subjectivism and relativism, it is clear that the aphorism itself does not support relativism about beauty. Things can be subjective but not relative, so to identify beauty as subjective does not get us to the claim that beauty is relative. A further argument for relativism about beauty would be needed.
Arguments for Relativism from Disagreement
Having disambiguated the aphorism, the defender of relativism about beauty may move to connect the aphorism to a different argument.7 A common kind of argument proceeds from the fact of disagreement about beauty and tries to use that fact to explain why subjectivism about beauty (as captured in the aphorism) does entail relativism about beauty. The argument can run as follows:
Premise 1—Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is, beauty is “in” people’s perceptions.
Premise 2—If beauty is in people’s perceptions, then people will perceive beauty differently.
Premise 3—This means that people will have disagreements about what is or isn’t beautiful (e.g., Person A will think Object O is beautiful because he/she perceives it to be so, but Person B will think Object O is not beautiful because he/she perceives it to be so).
Premise 4—If people have disagreements about what is or isn’t beautiful, then beauty is thoroughly relative.
Conclusion—Therefore, beauty is thoroughly relative.
This argument turns mostly on Premise 4, which connects disagreement about a phenomenon with relativism about that phenomenon. But such a connection is spurious. It is perfectly possible for there to be disagreement about a subject where that subject is not thoroughly relative. There are obvious cases like scientific disagreements (e.g., Scientist A thinks Phenomenon P is caused by X because it is sufficiently supported by the data, but Scientist B thinks Phenomenon P is not caused by X because it is sufficiently refuted by the data). Such a disagreement is perfectly possible, but this does not entail relativism about the phenomenon or that there is no truth of that matter. We can also return to the case of color to see that even completely subjective disagreement (i.e., disagreement about a phenomenon that is “in” subjects) does not entail relativism. There are disagreements about the color of an object. Such disagreements can be caused by optical illusions, deficiencies in perceptual powers, bad lighting, and so on (e.g., Person A thinks Object O is blue and black, but Person B thinks Object O is white and gold).8 But this disagreement does not entail that thoroughgoing relativism about color is true (that a claim about color is true in virtue of being claimed). There is thus not a sufficient connection between there being disagreement about X and X being relative to warrant the inference from disagreement about beauty to relativism about beauty. The proponent of relativism can say that disagreement about beauty is distinct and just does entail relativism about beauty, but this is obviously only to return to a question-begging assertion of relativism about beauty.
But perhaps I am being too hasty. Perhaps there is something genuinely distinct about disagreements of beauty, as compared to most other kinds of disagreement, that does entail relativism about beauty in a non-question-begging way. We can reframe the previous argument to focus not just on disagreement about beauty as such but instead to focus on what kind of disagreement about beauty there is. Consider the following argument:
Premise 1—Disagreement about beauty is utterly intractable (i.e., it is impossible to resolve disagreement about beauty).
Premise 2—If it is impossible to resolve disagreement about a phenomenon, then that phenomenon is thoroughly relative.
Conclusion—Therefore, beauty is thoroughly relative.
(Notice that as the argument becomes more about the intractability of disagreement and less about merely the fact of disagreement, the aphorism—which is about where beauty “lives”—becomes less relevant.) This argument still depends on a connection between disagreement, now intractable disagreement, and relativism (as expressed in Premise 2). Even when further specified as intractable disagreement, this connection is still spurious. We can easily imagine cases of intractable disagreement that do not entail that the phenomenon in question is relative. The examples I used before—scientific disagreements and disagreements about color—can continue to show this. Disagreements of all kinds can become intractable: out of stubbornness, out of irrationality, out of lack of data, out of competing underlying theories, out of perceptual disparities (in the case of color), and so on. The fact that disagreements cannot be resolved does not entail that the phenomenon in question is thoroughly relative, that there is no fact of the matter about which the parties are disagreeing. The very practice of philosophy itself—which is often plagued by intractable disagreement, but nevertheless maintains that there is a truth to be discovered about the difficult phenomenon in question—refutes the inference from intractable disagreement to relativism.
The proponent of relativism about beauty can take one more stab at connecting disagreement about beauty with relativism about beauty. They can further specify the argument this way:
Premise 1—Disagreement about beauty is in principle intractable (i.e., there are utterly no principles of beauty that could adjudicate disagreements about beauty and so disagreements about beauty are necessarily intractable).
Premise 2—If there are no principles with which to resolve a disagreement about a phenomenon, then that phenomenon is thoroughly relative.
Conclusion—Therefore, beauty is thoroughly relative.
But, again, this relies on a connection between disagreement (now a very strong and rare kind of disagreement) and relativism. And that connection between disagreement and relativism is still spurious. We can dispense with all these arguments trying to connect disagreement with relativism once and for all by considering the following argument:
Premise 1—Disagreement (even the most intractable sort) is an epistemic phenomenon (it is about two parties’ beliefs being different and their inability to change the other’s beliefs).
Premise 2—Relativism is a metaphysical phenomenon (it is about the structure of the truth value of a class of propositions).
Premise 3—One cannot infer a metaphysical fact from an epistemic fact (because epistemic facts are about our minds, which are limited, and metaphysical facts are about the world, which is separate from our minds).
Conclusion—Therefore, one cannot infer relativism about beauty from disagreement about beauty.
This argument irrevocably drives a wedge between disagreement—even necessarily intractable disagreement, which is still a fact about our minds and their limitations—and relativism.9 This of course does not argue directly against relativism about beauty. But it undercuts all these arguments for relativism that are based on disagreement, which is a common kind of argument offered in support of relativism.
What’s more, my responses to all the previous arguments about disagreement and relativism granted the premises claiming that there was intractable or necessary disagreement about beauty. I was happy to grant those premises for the time being, given that disconnecting disagreement from relativism is enough to sink the arguments. But it’s worth noting that as those premises get stronger, they become less plausible. It is obvious that there is some disagreement of some kind about beauty (as there is about virtually everything), but this fact clearly does not entail relativism. But to claim that disagreement about beauty is always utterly or even necessarily intractable is much less plausible. A single resolved disagreement about beauty (with or without principles) will
