliland and her refusal to undertake any financial commitment there which went beyond the purpose for which the Protectorate had been created, Rodd had in reality merely yielded to the inevitable. A notable attempt had at least been made to secure Ethiopian goodwill, and Ethiopian recognition had been obtained for the British Somaliland Protectorate within frontiers which were still consistent with the requirements of the trade to Aden. That this had been achieved at the price of unilaterally abandoning protectorate treaties with Somali clansmen, was, of course, unfortunate, but whatever misgivings Rodd himself may have had were reassured when an interview with Lord Salisbury revealed that the Foreign Minister was ‘not much preoccupied by Abyssinian encroachments in Somaliland’.13
Nevertheless, the Government of Bombay which was directly responsible through Aden for administering the territory was not entirely satisfied and prophesied that trouble with the Somali, who had not been consulted and knew nothing of the treaty, would be likely to follow. Any additional expenditure which might thereby be incurred should not, Bombay urged, fall upon its exchequer. The point was taken, and the Foreign Office, which had been responsible for the treaty, assumed responsibility for the Protectorate in the following year, in time to bear the burden of the first phase of the twenty years rebellion which broke out two years later.
Thus 1897 saw the definition of the British Somali sphere in relation to Ethiopia. But it was not until 1934, when an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission attempted to demarcate the boundary, that British-protected Somali became aware of what had happened, and expressed their sense of outrage in disturbances which cost one of the commissioners his life. This long period of ignorance, far from indicating acquiescence, was facilitated by the many years which elapsed before Ethiopia established any semblance of effective administrative control in the Haud and Ogaden.
Yet 1897 remains the crucial year in the imperial history of the Horn of Africa; and the boundary agreements made then have left a legacy of indeterminacy and confusion which still plagues the relations between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic. Nor was it only the British who unilaterally abrogated some of their protectorate obligations towards Somali. The Lagarde mission to Menelik, which had preceded Rodd’s, had also discussed boundary questions and reduced the extent of the Côte des Somalis to the satisfaction of the Emperor. In return, commercial guarantees were obtained which included agreement on the construction of the proposed railway from Jibuti, the new capital of the Côte, to the Ethiopian hinterland: the effect of this was to make French Somaliland the official outlet for Ethiopia’s trade.
Farther to the south, though as yet only weakly established, Italy was determined to cling to her new Somali interests, and forced, after her defeat at Adowa, to reach a boundary settlement acceptable to Ethiopia. This was negotiated by Major Nerazzini who had earlier conducted with Menelik the negotiations for the Italo-Ethiopian peace treaty.14 And although in that treaty Menelik described himself as ‘Emperor of Ethiopia and of the Galla countries’, making no reference to his pretensions in Somaliland, Italy was forced to reduce her claims to the Ogaden which Britain had accepted in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894. In fact, the Italian sphere was defined vaguely as lying within an area up to 180 miles from the coast and running from the boundary of the British Protectorate to the Juba River, north of Bardera. At the time, when the Italian position was so weak, this hasty division of spheres of interest may have seemed advantageous to both parties; certainly in later years it fostered the growth of a tradition of uncertainty and conflict which led to the Walwal incident and Italo-Ethiopian war, and is still unresolved.
Nevertheless, for the time being at least, France, Britain, and Italy, had now pruned their Somali possessions to dimensions acceptable to Ethiopia, and the stage was set for the march of local events. For the next twenty-three years these were dominated by the religious war against the Christian ‘infidels’ led by Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abdille Hassan in which Somali, who for the most part had so far seemed to accept those new imperial developments of which they had knowledge, fiercely strove to regain their lost independence.
CHAPTER IV
THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900–20
The Growth of Muslim brotherhoods
BEFORE FOLLOWING Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abdille Hassan’s remarkable struggle to free his country from foreign domination, it is necessary to pause for a moment to review the social and religious context in which this patriotic movement arose. Islam in Somaliland has long been associated with the brotherhoods or tariqas (literally, ‘the Way’) which express the Sufi, or mystical view of the Muslim faith, a view which, since it exalts the charismatic powers of saints, is particularly well adapted to the Somali clan system in which clan ancestors readily become transposed into Muslim saints. So well developed indeed had these religious organizations become in the nineteenth century, that the Somali profession of the faith was now synonymous with membership of, or more frequently, nominal attachment to a Sufi brotherhood. The esoteric content of Sufism, however, was not strongly developed locally, although each religious Order had (and has) a distinctive liturgy for its adherents to follow in their worship of God. Despite their common aim of promoting religious as opposed to secular values, the relations between different Orders are characterized by rivalry centring on the respective religious merits and mystical powers of intercession of their founders. Generally, the Orders have a loose hierarchical organization, and many, though not all, Somali Sheikhs and men of religion occupy positions of religious authority within the Order which they follow.
More significantly, notwithstanding their own rivalries, in their membership and following the brotherhoods cut across clan and tribal loyalties, seeking to substitute the status of brother in religion for that of clansman, so that men who are divided by clan affiliation may share common adherence to the same religious Order. In this way, by their very nature, the Muslim Orders contribute to national unity through Islam and seek
