On the State of Egypt. Alaa Al aswany

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U.S. policy and accuse the United States of hypocrisy and double standards?

      Finally, the crime of building the wall to starve the Palestinians is not unconnected with the question of democratic reform in Egypt, since the regime agreed to build the wall because it needs U.S. support for its plan to have President Mubarak pass on the presidency to his son, Gamal. Here we see a dangerous example of the consequences of despotic rule. The interests of the regime in Egypt have truly become contrary to the interests of the Egyptian people. If the Mubarak regime were democratic it would never dare to take part in the blockade and starvation of the Palestinians. Democratic systems alone are the ones whose interests are at one with those of the people and the nation.

      Democracy is the solution.

       December 27, 2009

      Why Are We Falling Behind

       as the World Progresses?

      A few months ago scientist Ahmed Zewail was appointed scientific adviser to United States President Barack Obama, and when Dr. Zewail went to meet President Obama White House officials gave him an entry pass stating his name and his position, but he noticed that at the bottom of the pass they had written the word “temporary.” Surprised at this, the scientist went to a senior White House official and asked, “Why have they written the word ‘temporary’ on my pass?”

      The official smiled and said, “Dr. Zewail, you’re working as an adviser to President Obama, aren’t you?”

      “Yes.”

      “President Obama himself is temporary,” the official said.

      When Dr. Zewail told me of this incident, I thought it significant in several ways. The U.S. president, like the president in any democratic country, holds office for four years, extendable to eight if he is reelected, after which he cannot remain in office a single day longer. The president obtained office because the people chose him of their own free will, and he is liable to strict oversight in everything related to himself and his family. Because he owes his office to the public and is liable to oversight by the people, he does his best to fulfill the promises on the basis of which the electors voted for him. This necessarily impels him to seek out the most competent people in the country to benefit from them in serving the people. That’s what happens in democratic countries, whereas we in Egypt have a president who holds on to power until his inevitable end overtakes him—a practice that definitely has serious repercussions, whoever the president may be and however good his intentions.

      First, the president in Egypt does not take office through voters’ choice but through the power of the security agencies and their ability to suppress opponents, so he does not attach much weight to public opinion, knowing that his survival in office does not depend on people liking him but rather on the ability of the security agencies to protect him from any rebellion or coup. The security agencies in Egypt are the authority that has the decisive say in every sphere and in every detail, starting with the appointment of the mayor in the smallest village to the appointment of deans of faculties and university presidents, and even allowing political parties to be formed, granting licenses to newspapers and satellite channels, and appointing and disqualifying people for ministerial positions. So many competent people have been candidates for ministerial office but were immediately disqualified when the security agencies objected to them. And so many incompetent people have been elevated to senior positions thanks to support from the security agencies. Among the countries of the world Egypt is in a uniquely abnormal situation: the state spends nearly 9 billion Egyptian pounds a year on the Ministry of Interior, twice the budget of the Ministry of Health (which is less than 5 billion pounds a year). In other words the Egyptian regime spends twice as much on subjugating, detaining, and repressing Egyptians as it spends on providing them with healthcare.

      Second, there is no legitimate way to compete with the president for office and the supreme objective is to ensure that the current president stays in power. That’s why, if any public figure surfaces who enjoys the people’s confidence, the regime gets upset and endeavors to get rid of him as soon as possible. This has always meant Egypt is deprived of major talents who are excluded because they have qualities that might make them eligible, even notionally, to assume the presidency. What happened to Dr. Zewail himself is the best example of that: after winning the Nobel Prize for Chemistry he returned to Egypt to submit a project for a technological university that could help move the country into the scientific age. But rumors and security reports warned that he was immensely popular among young people, many of whom said they wished to see Ahmed Zewail become president of Egypt. That was the death knell. The regime blocked every path in the face of Dr. Zewail, started to harass him, and lost interest in the university project he had hoped would benefit the country. A few months later the U.S. president quickly appointed him as his scientific adviser to benefit from his rich knowledge. Dr. Zewail is one example of the thousands of outstanding Egyptians who cannot contribute their talents because of despotism.

      Third, in Egypt the president has absolute powers and no authority can hold him to account. We have no idea how large President Mubarak’s fortune is or how much money his sons, Gamal and Alaa, have in the bank. What is the budget of the presidency and how does it break down into categories of spending? Is it proper that the state should spend millions of pounds of public money on the president’s rest houses and palaces while millions of Egyptians live in wretched shantytowns without basic human necessities? The president’s complete immunity from accountability also extends to senior officials. Audit departments in Egypt go after junior civil servants, hold them to account for the slightest lapse, and often bring about their dismissal and imprisonment. But faced with senior officials their authority is weak; they merely submit details of any transgressions to the president, and it is up to him alone whether he wants to hold them to account or turn a blind eye to their transgressions. In this way enforcement of the law is confined to the small, the weak, and senior people who have fallen out of favor. To fight corruption selectively, besides being meaningless and ineffective, is in itself a form of corruption.

      Fourth, in Egypt the president has the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers. He does not consider himself responsible for explaining his decisions to Egyptians, who never know why ministers are appointed or dismissed. And competence is not the prime factor in choosing ministers, as it is loyalty to the president that is most important. Last week we saw how Ahmed Zaki Badr was appointed minister of education although he has no accomplishments to his name and has no experience of improving education. His sole achievement when he was president of Ain Shams University is, in short, that for the first time in the history of Egyptian universities he called groups of thugs armed with knives and petrol bombs onto the university campus and allowed them to attack protesting students. This disgraceful behavior, which in any democratic country would have ensured the dismissal and immediate trial of a university president, was apparently the motive for Ahmed Zaki Badr’s appointment as minister of education.

      On top of this, the appointment and replacement of ministers generally takes place for subjective reasons no one understands. So the prime minister, who holds the highest political office after the president, is someone who has never in his life engaged in politics; the minister of social solidarity was originally responsible for the postal authority; the minister of information was originally a specialist in selling scientific encyclopedias; and former housing minister Mohamed Ibrahim Suleiman was appointed by presidential decree to be the chairman of an oil company. It appears that the president likes some officials and trusts their loyalty, shuffling the top positions among them without thinking too much about their suitability or experience. The regime excludes major talents because it doubts their loyalty or fears their popularity, whereas it grants positions to followers, even if they are incompetent. Because most members of parliament belong to the ruling party and have won their seats through rigged elections, they carry out the government’s instructions instead of playing their supervisory role. In Egypt a minister does not consider himself responsible to the people and knows full well

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