forces already inside Germany, and that their ability to supervise the expected millions of disarmed German soldiers found in barracks and camps both inside and outside Germany would be insufficient.16 That said, the British appear to have believed that creating new staff for disarmament at this time was a waste of already scarce manpower. Instead, it was decided that a number of personnel from the Staff Duties Section would form the nucleus of a disarmament staff until Rankin C conditions were obtained. Colonel Grazebrook was named to undertake this task.17
German evasions of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and their protestations that the war had not been lost were themes repeated both in Washington and London. According to the terms of the World War I armistice, the Germans were required to evacuate German-occupied territories on the Western Front within two weeks. Any troops remaining in these areas were to be interned or taken as prisoners of war (POWs). Allied forces were to occupy the left bank of the Rhine within a month, and a neutral zone was to be established on the right bank. In terms of military equipment, the Germans were to turn over to the Allies 5,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 trucks and its entire submarine fleet. The majority of Germany’s surface naval fleet was interned; the remainder was to be disbanded.18
A memo by a prominent German lawyer who had fled to the United States and joined the US Army, prepared for Major General John H. Hilldring, chief of the newly formed Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, and written from personal knowledge, stated that when the armistice was signed in 1918, it was signed “at Compiegne at a time when the German armies were holding in Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Belgium and France. The German soldier did not realize he was defeated. . . . After the proclamation of the Armistice the German troops going back through France and Belgium gave the appearance of well-organized fighting units. They had observed good marching discipline, and were fully equipped with rifles, machine guns and cannons. Their flags were flying and their bands were playing.”19
On 14 January 1944, Major General C. A. West (UK), deputy chief of staff (G-3), highlighted in a COSSAC memo the fact that there was a complete lack of UN policy to help deal with problems arising from Operation Rankin. General West specifically addressed the issue of armistice terms and disarmament, stating that there had been considerable guidance from British sources but that they dealt exclusively with long-term policy after the initial occupation of Germany. It was essential now, he wrote, that papers on all these problems be prepared with some urgency. This would allow the SCAF to lay down policy for the first ninety days following the armistice. He then outlined ten issue areas that needed addressing to include armistice terms and disarmament, and assigned both G-3 and G-4 (Logistics) divisions the responsibility for developing these papers. He also addressed both the navy and air staffs and invited them to nominate officers to work on issues of interest to them.20
By 25 January, the draft COSSAC disarmament paper had become a SHAEF paper and been sent to SHAEF’s head planners, indicating that significant amendments from the previous meeting had been incorporated and that unless controversial points arose during the coordination process there would be no further meetings on that paper. Among the various changes incorporated was a war establishment / table of organization (WE/TO) for the disarmament mission that now included manning for separate US and British units.21
The paper was released under the signature of Colonel Grazebrook, then Deputy Chief Staff Duties Section (G-3). The fifteen-page paper contained four appendices and a map. Extremely detailed, it included suggested sizes and compositions for mobile missions as well as disarmament detachments to be set up in German military districts (Wehrkreisen), and outlined the responsibilities of SHAEF and the German commanders who were to be used to implement disarmament under Allied supervision. In April, the study, now titled Primary Disarmament of the German Armed Forces, was forwarded to the SHAEF chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, for approval. The cover letter stated that the total personnel requirement for the necessary disarmament missions would be 272 officers and 165 enlisted men and other ranks. This study, which was the second of four such studies, was approved on 29 April 1944 and issued as PS-SHAEF (44)10.22
There was one aspect of this study to which the British Foreign Office objected. The offending paragraphs stated that German forces would be used to guard German arms and supply depots in liberated territories to prevent them from being raided by Allied nations. The Foreign Office suggested that Allied governments would be offended to learn that after their liberation from the Germans, German troops were being retained on their territory to do a job the Allies could do. Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed the Allies would be none too pleased that Germans were needed to protect the dumps from Allied nations. The Foreign Office expressed its hope that these paragraphs would be thoroughly reconsidered.23
Several days later, the Allied naval staff sent a memo to the Admiralty asking for guidance on naval objectives that still needed to be occupied and on additional naval operations that were to be carried out. It suggested that naval disarmament requirements could be met by including naval representation in the disarmament missions then being prepared by SHAEF. The memo also included an enclosure with a timetable establishing when various ports were to be occupied under the present plan as well as under an accelerated, modified plan. The timetable indicated that none of the German ports could be occupied sooner than seventeen days after the armistice was signed.24
In early February, the War Office asked SHAEF for estimates of manpower needs for the control and disarmament commission. The War Office said that the bulk of the requested technical personnel would come at the expense of the 21st Army Group and forces in the United Kingdom that were needed for reinforcement or maintenance, and asked that requirements be kept as small as possible until the war was over.25
Responsibilities of the Supreme Commander
Concurrent with the planning taking place in SHAEF during 1944, questions concerning the postsurrender responsibilities of the supreme commander continued to be raised. In May, General Eisenhower received his first directive on military government in Germany. Known as CCS 551, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, the directive vested in him supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers but contained nothing regarding disarmament or demilitarization.26 The receipt of CCS 551, and its guidance for military government in those areas of Germany captured by the Allies before the war was terminated made the lack of definitive guidance regarding Eisenhower’s responsibilities following Germany’s surrender even more urgent. Accordingly, and shortly before planning for Operation Talisman began, two additional documents, a staff study (titled Preparations for the Armistice and Post Hostilities Middle Period) and a memorandum (titled Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning), addressed the responsibilities of the supreme commander and his powers during the “middle” or “military period.”27
The key feature of the staff study was its recommendation that the German Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) should be used to impose the will of the Allies upon a defeated Germany. Acknowledging that the EAC was still working on the Instrument of Surrender and that directives to complement the surrender document were still required from CCS, the study went on to consider the kinds of problems the supreme commander would confront during the middle period before an Allied control authority was established. These issues included control of the OKW, which was expected to remain in existence to ensure the terms of surrender were met; the disposal of enemy war matériel and captured arms; the destruction of enemy fortifications; the disbandment of the German armed forces, including their discipline, provisions, and use as labor before being demobilized; and lastly, the disposal of the German secret police, the Gestapo, and the denazification of those police forces that would be retained to impose law and order.28
The memorandum, written by General Bull, reflected the contents of a memo written by Colonel Grazebrook one month earlier. General Bull bemoaned the still-confused
