the Swedish naval attaché in Berlin, Anders Forshell, brought up the subject of the embarkations in Stettin. Fregattenkapitän Schulte-Mönting brushed it aside; nothing was happening in Stettin and there were no German threats towards Sweden. Still, Forshell concluded in his report to the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office in Stockholm that in his opinion, based on other things Schulte-Mönting had said earlier, Germany was preparing to forestall a British intervention in western Norway. The report was copied to the Swedish embassies in Oslo and Copenhagen on 4 April ‘for information’, but its content appears not to have been forwarded to the government or military authorities of the two countries, except for a brief, informal telephone call from the Swedish Naval Intelligence Office to its Norwegian counterpart.23
In the afternoon of 3 April, Minister Colban in London sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in Oslo informing them that Noel Baker, a Labour MP in the House of Commons had ‘let him understand the British government was preparing a direct action against the ore traffic inside Norwegian sea territory, very soon’. This telegram was copied to Nygaardsvold and Ljungberg and very much focused the attention of the Norwegian government and military in the days to come. Foreign Minister Koht later wrote that the telegram from Colban made him more uneasy than any of the information that came from Berlin in the following days.24
Oberst Hans Oster was one of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris’s closest associates in the German Abwehr. He was a convinced anti-Nazi and when he learned of the plans for Weserübung, it appears he saw an opportunity to cause a military defeat large enough to provide the occasion for a coup against Hitler. It has not been possible to ascertain whether Canaris endorsed Oster’s actions, but the two men had a close personal and professional relationship and it is unlikely Canaris was unaware of what was happening. Oster asked his old friend the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Gijsbertus Jacobus ‘Bert’ Sas, to see him in the afternoon of 3 April. The details of what exactly was passed from Oster to Sas are lost, but Sas later insisted Oster told him that imminent German operations would be directed simultaneously at Denmark and Norway and the offensive in the west would follow shortly after. Whether this is correct and the subsequent distortions were made inadvertently when forwarding the information or remembered differently by one or more of those involved, we shall never know. Oster was treading a fine line and may deliberately have tainted the information to protect himself and to avoid unnecessary loss of German lives, or perhaps he tried to make what he did less treasonous in his own eyes by not revealing the plans correctly. Meeting briefly again next morning, Oster confirmed to Sas that the operation was set for 9 April and encouraged his friend to forward the information to the embassies of the countries involved.25
Oberst Hans Oster of the Abwehr. (Bundesarchiv Koblenz)
During the morning of the 4th, Sas contacted Swedish Naval Attaché Forshell, informing him of the information he had received from Oster. Forshell, who was already aware of German planning against Norway from his conversations with Schulte-Mönting, realised the seriousness of the information brought by the Dutchman. He briefly informed his minister, Arvid Richert, of the news and hurried across to the Danish Embassy, asking to meet Kommandørkaptajn Frits Hammer Kjølsen. The stunned Danish naval attaché listened with growing unease as Forshell told him his country would be the subject of German aggression within a week, followed by an occupation of Norway and later most likely an attack on the Low Countries. Troopships had been made ready in the Baltic and soldiers, including Alpine troops, were embarking at that very moment. Unaware that Forshell had already been to the Danish Embassy, Major Sas came shortly after to share the information from Oster, asserting it came from ‘reliable sources inside the OKW dissatisfied with Hitler’. Sas later insisted he told Kjølsen both Denmark and southern Norway would be invaded simultaneously on the morning of 9 April. Kjølsen, however, categorically denied having been given any dates for the invasion other than ‘next week’, claiming the accounts of Sas and Forshell were ‘near identical’.26
The Norwegian representation in Berlin was one of the few without a military attaché and Vice-Consul Stang would be Major Sas’s natural level of contact. Sas was aware of Stang’s friendly relations with a number of high-ranking German officials, and chose to ‘bump into him by chance’ at the Hotel Adlon, where he knew he would most likely have his lunch, rather than ask for a meeting. Later, Sas claimed he had emphasised in a few brief sentences that both Denmark and Norway would be attacked simultaneously on the 9 April. Stang, however, denied this, claiming Norway had not been mentioned at all and that he had forwarded exactly what he had been told (or at least what he thought he had been told). Based on what Sas told Forshell and Kjølsen, it is hard to believe he did not mention Norway to Stang.27
Kjølsen informed Minister Herluf Zahle of the information he had received from Forshell and Sas and called the Norwegian Embassy, asking to be received in the afternoon to discuss ‘matters of utmost political consequence’. Unknown to Kjølsen, his telephone was tapped and his calls to Zahle and the Norwegian Embassy were intercepted by German intelligence. The information ended up in the OKW and eventually in the SKL on the 7th, where it was concluded it was possible that the Danish naval attaché ‘somehow had obtained information on the forthcoming Operation Weserübung!’28
At the Norwegian Embassy, Kjølsen informed Minister Scheel. Understandably, the old diplomat was ‘very upset to learn of the serious threats to his country’. Later in the evening, Stang, who had not been present at the meeting, came to the Danish Embassy to discuss matters. Kjølsen and Undersecretary Steensen-Leth presented all the information they had to Stang. He responded that he had been informed of German plans from a ‘neutral civilian source’ without elaborating, but claimed, to the surprise of the Danes, that the attack would not be directed north, but south and west towards Holland and France.29
During the afternoon, Minister Zahle at the Danish Embassy signed a memorandum to the Foreign Office in Copenhagen written by Kjølsen, and had it couriered home by one of his staff on the afternoon flight. The next day Kjølsen sent a supplementary report to the Naval Ministry, copied to Zahle and the Foreign Office, stating that he believed Major Sas’s information to be reliable. Indeed, troop concentrations and loading of transport vessels in Stettin and Swinemünde indicated something was going on. Kjølsen concluded that ‘contrary to the Norwegian Embassy’ (i.e. Stang), he believed Norway would be attacked and the possible attack in the west would be limited to Holland.30
What discussion took place between Stang and Scheel in the Norwegian Embassy after Kjølsen left is not known, but Stang’s view must have won the day, as next morning, 5 April, a telegram was received in Oslo informing the Foreign Office that the embassy had ‘been informed from an attaché at one of the neutral embassies – in strict confidence – of German plans to invade Holland in the near future’. Denmark was also threatened as Germany might be seeking ‘air and U-boat bases on Jylland’s west coast’. Norway was not mentioned at all. The embassy forwarded the information cautiously, it was stressed, as it could not be verified, even though the attaché who had brought the information was ‘usually reliable and well informed’. The telegram was composed by Stang and signed by Scheel in spite of the somewhat different information he had received from Kjølsen. It must have occurred to Scheel that the message could be misleading; some hours later, a second telegram followed adding that information from Danish diplomats indicated that places on the Norwegian south coast might be threatened as well ‘to increase the speed of the war and pre-empt Allied actions’.31
Koht rated both telegrams as rumour and took little notice of either. They were copied to Ljungberg the next day, but not to any other member of the government. No initiatives were taken by the Foreign Office to discuss the information internally in the government or with the other Nordic foreign offices. The telegrams were forwarded to the Admiral Staff and the General Staff during the 5th and shown to relevant officers who came in the next day (Saturday), including the army Chief of Staff Oberst Hatledal.32
Swedish
