month.29
When this treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947, it became the first specifically European postwar security arrangement. Although designed specifically to prevent the reoccurrence of German aggression, it also became the first of several attempts to develop both an Anglo–Western European defense group and a North Atlantic security system.30
The collapse of the London foreign ministers meeting in December 1947 gave Bevin the necessary incentive to launch his plans for a western union. The London conference broke down over the question of reparations and the Allied refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands. It was the last attempt to obtain a major East-West agreement on Germany.31 On 17 December, Bevin spoke in turn to French foreign minister Georges Bidault, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in London. The gist of these conversations was that the time had come to create “some sort of federation” in Western Europe.32
The first step toward such an arrangement would involve Britain and France signing bilateral treaties—modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty—with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Bevin publicly outlined his plan in a speech to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, saying that Britain could no longer stand outside Europe nor could it “be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth column methods, from [its] aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe . . . who [were] ready and able to cooperate.”33
Bevin was also clearly attempting to get the United States to commit to the defense of Europe. Without an American security guarantee, the British were not sure they could make the Western Union work. Until the union was successful, however, the United States would not discuss participation.34
The Benelux countries also put pressure on the United Kingdom.35 They did not like the Dunkirk model because they believed it was directed solely against Germany and did not reflect current realities. This view was strongly advocated by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, who also urged that the collective arrangement be economic, cultural, and social as well as military.36 Paris, however, held to the Dunkirk model because of French sensitivity concerning Germany. Any pact directed against the Soviets that did not deal with the possibility of a rearmed Germany was unacceptable to France, a view Britain also shared.37 In fact, France had previously approached the United States and asked, in light of the fact that the treaty on German demilitarization was dead, whether the United States would be interested in entering a three-power treaty that contained similar stipulations.38
On 24 February 1948, a Soviet-backed coup d’état toppled the Beneš government in Czechoslovakia. This event sent a shiver of fear throughout Western European governments, magnified by the weakened state of the almost totally demobilized Allied forces. The coup prompted France to take a much broader view of European security and Britain now also accepted the need for a multilateral pact. Bevin was convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing to extend its grip over the rest of Europe; there were fears of a coup in Italy and the Soviets were pressuring Finland and Norway to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance.39 As a result, on 4 March, negotiations between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg began in earnest and on 17 March, in an atmosphere of pessimism and crisis, the Brussels Treaty was signed.40
The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was more than a response to the apparent Soviet threat. It contained a consultative council, a permanent commission, and a permanent military committee comprised of the five defense ministers, meeting as the Western Union Military Committee. It was envisioned by Bevin as a basis for the organization of all of Western Europe, and as a vehicle to convince the United States that Europe could stand on its own. The immediate US response was a speech by President Truman supporting the new European organization as well as a request to Congress to complete its action on the Marshall Plan. Unknown to the Europeans, however, studies were initiated within both the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to determine how best to support the Western Union, including whether to associate with it at all (see chapter 3, this book).41
The French government, however, remained unsatisfied with the US response to the Brussels Pact. In May, France’s ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, told Theodore Achilles of the State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs that Europe was disappointed that the United States had not acted faster in support of the Brussels Treaty. Achilles said that the United States had made it abundantly clear that the Brussels Treaty countries needed to first formulate and carry out their own plans for an integrated defense before asking the United States for help. Bonnet’s response was that United States needed to understand the “French psychological difficulties” and need for reassurance on security in general. Achilles replied that France needed to understand US psychology as well, and gave the following US response to the Europeans: “You made a start, but it’s still a small start. Put some military ‘bones’ on that Treaty, preferably some collective ones.”42
The existence of the BTO as a viable, independent entity was short-lived, however.43 Concerned by events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, which followed in June 1948, the five Brussels Treaty members joined the United States, Canada, and five other West European nations (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy) to sign the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, creating NATO. Two defense organizations—one spanning the Atlantic and the other containing the germ of a future integrated Europe—now existed in Western Europe where a year earlier there had been none.
Beginning in Truman’s second term as president, US foreign policy fell into the hands of a small group of individuals, later known collectively as the wise men.44 Two of them, Acheson and John J. McCloy, the US high commissioner for Germany, played extremely important roles. A third, lesser-known individual, Henry A. Byroade, a US Army colonel on loan to the Department of State as the director of the Office of German Affairs, was just as instrumental to developing the State Department’s German policy during this very volatile period. The fact that Byroade, as an army officer, could discuss key German issues informally with Pentagon staff officers during a period when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, a foe of Acheson’s, forbade Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) staffers to speak to the State Department without his express permission, proved to be of crucial importance.45
Published State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) papers shed little additional light on State Department thinking about German rearmament and those that do appear to duplicate thoughts in JCS documents.46 For example, in March 1948, the PPS recommended that the Western Union should be encouraged to “include eventually . . . Germany . . . and to deepen its cooperation in all aspects foreseen in its charter . . . as well as military.” Both George F. Kennan, then head of the PPS, and Hickerson opposed the focus on Germany, conceding, however, that it must eventually “have its place” in that union. Both felt that the union should become more than just a defensive entity, at which point there would be no question of US support.47
In June of that year, another PPS paper concluded that the United States should undertake the Washington Conversations (prelude to the NATO treaty) as requested by Bevin and Bidault (then foreign minister). It was also noted that the Department of State should explore with the Western Union the problem of increasing the security of several European countries through integration or some form of association with the BTO, to include a recommendation that “when circumstances permitted,” the adherence of Germany (or the western zones) be explored. France’s minister in Washington, Armand Bérard, had cautioned earlier in February, however, that his government believed that any German participation in European security measures meant the reestablishment of a German army, which his government would not favor unless the British were full participants.48
During this same period, Bevin had conveyed his thoughts to the State Department on an Atlantic defense system and the future
