were taken to prevent that from happening. As long as qualified officers remained in Germany, they would remain a source of danger. This danger could be prevented by the complete destruction or removal from Germany of the best brains of the military caste.93
Grazebrook’s study mentioned that there were no organizations parallel to the General Staff Corps in either the German Navy or Air Force, nor were there equivalents to General Staff Corps officers among the German officer corps in general. The study specified that German generals should not be allowed to retain any of their power or be allowed to continue in office in any capacity. The study recommended that these officers be detained after their surrender and permanently exiled from Germany in order to render them “impotent.”94
Because of the nature of the problem, which went well beyond the supreme commander’s level and was a tripartite matter, SHAEF stated that all it could do was recommend to CCS that a long-term policy statement be prepared.95 A second draft of the study, apparently written on 12 November and designed to reach conclusions that would be incorporated in an attached cable to be sent to CCS, included policies suggested by both US and British authorities but also highlighted discrepancies between the two. The US Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander Regarding Military Government of Germany Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance that the JCS had given the CCS for consideration stated the following: “All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officer Corps.” A similar British directive submitted to the EAC made no specific mention of the German officer corps or General Staff: “You will be guided in the general disposal of forces under German Command by the following considerations: (1) All sections of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL and staffs which are not required for essential administrative control purposes will be detained under guard or disbanded as you may direct as early as practicable.”96
The five-page staff study, which incorporated many of Grazebrook’s earlier statements, underscored the importance of the problem by referring to the abundant historical examples of how the “German Armed Forces reduced by peace treaties to apparent impotence, reemerged in an astonishingly brief period as an effective and potentially dangerous organization.”97 Thus, the objective (the total defeat of Germany), the study continued, was to “prevent a recurrence of this disastrous cycle by effecting the complete and permanent demilitarization of Germany.”98
The study then divided the military caste into three categories: generals, the General Staff Corps, and the professional officer corps. After a brief section on the generals that maintained that generals who surrendered should not be allowed to retain any vestige of authority or continue in office in any capacity, the General Staff Corps received the greatest censure. Defined as the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” the General Staff Corps was cited as “the repository of expert knowledge resulting from exhaustive study and experience, and who sought to perpetuate the teaching of von Clausewitz.”99 The study warned that unless drastic steps were taken, the General Staff Corps would plan and develop a future Wehrmacht, going even so far as to state that “the only fully successful method [of preventing the rebuilding of the General Staff Corps] would be the extermination of the military caste,” and that if this was not acceptable, some form of permanent control over all members of the General Staff Corps was essential.100
The remainder of the study dealt with the need to detain these officers and when that detention should occur. It also advised that a number of German commanders and staff officers would be required to assist in the administration and disbandment of the German armed forces and that close supervision was needed. The study also cautioned that the detention of all potentially dangerous officers was needed to demonstrate Allied determination to stamp out German militarism.
A few days after the study was distributed, Chief Operations A Subsection Colonel C. R. Kutz forwarded his comments on this second staff study. He concluded that segregating or eliminating the German General Staff Corps would be, at best, a temporary expedient as long as German military writings remained. He also felt that their physical extermination would only make martyrs out of them and give General Staff Corps officers even greater prestige. Kutz recommended that a way be found to discredit them in the eyes of the German people and that after their discharge, they be kept under strict surveillance and required to report periodically to Allied authorities. He also recommended that SHAEF’s Psychological Warfare Division study the measures that could be used to discredit General Staff Corps officers.
A draft cable was attached to this second staff study requesting guidance from the CCS regarding the ultimate disposition of German General Staff Corps officers and general officers “now being arrested” as none of the existing guidance provided an answer to that question. The draft cable suggested that “drastic steps” be taken and actually included the recommended “physical extinction” of these officers. If that was unacceptable, the draft continued, permanent exile or life imprisonment was to be considered. A policy decision was requested as soon as possible in order to coordinate plans and put them into action. Although this solution was not accepted in the long run, the staff study, signed by Major General E. W. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff (G-2, Intelligence Division), recommended approval.101 Toward the end of December, however, General Morgan disapproved the several recommendations regarding this issue, stating that though it had not yet been approved, the JCS directive would provide sufficient guidance.102
While the final method for disposing of senior German commanders and staff officers had not been determined, guidance provided by SHAEF, which also included Eclipse Memorandum No. 7 and the Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany, specified that both active duty and retired General Staff Corps officers were to be arrested, not to punish them but to prevent them from making plans or preparations for future wars and to ensure that their ability to mount subversive activities against the Allies was reduced to a minimum. Additional guidance signed by the SHAEF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that they were to be segregated completely in special internment camps. Similarly, general officers not needed to administer and control German military personnel awaiting disbandment were to be deprived of all authority, not permitted to wear decorations or other symbols of military achievement, and be sent to regular concentration areas.103 They were not to be discharged without authorization from Supreme Headquarters.104 British officers in particular were convinced that General Staff officers were no good and would do everything possible to retain their power, re-create the General Staff Corps, go underground, plan new wars, and so on. As late as March 1945, the 21st Army Group wanted them to be registered and placed under counterintelligence supervision after their discharge.105
The Disarmament School
In early 1944, while the planning for Operation Rankin C was underway and in anticipation of the need to implement those plans, Colonel Grazebrook wrote a memo outlining the need for cadres trained for the disarmament mission as well as a draft syllabus for that training.106 Grazebrook’s suggestions were seen as a good idea by most, although the question of who would ultimately be responsible for the training and where it would be given was left unanswered at that time. Regarding the several suggestions regarding syllabus topics, Colonel Grazebrook was reminded that there were still a number of officers around who had been involved in disarmament matters in the last war and that he would be well-served by having them give “a few informal talks to the cadres.”107
A month later, on 9 May, the Civil Affairs section of the British War Office indicated that they were prepared to run a disarmament course and, if so directed by either SHAEF or CCMS, could do it with three weeks’ notice.108 After much discussion with headquarters, the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA), and the British (to find a suitable location), the disarmament school was established in London with a staff of twenty under the
