that the first Quebec conference provided no guidance to COSSAC regarding posthostilities planning. It did, however, provide support for a continued planning effort.51 On 23 August 1943, the plan, which contained three scenarios that were envisioned as signaling the end of hostilities, was approved by COSSAC. The first scenario, named Rankin Case A, simply foresaw a rapid collapse or substantial weakening of German strength and morale, allowing Allied forces to land on the continent earlier than planned. The second scenario, Rankin Case B, saw a German pullback to its prewar borders, also allowing Allied forces an early entry on the continent. Rankin Case C, the third and final contingency, foresaw an unconditional surrender, thereby allowing an unopposed Allied entry into Germany with a force of approximately twenty-five divisions. It was the only case that had anything to do with the occupation of Germany and therefore became the primary plan.52
Rankin Case C did not, however, consider much beyond the immediate disarmament of the German armed forces. The plan only provided guidance for stationing troops in certain strategic areas, not all the locations that eventually came under SHAEF’s purview. It did not address what to do with German military forces once they were disarmed or how to treat German police or paramilitary forces. Furthermore, it failed to address how Allied forces would take up their positions with sufficient speed to disarm the German troops before they were able to retreat into Germany. In addition, it also failed to address the question of Germany’s military-industrial complex, due in part to the lack of comprehensive postwar planning at the most senior levels of government.53
Nonetheless, with support for continued planning from the Quebec Conference, General Morgan gave priority to Rankin Case C and a final draft was prepared in October 1943 and issued as a planning directive to both the British 21st and American 1st Army groups. A revision of the plan covered occupation areas deep in Germany and included Berlin. It also specified the involvement of US forces. There remained, however, no additional guidance regarding the disarming of German forces. Operation Rankin—whose target date was set for 1 January—never went into effect. Despite the great effort and time that went into its planning, Rankin continued to be based on what proved to be false assumptions. As late as July 1944, the senior officer of the British CCMS stated his opinion that “the German surrender probably would take place with our forces still well outside the German frontier” and that planning in the CCMS was being conducted on that basis.54 Rankin’s significance according to McCreedy, however, was that it began a “process of thinking and preparing for postconflict operations that would continue through the rest of the war.”55
This process of “thinking and preparing” was supported by General West, who underscored the importance of not waiting for policy to be laid down by the Allied powers. It was essential, he wrote in January 1944, “that [they] . . . prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems” (armistice terms, disarmament, and the disposal of captured war matériel among other issues).56 Thus, as D-Day approached, there was an explosion of planning activity and as early as April 1944, two postconflict staff studies were underway and the subjects listed by General West as needing urgent attention eventually became Operation Eclipse memoranda or administrative memoranda.57 Thinking shifted from anticipation of the sudden military collapse envisioned by Rankin to the realization that the war would only be brought to an end by military operations.
Following a directive to all chiefs in the G-3 division from General Bull, a weekly progress report covering the activities they had completed or taken under study during the previous week began to arrive. On 26 April, the posthostilities planners indicated that two papers—Primary Disarmament of German Forces and Preparation for the Armistice and Post-Hostilities (Military) Period—had been approved by the chief of staff. Another report, issued on 31 May, stated that Operation Rankin C, continental operations, had been redesignated Operation Talisman.58
By mid-June, Colonel Grazebrook’s posthostilities subsection appeared to be fully engaged on several drafts dealing with the control and disposal of German forces, and on 9 July, planning for Operation Talisman formally began.59 The objectives of Talisman were, inter alia, to disarm the Germans in the West to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and to occupy strategic areas on the continent to enforce the terms of surrender, which was to be accomplished in three stages. A supplement to the outline plan concluded that the supreme commander’s first three responsibilities would be (1) disarming the German forces, (2) disposing of surrendered war materials in the short term, and (3) controlling the German forces through subordinate headquarters but not through the OKW.60
The plan encompassed a very narrow view of occupation and thus rejected responsibility for control of the German munitions industries, the disposal of enemy war matériel, and the disbandment of German forces.61 The planning directive condensed the scope of the operation and made several technical changes to the three stages of the operation. Additional functions and tasks were also added, including the partial demobilization of the German armed forces for use as labor. The directive also defined Talisman as “plans and preparations for operations in Europe (excluding Norway and the Channel Islands) in the event of German surrender. Operations in Europe will include the liberated countries until their indigenous governments are firmly established and in complete and independent control, and will include Germany until it is taken over by the Tripartite Military Government.”62
The Talisman outline plan was distributed as a planning directive on 13 August 1944 and had a number of significant changes, including the assignment of responsibilities to the major commands. It also redefined surrender as a “formal surrender signed by properly constituted German authorities, or the capitulation of the major portion of the German forces opposing the Allied Expeditionary Force.”63 In this latter case, the supreme commander would designate a date, to be known as A-Day, signifying the beginning of Talisman. Thus, the plan allowed more flexibility in that it could be implemented not only upon Germany’s official surrender, but at the discretion of the supreme commander should a significant portion of Germany’s forces surrender. In addition, the definition of German forces was expanded to include both paramilitary forces and the police, and a distinction was made between primary and complete disarmament and control of German forces.64
On 16 August 1944, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, were directed to initiate plans and preparations in the event of a German surrender, which was not expected before 1 September 1944.65 The main objectives of this operation were to (1) completely disarm and control all German forces within SCAEF’s area of responsibility, (2) enforce the terms of surrender, and (3) establish law and order.
To this end, both army groups were expected to plan and execute the operation in their AOR and to collaborate closely with one another. Appendices to the outline plan provided the estimated number of troops available to both commands between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945 as well as the number of troops required. General Bradley was informed that his army group would have a large surplus of forces that might be required by the British 21st Army Group. One week later, both commanders were given drafts of the Directive for Military Government of Germany for their concurrence.
In early September, however, Lieutenant General Smith, SHAEF’s chief of staff, sent a letter to the chiefs of staff of the commander in chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces (ANCXF), the senior air officer of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), and key SHAEF staffs stating that as Allied forces would soon be entering Germany and thus facing Talisman conditions, it was essential that army groups and air forces receive early guidance. He therefore requested that the memoranda for which they were responsible be prepared for distribution as soon as possible, even if incomplete. Several days later, Colonel Grazebrook was authorized to issue several memoranda on a provisional basis.66
Operation Talisman planning increased the size of the force required to thirty-nine and two-thirds divisions. A revised Talisman outline plan, distributed in October 1944, delineated zones of occupation as decided on
