of the public lands of Upper and Lower Canada, and supported the maintenance of a “Protestant clergy.” The Church of England began to sell the land in 1819, but this led to disputes over the sharing of proceeds among other Protestant churches. By the early 1850s, secularization of the reserves was widely demanded, along with provisions to pay life stipends to clerical incumbents. Many in the legislature opposed the Clergy Reserves Bill on principle. Macdonald took a more practical approach: “I believe it is a great mistake in politics and private life to resist when resistance is hopeless . . . there is no maxim which experience teaches more clearly than this, that you must yield to the times. Resistance may be protracted until it produces revolution. Resistance was protracted in this country until it produced rebellion.”
When George Brown attacked the notion of religious schools, Macdonald defended the historical rights of French-Canadian Roman Catholics: “[H]e should be sorry if a legislature, the majority of whose members were Protestants professing to recognize the great Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, should yet seek to deprive Roman Catholics of the power to educate their children according to their own principles.”
When the Separate School Bill passed in 1855, George Brown called it French-Canadian tyranny, and reaffirmed his commitment to representation by population. His goal was to diminish the influence of French-speaking legislators. However, it was not just the church and the language that Brown sought to control. He also wanted to make French culture extinct, just as Lord Durham had proposed in his 1839 Report on the Affairs of British North America, when he described “two nations warring at the bosom of a single state . . . a struggle not of principles, but of races.”
Writing to a reporter for the Montréal Gazette, Macdonald lambasted the Anglophone attitude towards the French in Lower Canada: “The truth is that you British Lower Canadians never can forget that you were once supreme—that Jean Baptiste was your hewer of wood and drawer of water. You struggle, like the Protestant Irish in Ireland, like the Norman Invaders in England, not for equality, but ascendancy—the difference between you and those interesting and amiable people being that you have not the honesty to admit it.”
Macdonald believed that any attempt to assimilate or dominate the French was pointless and ignored reality: “No man in his senses can suppose that this country can, for a century to come, be governed by a totally un-frenchified government. If a Lower Canadian Britisher desires to conquer he must ‘stoop to conquer.’”
Macdonald’s moderate and respectful views enabled him to build bridges with French Canadians. He understood that for the French these battles were a matter of survival. Far ahead of his time, he was perhaps the first English politician to recognize the French people of Québec as a nation: “(We) must make friends with the French, without sacrificing the status of his race or religion or language (we) must respect their nationality. Treat them as a nation and they will act as a free people generally do—generously. Call them a faction and they become factious.”
Presciently, Macdonald foretold how French Canadians would react when threatened: “Supposing the numerical preponderance of British in Canada becomes much greater than it is, I think the French would give more trouble than they are said now to do. At present they divide as we do, they are split up into several sections, and they are governed by more or less defined principles of action. As they become smaller and feebler, so they will be more united; from a sense of self-preservation, they will act as one man and hold the balance of power . . . So long as the French have twenty votes they will be a power, and must be conciliated. I doubt very much however if the French will lose their numerical majority in Lower Canada in a hurry. . . . I am inclined to think they will hold their own for many a day yet.”
These views were instinctive to Macdonald. His impulse was to look to the French to build a stronger coalition in the Union. He understood that whoever could forge and sustain a partnership with francophones would govern. The “representation by population” forces were motivated, not by pure democratic principles, but by a desire to diminish the French fact and French influence. By standing up to these forces, Macdonald solidified his coalition with the Bleue Canadien members. “Do not put yourself in opposition to the French,” Macdonald told a colleague. “The French are your sheet anchor.” To Brown and his ilk, Macdonald had sold his soul for the sake of power. Macdonald countered that his interest was not power, but simple fairness. His responsibility was to govern “for the good of the whole country and the equal interests of all.”
In the century that followed Macdonald’s death, some Conservative leaders treated Québec as a political wasteland and failed to embrace Macdonald’s inclusive national views. Not until 1984 would Conservatives have a leader from Québec on the ballot, Brian Mulroney, who would put forward constitutional packages that recognized Québec as a distinct society. In 2006, Stephen Harper would place before Parliament a resolution recognizing the Québécois as a nation within a united Canada. In these instances, Mulroney and Harper followed Macdonald’s pre-Confederation instincts. For all three, the consequence was a decline in support for Québec separation and a rise in the fortunes of the Conservative party.
Macdonald was one of the few English-speaking politicians to gain the respect of his French-speaking colleagues in the legislature. While leading his party in Canada West, Macdonald served as deputy to Étienne-Paschal Taché, the leader in Canada East and premier of the United Province of Canada. This partnership lasted eighteen months. In November of 1857, Macdonald became premier, with poet, corporate lawyer, and prominent French Canadian Georges-Étienne Cartier serving as his deputy from Canada East. Cartier was atypical: a French-speaking monarchist who had named one of his daughters Reine-Victoria and who called the French Revolution an episode of “misery and shame.” The alliance between Macdonald and the bleue Canadien politicians loyal to Cartier was the foundation of Tory governments pre and post-Confederation. Few if any Canadian political partnerships have been as close or productive as that of Macdonald and Cartier.
The location of the capital of the United Province of Canada was a source of ongoing and acrimonious debate. After a brief time in Kingston, the capital was moved to Montréal where it stayed from 1843 to 1849. Following an outbreak of violence at the legislative buildings in Montréal the capital was moved again and alternated between Toronto and Québec city. In 1856, Québec City was given permanent status, but the assembly could not decide on funds for the construction of the legislature. Elected members were divided strictly on lines of geography and could reach no clever compromise or consensus. Macdonald decided to take the issue out of the hands of parochial politicians and asked Queen Victoria to choose. Though a politically wise stratagem, this action nevertheless acknowledged that the elected assembly, which was hoping to be granted responsible government, was not yet mature enough to make its own decisions. In their wisdom, in 1857, the Colonial Office and the Queen, on advice if not direction from Macdonald, recommended the boisterous lumber town of Ottawa as capital of the Province of Canada (the union of Canada East and Canada West). It was the choice Macdonald had had in mind all along.
Given the difficulty the legislature had in choosing a capital, it must have seemed ridiculous to think its members could agree on expanding the boundaries of the Union. However, Alexander Tilloch Galt boldly proposed the idea of establishing a federation of British North American colonies to form one great nation. Macdonald was interested, but cautious. Confederation, as it would be called, may have seemed daunting to a man who was frustrated and fatigued: “We are having a hard fight in the house and shall beat them in the votes,” Macdonald wrote to his sister in 1858. “But it will, I think, end in my retiring as soon as I can with honor. I find the work and annoyance too much for me.”
Macdonald overcame his lethargy and showed examples of feistiness. He challenged Colonel Arthur Rankin to a duel after offensive remarks were made in the legislature. Rankin wisely retracted his remarks and the duel was averted. Macdonald eventually found the work of defining a nation intoxicating. Varying visions were debated. Some thought the problems of the Province of Canada made expanding the boundaries of the nation impracticable. Some thought
