responsibilities in comparison to the chief of GEETHA. This was first addressed by Law 660/1977 which restructured the organization of the MoD and provided the chief of GEETHA with more operational authority. Its main aim was to ensure the flow of intelligence to facilitate rapid decision-making in times of war. As an institutional body GEETHA was considered the military services’ co-ordination hub and the chief of GEETHA installed as the first military advisor to the Secretary of Defence. However the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force retained their advisory roles to the Secretary. The MoD has since admitted that Law 660/1977 did not adequately strengthen the role of the Chief of GEETHA in comparison to the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force.76
Regarding decision-making at a political level, Law 660/1977 established the ‘National Defence Supreme Council’ (Anotato Symvoulio Ethnikis Amynas) under the presidency of the Prime Minister. The council included the Vice-President of the Administration, the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of Co-ordination of the administration, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Public Order and the Chief of the General Staff. All members had voting rights and the Prime Minister could call on ‘any public sector official’ in order to be provided with information’ (article 2 par. 5); there is no explicit reference to the NIS director. In times of war, the National Defence Supreme Council would be renamed ‘War Council’ and would be the only government body which could declare a state of emergency and mobilise the armed forces (Article 3, par. 1c). Surprisingly, there is no mention of NIS’s supporting role within the Supreme Council. Only Article 5 par. 4c stated that the Defence Secretary ‘in co-ordination with the Secretary for Public Order could set the general directions for homeland defence planning for NIS and for the other Security Services’ (i.e. Police and the Coast Guard). Article 10 par. 4d entitled the Chief of the General Staff to receive ‘all government services intelligence’. Paragraph 5a required the chief (after a relevant Council decision) ‘to exercise full control over NIS and Police intelligence services in times of war or general military mobilisation’. This demonstrates that the Karamanlis administration did not seek to upgrade the institutional status of NIS in information collection and analysis and instead emphasised the roles of the MoD and the chief of General Staff. Law 660/1977 referred to ‘general mobilisation or war’ and not to the arrangements of crisis management.
In February 1982 Andreas Papandreou renamed the Supreme Defence Council, the ‘Foreign Affairs and Defence Council’ (Kyvernitiko Symvoulio Eksoterikon kai Amynas, KYSEA). KYSEA was led by the Prime Minister and consisted of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the two MFA Undersecretaries, the Secretary and the Undersecretaries of Defence, the Secretary for the Presidency of the Government and the Secretary for Public Order (Article 11 par.1). The Chief of the National Defence General Staff retained his voting rights and membership according to Law 660/1977 (Article 11, par.6). The Prime Minister ‘could call on anyone from the public service suitable to provide advice for the issues under consideration’ (Article 11 par.2). KYSEA was required to decide ‘on issues of intelligence and public order related to the foreign and defence policy’ (Article 11, par.3a). This is the one and only reference to intelligence issues in Law 1266/1982. Papandreou did not upgrade NIS institutional status in supporting KYSEA decision-making and there was no reference to intelligence structures to deal with crisis management.
In February 1995 the PASOK administration introduced Law 2292/1995. It is the first detailed public document on KYSEA with reference to the special responsibilities of the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force Staff in ‘times of emergency’. Law 2292/1995 retained the provisions on KYSEA membership which were included in Law 1266/1982. KYSEA had the authority to vote on the ‘system of crisis management’ (this is one of the first ever references in a Greek legal document) and ‘to give the Defence Secretary policy directions’ (Article 3 par. 1e). KYSEA also had the authority to formulate ‘the policy and the collection priorities and the exploitation of strategic intelligence related to national defence’ (Article 3 par. 1h). However the document did not include a definition of ‘strategic intelligence’. The Defence Secretary ‘in co-ordination with other secretaries provided general directions for national defence planning of NIS and of other security services’ (Article 5, par.6c).
The Chief of the General Staff is responsible for the ‘overall threat assessment with the contribution of the General Staff and other authorised government agencies’. The Chief of the General Staff is authorised ‘to formulate strategic assessments within the zone of interest of the country’ (Article 11 par. 8e) and organises the ‘joint system of collection, processing and exploitation of military intelligence, issuing directives and identification of intelligence requirements for the authorised government agencies. Their task is to provide support for operational planning’ (Article 11 par .8z). These provisions gave the chief an unprecedented privilege and monopoly on threat assessment and sidelined NIS as an institution. During periods of war, national emergency or ‘in case of imminent threat to territorial integrity’ the KYSEA ‘decides on the jurisdiction of the chief of the National Defence General Staff who is authorised to have direct jurisdiction over NIS and other public security services’ (Article 11 par. 19 a1). Following a decision by KYSEA, article 22 promoted the Chief of the General Staff to a General-in-Chief in times of war, general mobilisation or an ‘imminent threat to the territorial integrity of the country’. This term refers to Greek fears of a possible Turkish threat to the sovereign rights, the air and the sea borders of islands in the Aegean.
The intelligence and crisis management legislation from 1977 to 1995 was characterised by attempts to centralise political control under the Prime Minister, his Secretaries and the command of the armed forces under the Chief of the General Staff. KYP/NIS was sidelined and essentially placed under MoD jurisdiction in times of war or crisis. NIS did not gain an official intelligence role in support of KYSEA and it was not until 1992 that the NIS director was named official ‘intelligence advisor’ to KYSEA. As a Major-General admitted, in the 1980s and 1990s, NIS could not provide special military intelligence to the MoD and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The poor regard for the performance of NIS in matters of intelligence and espionage lead to the marginalisation of the service with Law 2292/95.77 The Greek legal framework regarding intelligence services and crisis management demonstrates a monocentrist approach to leadership-intelligence relations.78 Throughout the period under examination, NIS/KYP leaders were limited to information gathering and delivery and certainly had no authority to consult with the chief of the General Staff on equal terms or to provide official advice to the cabinet. The politicians assigned issues of intelligence to military officers and therefore, intelligence was regarded as only military information.
Greek-Turkish antagonism and legal arguments
From 1974 until the present day, several geographical areas have dominated the Greek-Turkish disputes. These include the continuation of the Turkish occupation of the north coast of the Republic of Cyprus, the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf, the sea and air borders within the Aegean, the international aviation responsibilities between the two countries and the NATO assigned operational responsibilities over the Aegean.
In 1996 Turkey declared that ‘some areas’ (i.e. East Aegean islets) had no clear sovereignty status. Ankara did not define the number and the location of these so-called disputed ‘grey zones,’ and this caused Greek frustration and encouraged fresh assessments of Turkey’s seemingly expansionist intentions. The sovereignty dispute over the Imia Aegean islets has been the last major Greek-Turkish crisis until today. To fully understand the nature of the Aegean disputes, it is necessary to review the history of the legal positions of Ankara and Athens.
In May 1974, the Turkish survey ship Chandarli, escorted by 32 warships, conducted seismological surveys over the continental shelf in international waters. Athens protested without using force. The surveyed area in the North Aegean was outside Greek territorial waters around the Greek islands of Lemnos, Mytilini and Chios but within the part of the continental shelf claimed by Greece.
On 6 August 1974, seventeen days after the invasion of Cyprus, Ankara issued NOTAM [Notice to Airmen] 714, requiring all flights
