. . . If one does not make the human knowledge wholly dependent upon the original self-knowledge and consequent revelation of God to man, then man will have to seek knowledge within himself as the final reference point. Then he will have to seek an exhaustive understanding of reality. Then he will have to hold that if he cannot attain to such an exhaustive understanding of reality, he has no true knowledge at all. Either man must then know everything or he knows nothing. This is the dilemma that confronts every form of non-Christian epistemology.95
Sparks makes a glaring omission here. It is God alone who has comprehensive knowledge of creation—rooted in his exhaustive self-knowledge.96 This same God reveals truth to man in part, alleviating any instability in terms of man’s finite capacities. As for his contention that Van Til’s presuppositionalism leads to affirming that only Christians are able to provide the right interpretation, there seems to be an oversimplified straw man present. Van Til explicitly recognizes that “followers of the self-authenticating Christ always disclaim infallible interpretation.”97 Rather, only the self-authenticating Christ has the infallible interpretation as God. As for his comments citing a disregard in Van Til for what he calls general hermeneutics (i.e., interpretive practice, Christian or not),98 he displays a very superficial understanding of Van Til’s nuanced view of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God, general revelation, and common grace.99 Space will not permit an extensive treatment here but, in short, unbelievers cannot help knowing truth about God, being in the image of God and living in God’s world, and can arrive at truth, even if ultimately inconsistent with their own unbelieving commitments.
Not unlike Carson, Sparks ends up mirroring Van Til’s emphases later in his discussion. There are two particular examples in which this is seen. First, he argues that the fall narrative underscores the Creator-creature distinction. The Creator alone knows all and the creature does not. The serpent essentially tempted Adam and Eve to subvert this distinction, which has important implications for epistemology and hermeneutics.100 Indeed, the fall narrative functions significantly in Van Til’s works, as he sees this as the origin of all unbelieving epistemology, especially in light of the Creator-creature distinction.101 However, as Sparks nuances certain implications of the fall for epistemology, he also diverges from Van Til at certain key points.102 However, he at least sees the need to consider these issues in relation to epistemology and hence, interpretation. Second, he emphasizes that man, being in the image of God, has the ability to succeed as an interpreter. This seems to mirror Van Til’s notion of analogy, though again, not without its divergences.103 However, Sparks’ rightful concern for man’s ability to have interpretive success is plagued by confusing finitude with sin and rooting epistemology in the reliability and probability of man to get things right, even if imperfectly so. While Sparks exhibits obvious misconceptions regarding Van Til’s epistemology, he does show concern for issues he sees as having an important relation to hermeneutics, which mirror Van Til’s own.
Our brief survey of Thiselton, Carson, and Sparks’ interactions with Van Til has ironically highlighted his relevance for contemporary hermeneutics rather than providing reasons for his dismissal. Rather than succeeding in downplaying his relevance, each has actually opened the door for a further investigation into it.
There are others, however, who have seen the positive relevance of Van Til for hermeneutics and have explicitly mentioned him in their work. Rather than proceeding in a chronological fashion, we will begin with those who give indirect, passing attention and then progress to those who give more direct attention.
D. Clair Davis, in an essay on inerrancy and Westminster Calvinism, argues that Van Til brought a helpful shift in apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary, from focusing merely on detailed refutation of liberalism to a focus on the integrity of a Christian methodology. This is due to Van Til’s self-conscious aligning of method with theology—specifically, God as Creator.104 While no theological model can exhaust the revelation of the triune God, our model and method should seek to approximate God’s system set forth in Scripture. He specifically cites John Frame, Vern Poythress, Edmund Clowney, and Richard Gaffin as deriving from Van Til’s theological emphases and methodology, and expanding their application beyond his own scope, including hermeneutics. For example, Gaffin delves into Berkouwer’s criticism of Van Til’s lack of exegesis by providing explicit exegetical support for the latter’s emphases in epistemology, which have significant implications for interpretation.105 This coincides with the fact that while Princeton and Westminster’s focus was on the doctrine of Scripture, the current focus has become biblical hermeneutics. He suggests that Van Til would have welcomed this shift and applied his distinctive approach accordingly.106
Vanhoozer, a key contributor to the current hermeneutical discussion, mentions Van Til briefly in an essay on the interplay between theology and hermeneutics in interpreting not only the Bible, but culture.107 He apparently commends Van Til for stressing that “created reality does not exist as brute, uninterpreted fact . . . it is already meaningful because it is interpreted by God.”108 Hence, the task of the human interpreter is to “think God’s thoughts after him.”109 After such an endorsement, it is surprising that he makes no further mention of Van Til. This is even more peculiar as he proceeds to discuss such topics as presuppositions and conflicting worldviews, even concluding his discussion with the observation that “culture is the fruit of a theology or worldview.”110 Whatever the reasons for not giving Van Til a more prominent place in the dialogue,111 Vanhoozer does employ a few important ideas in Van Til’s thought in service of the interplay between theology and hermeneutics.112
Richard Pratt mentions Van Til when discussing the personal dimension of interpretation. Elsewhere, he more explicitly endorses Van Til’s approach to apologetics,113 but here, in this context, he is very brief.114 However, what he speaks of is significant. Earlier he had argued that sanctification and interpretation are interdependent.115 In the midst of that discussion, Pratt says that we must “‘think God’s thoughts after Him’ if we are to interpret properly.”116 In other words, sanctification involves not only our behavior and emotions, but our thinking as well.117 His direct mention of Van Til expands on this earlier reference in the form of a quotation summarizing the point that our whole being (mind, emotions, and will) must be in submission to God in a manner of consistency found in God himself.118 Man’s interpretation of Scripture involves applying it to our whole existence. This holistic thrust is in keeping with contemporary hermeneutical concern for both the horizon of the text and of the interpreter as it relates to
