members of the German National Militia (Volksturm). Part II of this memorandum dealt specifically with the discharge of members of the Waffen SS and paramilitary organizations.
Shortly after this memorandum was issued, General Barker, now assistant chief of staff (G-1, Personnel Division) for SHAEF, wrote General Morgan, SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff, that the memo lacked both a “clear definition of the object to be obtained” and “practical guidance to the recipients.” With regard to the first omission, General Barker wrote that he would have a paper prepared that would provide a foreword or opening statement to explain the purpose of the disbandment procedure. Regarding the second issue, Barker felt that disbandment had been more than adequately covered in the occupation handbook and that the Eclipse memo was merely an extension of the handbook.82
Barker’s memo also stated that he did not believe SHAEF would be confronted with a shortage of guards as there were, on the US side alone, sixty divisions in the field.83 He also felt that the surrendered German forces would not have to be heavily guarded, believing that “from the German point of view, the advantages of obeying orders . . . under this plan, exceeded the disadvantages.”84
That said, Barker did think that the memo offered a “systematic and efficient procedure” for implementing the disbandment under any of the various conditions that might arise. Furthermore, he added, the statistical and documentation procedures had been thoroughly considered by commanders and appeared to meet the needs of the zone commanders and SHAEF. The only difficulty with the documentation issue, he concluded, was the vastness of its scope.
Despite promulgation of the Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation Eclipse in November of 1944, Memorandum No. 10 (air force disarmament) had not been completed or issued as of 31 January 1945. On 1 February, Lieutenant General Morgan directed that all memoranda that had not yet been issued be completed and that those issued be revised or amended by 10 February.85 These memoranda were subsequently completed and approved on 10 March 1945 and disseminated to the appropriate commands for action.86 The first four months of 1945 saw accelerated progress in the development and issuance of additional Eclipse memos and directives, including memorandum nos. 10, 11, and 17, and the Interim Directive for Occupation of Germany.87
Demobilizing and Disbanding the German Armed Forces
More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, SHAEF’s G-3 (Operations Division) gave a great deal of thought to the manner in which members of the German armed forces were to be demobilized. Many issues, such as what to do with non-German members of the German armed forces, where to send Germans for demobilization (particularly those who had been recruited in what was to become the Soviet zone of occupation), what demobilization papers would be needed and what form would they take, and other more mundane details, such as what pensions or gratuities would be provided and what articles of clothing and personal equipment would they be allowed to retain, all required decisions.88
For example, on 15 July 1944, a draft directive titled Disposition of German Armed Forces Subsequent to Surrender that covered all these issues and more was submitted by the planning committee of the US advisor to the EAC for consideration and for forwarding to the Department of State and the secretariat of the JCS. Among other things, the draft ordered the three Allied commanders in chief to implement the surrender terms and made them responsible for the demobilization and disbandment of German forces in their respective zones and theaters of operation, and it directed the dissolution of the OKW and the service commands at the earliest possible date, but authorized temporary retention of portions of those organizations in order to effect the controlled administration of the German armed forces during the demobilization and disbandment.
It further authorized the commanders in chief to keep and use disarmed German forces or POWs as required to accomplish tasks deemed necessary, such as the destruction of fortifications, rehabilitation projects, and safeguarding surrendered German armaments and equipment. In addition (and in line with the ultimate objective of totally demilitarizing Germany), the commanders in chief were directed to impress upon the German people the complete defeat of the German armed forces. Accordingly, demobilized German personnel would be allowed to return home with only their approved personal effects and enough money and supplies to make the journey. Under no circumstances were returnees to be allowed to return home in military formation or with bands playing or flags flying as had been the case following the armistice that ended World War I.
Other paragraphs of the draft directive dealt with the return of German units outside Germany’s 31 December 1937 borders and non-German personnel in the German armed forces. Lastly, commanders in chief were cautioned to refer to as yet unwritten guidance for instructions on the treatment of war criminals before disposing of German personnel or POWs.
This draft, circulated as US Directive No. 15 and EAC(45)1, underwent several amendments and changes but was never approved, so SHAEF was never provided with official guidance on this issue. On 6 December 1945, more than a year later, and months after the war had ended and long after most disarmed German forces and POWs had been demobilized, the ACC issued Control Council Directive 18, “For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces,” which contained the same basic guidance as the US draft.89
In mid-1944, a key assumption of another draft study outlining the planning process for the disbandment of the German armed forces was that the bulk of these forces in the West would be outside Germany’s 1937 borders. Other assumptions were that some surrendered German forces would be used for labor in the liberated areas and that some arrangement would have to be made with the USSR to transfer surrendered personnel to and from the Soviet zone. What was decided at that time, however, was that disbandment during the middle period would be solely based upon the need for labor with priority given to medical personnel, agricultural workers, and workers in certain essential industries. The draft also included details as to what articles of clothing would be issued to disbanded German armed forces members based on their rank (whether their clothing had been issued or paid for by the individual) and the availability of their own clothing. Pay, initially set at 60 Reichmarks for officers and 30 Reichmarks for other ranks, was later modified to 80 and 40 Reichmarks respectively. Food allowances were also specified in this study.90
On 28 November 1944, the SHAEF posthostilities planning staff produced yet another study, which essentially recommended that with the exception of certain categories of personnel, all surrendered German armed forces personnel should be discharged and sent home as soon as possible. It portrayed the elaborate and bureaucratic procedures that were being developed and the need for labor as the primary criterion delaying discharge for as long as eight months. It stated further that the large numbers of POWs, estimated at two and a half million, would exceed the Allies’ ability to control.91
Along with discussions of the disbandment of the German armed forces and demilitarization of Germany in general that will be discussed below, the issue of what to do with German general officers, especially the German General Staff Corps, collectively known as the “military caste,” was a major issue. On 24 September 1944, Colonel Grazebrook disseminated a staff study for comment on “The Disposal of the German Military Caste.” The staff study indicated that one of the primary objects of defeating Germany was to effect Germany’s “complete demilitarization and eradicate her traditional militarism.” It continued that although plans had been made to disarm and disband the military and destroy its warmaking potential, these plans were superficial: Germany’s militaristic spirit and military caste of highly trained, professional officers remained, and they held not only the ability to rebuild the Wehrmacht but “the burning desire” to do so.92
The study continued, explaining that although the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the reestablishment of the great German General Staff, it had nonetheless been resurrected in other forms. Grazebrook expressed his fear that while the surreptitious methods used in the 1920s would most likely not succeed in the 1940s,
