Allied representatives.
Eclipse Memorandum No. 9, “Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces,” Eclipse Memorandum No. 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces,” and Eclipse Memorandum No. 11, “Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces,” dealt specifically with the three individual services and were, for the most part, quite similar. Memorandum No. 9 was, however, the most comprehensive of the three. It began by defining war matériel as “materiel intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air,” which included:
a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implement of war of all kinds.
b. All naval vessels of all classes, surface and submarines, auxiliary naval craft, all merchant shipping whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building.
c. All aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices.
d. All military installations and establishments including air fields, seaplane bases, ports and naval depots, storage bases, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.76
It continued by outlining the objectives of primary disarmament, which were to prevent a continuance or renewal of hostilities, to safeguard the deployment of the Allied Expeditionary Force during Operation Eclipse, and thereafter to facilitate the establishment of law and order in the supreme commander’s AOR.
Although this memorandum addressed the primary disarmament of German land forces, it also delineated the responsibilities of the Allied ground forces in the disarmament process by defining what made up the German land forces. Thus, the Hermann Göring Parachute Panzer Corps and German Air Force field divisions, parachute formations, and other similar Luftwaffe units attached to the German Army became an Allied ground force responsibility. Similarly, the disarmament of German naval forces ashore, Luftwaffe and naval flak organizations, and the Nazi party Flieger Korps were also determined to be Allied ground force responsibilities.
Of particular interest is the guidance given that where it was not possible to provide Allied forces to guard and control dumps containing enemy war matériel, control would be maintained by German forces under the close supervision of the Allied commander in whose AOR the enemy war matériel was located. In fact, the memorandum specified that “the fullest possible use will be made of the existing German military machine, and orders will be issued through the recognized German channels of command wherever they survive the process of occupation.”77
In line with Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, the maintenance, classification, and inventory of enemy war matériel were made German responsibilities under strict Allied supervision. Lists of enemy war matériel that had to be surrendered and lists of matériel that would be retained so that German forces could carry out orders given to them, including limited numbers and types of weapons (e.g., rifles and pistols), were provided in two appendices.
Similarly, Eclipse Memorandum No. 10 set out plans and policies for the primary disarmament of the Luftwaffe. For this task, the memorandum specifically named the commanders of the Ninth Air Force (US) and the Second Tactical Air Force (UK). This memorandum also defined what formations, units, and personnel were included in the Luftwaffe and followed Memorandum No. 9 in allocating primary disarmament responsibility for some Luftwaffe units to Allied ground forces.
This memorandum further delegated the exercise of the air commanders’ responsibilities to the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) air disarmament staffs and, given that the tactical situation on the ground did not reflect the final zones of occupation, guidance was provided regarding the coordination and operational control of the national disarmament staffs while operating in another national Allied commander’s AOR (e.g., RAF units operating in Ninth Air Force areas, etc.). The memorandum also referenced Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, Administrative Memorandum No. 5, and the occupation handbook regarding the disposition of captured enemy war matériel and “common use” items.78
Similar to Eclipse Memorandum No. 9, the air forces’ plan recognized the possibility that sufficient Allied forces personnel might not be available to guard every Luftwaffe establishment to effect direct control over war matériel. Thus, German Air Force commanders were to be held responsible to ensure Allied orders regarding such materiel and its inventory were followed.
The memorandum expected that USAAF and RAF air disarmament staffs would be in position behind advancing Allied forces and thus ensure that Luftwaffe units located within the area of advance were properly disarmed. It also specified that a “Reconnaissance Party” provided by both the US and British control councils would be sent to the Air Ministry and that other elements would go to various Luftwaffe headquarters to compel compliance with the terms of surrender, if required. Specific tasks of these units were set out in an appendix to the memorandum and two other attachments contained organizational diagrams of the respective US and RAF disarmament organizations.
The third memorandum of this group, Eclipse Memorandum No. 11 covering naval disarmament, was the briefest, at only two pages.79 It accepted the responsibility for disarming all German warships and merchant vessels, delegating the actual exercise of that responsibility to US, British, and Allied naval officers-in-charge in the areas under their control in accordance with instructions laid out in the SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook. In addition, it followed the line of responsibility for disarming naval forces ashore found in Eclipse Memorandum No. 9.
Section III of Eclipse Memorandum No. 9 addressed naval demolition and stated that the demolition of naval defenses in Germany, which included submarine pens, fortifications, and underground storages, to name a few, would most likely not take place during the supreme commander’s period of responsibility. Such demolitions, it indicated, would be carried out as part of a long-term policy by the ACC.
The last key disarmament memorandum, Eclipse Memorandum No. 17, “Disbandment of German Armed Forces,” was put into operation on 9 May 1945, the day after Germany surrendered.80 This memorandum laid down the policies by which army group commanders were to carry out the disbandment of the German armed forces. Like many of the other memos, this memo began by stipulating that it was impossible to forecast conditions in Germany when the war ended. It therefore posited several assumptions upon which the plan was based, the essence of which was that Allied forces would have penetrated deep into Germany by the time hostilities ended and that those German forces not already in POW camps would have been moved into containment areas under the control of their own officers working under close Allied supervision.
Additional assumptions were that those Germans eligible for discharge would be released with as little delay as possible to avoid large-scale desertions. Furthermore, it was believed that it would take as many as six months before the occupation armies were fully deployed in their respective zones.
While various memoranda and documents dealing with the anticipated surrender maintained that the German military machine was needed to effect the terms of surrender and control the surrendered German forces, the plans of Eclipse Memorandum No. 17 were designed not to utilize German machinery in the discharge process if it could be avoided.81 The discharge of captured and surrendered German forces would begin when directed by the supreme commander but would first be subject to the manpower needs of the Allied forces to assist in the occupation and to the manpower needs of the governments of Allied or liberated territories for purposes of reconstruction.
The remainder of the memorandum outlined very specific principles and responsibilities regarding the discharge process, including a very detailed set of statistical procedures by which members of the German armed forces were to be documented and prioritized for discharge. These procedures included the transfer of personnel who had been recruited in a different zone of occupation,
