Frank Kowalski Jr.109
Grazebrook’s memo, now SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, “Training of Disarmament Missions,” proceeded on the assumption that trained disarmament cadres would be authorized before the cessation of hostilities.110 It suggested a four-stage course of training that would include an introductory course in which students would obtain background information, a period of study covering both general and specific problems they would face, a discussion period in which to exchange ideas and formulate policies, and lastly a period in which the newly trained cadres would, in turn, train the remaining personnel of the disarmament missions and detachments. The memo further recommended that SHAEF (G-3) be responsible for the training and that it commence as soon as possible. An appendix to the memo contained a syllabus of introductory courses that contained eleven topics ranging from the background of the terms of surrender to the plan for the occupation and control of Germany, the German evasion of disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the various military, police, paramilitary, and armaments organizations, plans for the control and disposal of German forces and surrendered war matériel, and the imposition of sanctions and reprisals.111
On 24 August, Grazebrook learned that General Wickersham had received a reply to a letter Grazebrook had sent him in mid-July to forward to ETOUSA regarding the provision and training of disarmament staffs required for the US zone. The reply stated that ETOUSA had assumed responsibility for training these staffs and prepared a directive ordering the theater commanders to provide the necessary personnel and proceed with training. A detailed list of the numbers, ranks, and qualifications needed by US officers for the various disarmament staffs was also attached.112 This directive to theater commanders was sent on 27 September 1944 and expanded on 29 October 1944.
Thus, in early October 1944, the commanding general of the communications zone (ComZ) was directed to earmark US personnel for cadres for disarmament and control staffs and to conduct a training course for them.113 The first course started on 30 October and lasted for three weeks. According to School Memorandum No. 3, the three-week course, comprising approximately 130 hours of instruction, was divided into five phases covering six subject areas: organization for disarmament and control in Germany, policy and plans, German political organization, organization of the German armed forces, German industrial organization, and German supply and communication.114 The planned student capacity was 160 but more could be accommodated if sent by the army groups. Upon successful completion of the course, those officers attending were to be earmarked for duty with disarmament and control staffs upon cessation of hostilities. A second function of the school was to provide reference manuals to assist disarmament and control staffs in accomplishing their mission.
The first phase, “General Background Subjects,” took approximately one-third of the total class time, half of which was presented during the first week and the remainder divided equally between the second and third weeks of the course. The second phase, approximately twenty hours in duration, provided technical training for the students in accordance with their branch or duty assignment and special instruction for the executives and logistics officers. This training also took place during the last two weeks of instruction and included staff studies that each student had to solve on an individual basis.
Phase three consisted of lectures by British and American officers that were given throughout the course. Speakers were obtained from the armed forces division of the US Group Control Commission (US Group CC), US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, US Naval Forces in Europe, and the British CCMS. During the first course given there were a total of twenty-six lectures while the second running of the course contained sixty-five lectures.115
Phase four consisted of end-of-the-day “controlled” discussions in lieu of question-and-answer periods after each lecture or presentation. These discussions were led by a member of the school staff and the instructors of the previous day, and went over material presented the previous day. They were also used to underscore points made by the guest speakers.
Phase five took approximately one-fourth of the instruction time and was devoted to the development of staff studies by groups of students according to their duty assignments. It was believed that in this manner, the students would become familiar with sources of information and establish contacts with other groups with whom they would eventually need to establish working relationships.
In mid-September, staff-level discussions indicated that a second running of the disarmament course was needed. The discussions initially concerned training operations and logistics officers but they eventually expanded to include a limited number of key officers involved in the disarmament and demobilization process, some of whom would be retained and assigned to the US Group CC.116 On 29 October, a letter was sent to the commander of ETOUSA by SHAEF’s adjutant general, Brigadier General T. J. Davis, informing him of this necessity and requesting that action be taken to conduct a second course of instruction.
This second, and last, running of the course, which began on 26 November 1944, also ran for three weeks and saw a major expansion of the syllabus and a realignment of the subject matter into five key topics: organization for disarmament and demobilization in Germany, general policy and plans, disarmament and demobilization, Germany under the Nazis, and German armed forces. Air force and navy requirements were handled by their respective services and resulted in the attendance of fifteen naval and twenty air force officers.
In late December, Colonel William Whipple, chief of the SHAEF Logistics Plans Branch, wrote to SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff (G-4) to inform him that the second running of the disarmament school would end on 30 December and that present plans called for it to be disbanded. Whipple continued that a study undertaken by Colonel Karl F. Hausauer, chief of the Logistics Plans Branch, Post-Hostilities Section, and the 12th Army Group’s operations and logistics staffs saw a need for a third course. The 12th Army Group wanted to permanently augment their staffs with officers trained in disarming enemy armed forces and disposing of enemy war matériel, possibly train French officers of the 6th Army Group, and provide an orientation course for the 15th Army Group officers responsible for Eclipse planning and planning for the occupation of the Rhineland.117
However, Brigadier General R. G. Moses, assistant chief of staff (G-4) for the 12th Army Group, wrote SHAEF that he could not at that time justify diverting additional officers for training. He recommended that the present school be discontinued, with the possibility of investigating the establishment a school on the continent when the tactical situation eased (US forces were heavily engaged in the Battle of the Bulge at that time).118
Aftermath
Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945 (VE Day) and less than a month later, on 5 June, the ACC assumed responsibility for Germany, relieving Eisenhower of his disarmament responsibilities. At 0001 hours, 14 July 1945, SHAEF was dissolved and its US elements became part of US Forces European Theater (USFET) under Eisenhower, who became commander in chief of the US Forces of Occupation in Germany and the US representative on the ACC for Germany.119
The plans laid out by SHAEF and contained in the Eclipse memoranda to disarm, disband, and demobilize German forces were put into operation following VE Day. By late June, just over six million German troops had surrendered and between 15 May and 6 July, six disbandment directives were issued, giving the army groups authority to discharge both POWs and “disarmed German troops”120 in groups according to age, sex, nationality, occupation, area of residence, and so on—except for those considered war criminals, security suspects, or certain members and ranks of the SS.121
Much remained to be done, especially regarding the disposal of enemy war matériel and the destruction and demilitarization of German fortifications and war industries. For the most part, however, these issues were recognized early on as long-term problems to be handled by the ACC. In February 1945, for example, Brigadier W. E. van Cutsem addressed a meeting of the Standing Committee on War Materiel and suggested that it needed to differentiate
