expectation. This was further emphasized on the eve of the signing of the NATO treaty during a meeting between Truman, the secretaries of state and defense, and the foreign ministers of the NATO nations.
The purpose of this meeting was to outline a policy toward both Germany and the USSR that would focus on orienting Germany to the West by encouraging economic revival, accelerating the development of democratic institutions, and combating Soviet subversion. The United States had come to believe that the earlier proposals for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, such as those first enunciated by former Secretary of State Byrnes and then by his successor, Marshall, no longer corresponded to the current situation. Other means to provide security against a revival of German aggression had to be found. Therefore, this policy did not plan for the continued enforcement of security controls (e.g., prohibition of key industries or armed forces). The overall goal was to make Germany a full-fledged partner in an increasingly unified Western Europe and combine “any future German armed forces into a unified Western defense.”63
Two momentous events took place in 1949 that changed the face of European security. The first took place on 4 April when the United States ended 162 years of steering clear “of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world”64 by signing the North Atlantic Treaty along with eleven West European nations and Canada, committing itself to participating in the security of Western Europe.65 The second event took place on 23 May when the three merged zones of occupied West Germany became the FRG, albeit with limited sovereignty. Although military government ended and the military governors were replaced with civilian high commissioners, the occupation status remained and certain powers were reserved by the Allies. Chief among them was to guarantee security against a revival of German military power and to ensure that all agreed disarmament and demilitarization measures remained in force. To this end, the Military Security Board was created.66
These events, particularly the US entry into NATO, caused the State Department to again reiterate its position on Germany and to dissemble somewhat regarding the stationing of US troops in Europe. During Senate hearings on the NATO Treaty, Secretary of State Acheson was asked by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) whether Article 3 of the NATO Treaty meant that the United States would be expected to send “substantial numbers of troops” to Europe as a “more or less permanent contribution.” Acheson replied by saying that the answer was “a clear and absolute ‘No.’” While Acheson had not intended to deceive—he subsequently recognized his answer was “deplorably wrong”—it was clear that the United States had committed itself to a permanent presence in Europe, and although the troop numbers at the time were relatively small, they were to increase rapidly over the next several years.67
According to a joint Department of State and Department of Army memorandum to the president on German policy, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom were involved in a process of enabling West Germany to participate in the West European economic program and become self-supporting. Germany’s economic and industrial potential, however, led the United States to recognize that were Germany to be taken over by a hostile power for purposes of aggression, it would pose a danger to the security of the United States and Germany’s neighbors.
The memorandum concluded that the economic and industrial recovery of West Germany and its neighbors, which included a “satisfactory military posture” in those nations, would diminish the possibility of aggression throughout all of Europe, including Germany. Nonetheless, security considerations had to be taken into account and for that reason, the United States recommitted its occupation forces until the peace of Europe was established.68
In this same memorandum, the United States further recognized that as Germany became firmly embedded in a free European structure, a German military contribution to the security of that structure would be possible, but only if the other free nations of Europe deemed it necessary. That said, in talking points prepared for Acheson, dated 17 May 1949, just six days before West Germany became the FRG, Acheson was advised to reply to questions regarding German entry into NATO with the following: “No consideration has been given to the inclusion of Western Germany for a number of reasons. These include the fact that Western Germany is under the military occupation of several North Atlantic countries, that it has no government, that all Germany will presumably one day be reunited, and that the German people have yet to prove their attachment to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.”69
One month later, on 21 June, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee was told that although US policy was fully committed to the complete and absolute disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, “Germany [was and could] to an increasing extent contribute to the general economic strength of the Western European Countries, which is the essential foundation of military strength.”70 This answer allowed Germany to export matériel that could be used by other countries for the production of armaments.
The birth of NATO and the Federal Republic inevitably led to discussions about the role West Germany would play in the defense of Western Europe. For example, in July, the US Embassy in The Hague reported on the contents of a memo presented to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers at Luxembourg by Netherlands foreign minister Dirk Stikker. Stikker’s memo essentially stated that West Germany should be integrated as closely as possible but warned that such integration carried a risk. If allowed to remain independent, the FRG could turn to the East and upset the existing balance; therefore Stikker concluded that the occupation needed to continue until Western Europe was stronger than at present, both politically and militarily, that the FRG was not to have an armed force, and that it would not be allowed to manufacture war matériel. Many council members believed that West Germany should be at least an associate member (because of its lack of full sovereignty) but in the end, no action was taken.71
On 10 October, an office memorandum was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins in which the author, Wayne G. Jackson, a State Department officer, wrote that he had learned from an unnamed individual who would be speaking with the president on 11 October that US military authorities in Germany were in favor of the “prompt rearmament of Germany,” and that twenty-five divisions was the goal. This individual understood further that the Department of Defense, specifically Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, was in favor of arming the Germans.72
Perkins subsequently wrote Acheson a memorandum the following day stating that these rumors of German rearmament were “much exaggerated and substantially without foundation.” Perkins went on to write that it was “true that Pentagon thinking [envisaged] use of German manpower in the defense of Western Europe at some time in the future.” It was not true, however, that the prompt rearmament of Germany, the raising of twenty-five divisions, or the inclusion of Germany in either the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or NATO was being considered or favored. Perkins concluded, “We have no reason whatever to believe, and compelling reasons not to believe, that the military are acting in anyway in this field without our knowledge.”73 Nonetheless, high-ranking military officers were, in fact, making statements that led many to believe that the United States favored German rearmament of some type.74
Many newspaper articles and editorials, both in the United States and Europe, dealt with this issue throughout the remainder of the year. The gist of these articles was simply that even with NATO, there was a significant force imbalance between the military forces of the Allies and those of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with French troops fighting in Indochina and the belief that US occupation forces would be unable to hold off a Soviet attack until additional forces from the West were able to join the battle, the rearming of West Germany seemed inevitable.75 Adenauer also expressed growing concern about the creation of paramilitary police forces in the Soviet zone, the so-called kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei (the “barracked” riot or readiness police).76
Despite denials by Perkins, Schuman, and Acheson of any interest in rearming Germany, a cable from Paris reveals that French deputies continued to speculate about German
