target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_8e82656f-56d1-53c3-84e4-8024acb6fad8">44. Berdyaev, “Being and Existence,” 374–375.
45. Watts, Myth and Ritual, 35–36; Carabine, Eriugena, 35.
46. See the author’s book From Logos to Bios. Evolutionary Theory in Light of Plato, Aristotle & Neoplatonism (2018) for an extensive treatment hereof.
47. Quoted in Lossky, Mystical Theology, 92.
48. Heidegger, Introduction, 1–4.
49. LSJ, 772; Coomaraswamy, Civilization, 83.
50. Heidegger, Introduction, 15–16.
51. Heidegger, Introduction, 14.
52. Dillon and Gerson, Neoplatonic Philosophy, 169.
53. Heidegger, Introduction, 75–76.
54. Goosen, Nihilisme, 94, 103.
Metaphysical and Physical
The most basic division within cosmic reality is that between the higher, metaphysical world and the lower, physical world. We contend that this is a more accurate view of reality than the more commonly found differentiation between spiritual and material, since this physical world in which we live is already a combination of the levels of soul and matter. It is therefore, strictly speaking, wrong to say that we live in a material world, because the matter that we can perceive through our senses is formed matter, i.e., matter formed by soul. In contrast, unformed matter can be mentally conceived but not perceived, since it requires the addition of form to become accessible to sense perception.
Plato outlines the metaphysical view of reality as follows: “As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which always becomes but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but never really is” (Tim, 27d–28a). Later in the same work, Plato adds that the first kind neither receives into itself anything else nor enters into anything else. It is invisible and cannot be perceived by any of the senses. In contrast, the second kind is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and then perishing out of it (Tim, 52a). In the Platonic tradition these realms are usually denoted as the intelligible world (to noēton) and the sensible world (to horaton), respectively. The adjectives ‘intelligible’ and ‘sensible’ indicate the respective means by which these worlds may be known, namely rational thought and sense perception.
The metaphysical and physical worlds are also known as the realms of being and becoming, which are respectively related to eternity and time. Whereas being is eternal, unchanging, and perfect, becoming is temporal, ever-changing, and imperfect. Since the primary elements of earth, air, water, and fire change into each other (e.g., in the process of condensation) and thus possess no stability, Plato concludes that everything which has becoming is unstable. It is therefore better to say ‘what is such’ than ‘this’ or ‘that’ to describe physical objects (Tim, 49c–50a). Incidentally, this recognition of the fluidity and impermanence of everything in the sensible world rebuts the oft-repeated charge that Platonism entails a static world-view.
Martin Heidegger has remarked that the opposition between being and becoming stands at the inception of the ontological question. He adds: “What becomes, is not yet. What is, no longer needs to become. That which ‘is’ has left all becoming behind it, if indeed it ever became or could become. What ‘is’ in the authentic sense also stands up against every onslaught from becoming.” The German philosopher concludes that Heraclitus, to whom the doctrine of becoming is ascribed, is therefore saying the same thing as Parmenides, who introduced the doctrine of being in his famous didactic poem.55
One of the the greatest Christian thinkers of all time, Meister Eckhart, relates the distinction between being and becoming to their origins. He writes: “The first point to be made is that becoming is from secondary causes, but the existence of everything, either natural or artificial, in that it is what is first and perfect, is immediately from God alone.”56 Here the German theologian appears to suggest two distinct realms: an eternal world (‘first and perfect’), derived directly from God; and a temporal cosmos, produced by secondary causes. However, if one keeps in mind Eckhart’s view that all things exist only through participation in God, then even temporal things (i.e., the realm of becoming) exist insofar as they are supra-temporal. As Wolfgang Smith comments, the difference between the temporal and the eternal orders thus lies not in a kind of being, but rather in a lack of being. We could say that temporal things had not yet fully attained their being, but are “striving to be,” as is indeed suggested by the term ‘becoming.’ Moreover, nothing can ‘become’ unless in some way it ‘is.’ It could therefore be said in conclusion that temporal things both ‘are’ and ‘are not,’ since they consist of both being and non-being.57
The term ‘metaphysics’ first appears in the writings of Aristotle, Plato’s most famous student and founder of his own philosophical school at the Lyceum (an Athenian temple dedicated to Apollo, the god of light, truth, healing, and music). Aristotle’s extant writings were collected and published in the first century B.C. by Andronicus of Rhodes. A major work therein was titled ta meta ta physika, which means ‘after the physics’—i.e., following Aristotle’s writings on physical phenomena. In it, Aristotle declares the theoretical science called metaphysics to be the first philosophy (protē philosophia). Its object of study is being as such and the attributes which belong to being (Met IV.1003a).58 Since the Greek prefix meta also means ‘over beyond,’ Martin Heidegger points out that philosophizing about beings as such is precisely meta ta physika, or metaphysics.59 Evidently, in the Aristotelian view metaphysics is practically indistinguishable from ontology.
Moreover, for Aristotle metaphysics is closely related to theology. This term is derived from the Greek theologia, which means discourse on the nature of God or the gods. Aristotle views theology as the first and highest science, since it deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable; in other words, theology deals with the realm of the divine (Met VI.1026a). Several centuries later, theology is similarly conceived by Proclus as a branch of theoretical philosophy.60 This is particularly evident in his main works, Elements of Theology and Platonic Theology, which together contains the fullest extant exposition of Platonism.
It is important to note that the recognition of a fundamental differentiation between the metaphysical and physical realms does not imply an ontological dualism, since both these worlds obtain their reality from a transcendent Principle. As we have noted earlier, this Principle is variously referred to as God, Brahman, or the One. But an important distinction should be made regarding the origins
