Action against Scandinavia’. Based on the information available in the service departments and the Foreign Office, it concluded that the known disposition of German forces did not ‘support any probability of a Scandinavian invasion’. Limited operations on the Norwegian coast were to be expected to counter any Allied mining, but there was little advantage to be gained by Germany from occupying Denmark.90
The French and British press printed, with remarkable indiscretion, reports of the Council’s meeting on 28 March, including stories of imminent Allied intervention in Norway. For once, Koht asked the envoys in London and Paris to investigate. Colban reported back on the 29th, after meeting Halifax, that he did not believe ‘the British Government had made any decision regarding actions in Norwegian territory’. Similarly, Minister Bachke in Paris reported that he could not see that any concrete actions had been decided, but a ‘test-campaign might be launched to observe reactions’.
On 2 April, Chamberlain gave a speech in the House of Commons, but avoided any mention of concrete actions emerging from the Supreme War Council.
[The] most important . . . weapon of our economic warfare is the employment of our sea power, and the Allies are determined to continue and intensify the use of this weapon to the full. His Majesty’s ships have already taken certain practical steps to interfere with the unimpeded passage of the German cargo ships from Scandinavia. These operations have been carried out in close proximity to German naval bases, showing once again how empty are the German boasts the control of the North Sea has passed into their hands . . . The House may be assured that we have not yet reached the limit of our effective operations in this region.91
Colban commented to Oslo that the prime minister had ‘carefully circumvented any revelation of the intentions of the government’. Other less diplomatic commentators concluded that Chamberlain’s words actually signified that an intervention was already being prepared.
Reynaud, who felt that accepting mining of the German waterways was but a ‘minor concession’ compared to swaying the British Cabinet into offensive actions in Scandinavia, went home after the meeting on the 28th to discuss the plans with his Comité de Guerre Français. The French War Committee, under the influence of Daladier, strongly supported the actions in Norway, but rejected any execution of Operation Royal Marine, and Reynaud had to inform London accordingly on 31 March. Frustrated over what he considered French manipulation, Chamberlain told Ambassador Corbin, ‘no mines, no Narvik’, and both operations were postponed.92
On 3 April, Chamberlain discussed the status of the Norwegian issue with the Military Coordination Committee – of which Churchill had just taken over the chairmanship.93 Intelligence of troop concentrations in the Baltic were given, but dismissed as German preparations to counter Allied moves. The French refusal of Royal Marine had stalled momentum but Chamberlain was acutely aware that a line had been crossed and ‘ . . . matters had now gone too far for us not to take action.’ If the French eventually turned down Royal Marine altogether, it would be necessary to ‘proceed with the Norwegian Territorial Waters Operation alone’. Churchill was asked to go to Paris to try to change their minds, while a personal letter was sent from Chamberlain to Daladier. It appears the persuasion worked better the other way and on 5 April Churchill reported back to Halifax that Reynaud needed room to manoeuvre and the French may be ‘right in wanting to postpone the mining of the Rhine until the French Air Force is strong enough to meet German retaliation’. To avoid a renewed political crisis in Paris, the War Cabinet later in the day gave in and accepted to ‘proceed with the Norwegian plans’. The date for Operation Wilfred was confirmed as 8 April. That this was close to Reynaud’s intentions all the time is difficult to ascertain, but easy to believe.94
Available units were hastily assembled: the 24th Infantry (Guards) Brigade supported by French troops for Narvik and the incomplete 49th Division for Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Norwegian-speaking officers were transferred from wherever they could be found and information on conditions in Norway was distributed to officers and NCOs. Though not officially acknowledged, there was little doubt among the men where they were going. The troops for the Narvik part of Plan R4 were assembled on the Clyde and instructed to commence embarkation of the transport ships in the morning of 8 April. They would leave later in the day, escorted by the cruisers Penelope and Aurora with Admiral Evans and Major-General Mackesy onboard the latter. Brigadier CG Phillips and two battalions each for Bergen and Stavanger were to embark the cruisers Devonshire, Berwick, York and Glasgow of the 1st Cruiser Squadron in Rosyth on 7 April. A single battalion for Trondheim would follow two days later. It was assumed these forces would be able to forestall potential German reactions until reinforced, even if they were short of A/A defences. Chamberlain demanded that if faced with other than token opposition, the landing forces should withdraw and the operation be called off. Mackesy’s revised instructions, dated 5 April, state that:
. . . It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that your force should land only with the general cooperation of the Norwegian Government . . . It is not the intention that your force should fight its way through Norway. If Norwegian troops or civilians open fire on your troops, a certain number of casualties must be accepted. Fire in retaliation is only to be opened as a last resort. Subject to this, you are given discretion to use such force as may be required to ensure the safety of your command, but not more . . . You are to obtain further instructions from the War Office before entering Sweden.95
The 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons were to be kept ready as a ‘striking force’, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow respectively, and the Home Fleet would be ready ‘to deal with any sea borne expeditions the Germans may send against Norway’. None of the covering force would be at sea and all reactions depended on a timely recognition of German intentions.
On 4 April, the CoS submitted another memorandum to the War Cabinet informing that ‘Special arrangements have been made for obtaining from Scandinavia the earliest possible authentic information of a German move against Norway or Sweden. We have been informed of the details of these arrangements and are satisfied they should prove adequate.’ It is not detailed what the arrangements were, but as soon as information of German action was received in London, it would be forwarded to the War Cabinet, the Foreign Office and the service departments, including their sources in order to ascertain authority. Timing would be all important, and it was suggested that the Admiralty was empowered to initiate the departure of the troopships as soon as the first news of a move against Scandinavia was rumoured, however vague. It would take some twenty hours until the ships were off their Norwegian targets and they could be recalled at any time during this period should the War Cabinet decide the information was false or inadequate. Such pragmatism, which the Cabinet endorsed, makes the decisions made by the Admiralty a few days later to disembark the troops even more curious.
Part of the ‘arrangements’ referred to by the CoS in all likelihood included a handful of Military Intelligence Research (MIR) officers, clandestinely arriving at the legation in Oslo during 2 and 3 April. Nominally, they were to supervise the transit of remaining equipment for Finland. Actually they were to report status in Norway and to liaise with the Norwegian forces when R4 arrived. Captains Croft and Munthe came via Sweden, while Major Palmer flew in via Perth. The legation was instructed to give them all necessary assistance. Within a few days, Munthe continued to Stavanger, Croft to Bergen and Palmer to Trondheim. A fourth officer, Captain Torrance, went directly to Narvik via Stockholm. How these men were to detect German intentions regarding Norway before anybody else is not obvious.
The willingness of the British decision makers to engage in complicated and far-reaching operations with so limited preparations and so little knowledge of things Norwegian is startling – as is their lack of realistic analysis of German intentions. The degree of provocation necessary for Berlin to react seems never to have been debated properly, far less realistic scenarios of how the Germans might respond. All British (and French) thinking was based on traditional suppositions of moves and countermoves within given ‘rules’ of strength and mobility. That the new
