trade’, if necessary by operating inside those waters. The Norwegian government was taken aback by the British note. ‘Colban’s report from his meeting with Halifax shocked me,’ Koht wrote, ‘it was the most serious scare and I really felt the war looming. Not for a second did I doubt the Germans would see this as a provocation and turn their war-machine against Norway.’ The memorandum and its implications were discussed at length in the Norwegian government over the next few days. Koht held that, should a situation arise where there was no choice left, it was vital Norway was not brought into the war on the German side. It was equally important, he said, that this was not publicly known as it might in itself compromise the neutrality.
The reply from Oslo eventually took the form of an emphatic letter from King Haakon to King George, delivered by Colban on 9 January. The king’s letter, no doubt endorsed by the government, underlined his ‘great surprise and consternation’ over the plans to ‘make Norwegian territorial waters a basis for British naval action’ and ‘appealed to [His Britannic Majesty] to prevent such steps, which inevitably would bring Norway into the war and imply the greatest danger for her existence as a Sovereign State’. Embarrassed by this approach and fearing Norwegian reactions might harm the ‘larger project’, Chamberlain and Halifax decided to abandon any operations against the Narvik traffic for the time being. As the Swedish reactions were also very negative, the War Cabinet accepted this on the 12th. The CoS was nevertheless ‘invited to consider the possibility of capturing the Gällivare ore fields in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition’.73 No indication of the decision to stand down should be given to the Scandinavian governments, but Laurence Collier of the Foreign Office remarked sourly to Colban a few days later: ‘You have won – so far.’74
Scandinavia was not long off the agenda of the War Cabinet, however. Minister Colban was called to Halifax again on 18 January and learned that:
. . . the real question at issue was not one of law, and it was for that very reason [Halifax] regarded the case of His Majesty’s Government as stronger than the Norwegian Government seemed willing to admit. Not only was it a case in broad equity for equalising the treatment of the two parties in respect of the conduct of war so that the Germans could no longer be permitted to break all the rules and commit inhumanities of every sort, not only in Norwegian waters but everywhere on the high seas while His Majesty’s Government were expected to refrain from even the smallest technical violation of international law.75
To this, Colban answered that after the incidents in mid-December, the Norwegian Navy had started escorting convoys along the exposed parts of the coast and nothing more had happened. As for supporting the Allied cause, the charter agreement for merchant tonnage had just been signed and the negotiations for a war trade agreement were making progress.
Meanwhile, the planning of the ‘larger project’ progressed unfalteringly and had by late January grown to three parallel, complementary operations; one in northern Norway–Lapland, one in southern Norway and one in southern Sweden. It was underlined by the CoS to the War Cabinet on 28 January that the stakes of such an operation would be high, but the prize of success would be ‘great’ and should be seized ‘with both hands’ should an opportunity arise. Breaking through determined resistance would be costly and the co-operation of both countries was ‘essential’. Even with the consent of the Scandinavian governments, the operation would draw heavily on the navy for transport and protection; two divisions intended for France would have to be diverted. In order to be ‘ready to act in April’, the CoS concluded it would be necessary to make a decision to launch the operation ‘in the near future’. Chamberlain, however, was still smarting from the defeat in January and not prepared to make any firm decisions. The troops, naval forces and transports earmarked for the operation were to be released even if the CoS was allowed to continue the detailed planning for Scandinavia, including the ‘purchase of specialised stores and clothing required for Arctic conditions’.76
In early February, the French ambassador to London, Charles Corbin, asked Foreign Secretary Halifax for ‘the whole question of [the] policy in Scandinavia and Finland’ to be discussed in the next meeting of the Supreme War Council. The meeting was convened in Paris on 5 February. Three days earlier, the British War Cabinet had decided, against cautioning from the Foreign Office, that it ‘ought to do something, even if it were only to divert from ourselves the odium of having allowed Finland to be crushed’. Thus, Chamberlain, after having dismissed a French proposal to land troops at Petsamo in northern Finland, advocated the larger project. He did however, urge the Council not to lose sight of the principal aim, the defeat of Germany, in their determination to save Finland. The ideal operation would, according to Chamberlain, be one which, proceeding from Norwegian ports, combined assistance to Finland with control of the Lapland ore fields. Daladier was happy to comply and on this day, almost two weeks before the Altmark incident, the council agreed to set up an Anglo-French expeditionary force – to be ready by 20 March – ostensibly to help Finland but first and foremost to secure the Swedish iron ore, gain strategic control over the Norwegian coast and, with any luck, to divert substantial German forces from the Western Front. To overcome their unwillingness it was decided to exert ‘vigorous moral pressure’ on Norway and Sweden, while Finland would be asked to issue an official appeal for help to add moral pressure. According to Churchill, the issue of what to do if Norway and Sweden refused, as seemed probable, was never brought up. The risk of becoming entangled in a war with Russia appears also to have been pushed under the carpet; possibly few of the British delegation really expected that the soldiers would go beyond the Swedish ore fields. The Germans would respond, but this would take time and meanwhile any attack in the west would be postponed – it was assumed.77
General Ironside noted enthusiastically in his diary:
If we bring this off, we shall have carried out a great coup, which will upset . . . German preparations. One is almost frightened at the boldness of the plan, knowing what slender means one has at the moment to carry it out. We must see we are politically strong, and remain quite cynical about anything except stopping the iron-ore.78
The plan was indeed bold. In spite of the setback in late January, military preparations had continued steadily and plans were now nearing completion. Operation Avonmouth would seize the Lapland fields, Operation Stratford would secure control of western Norway and Operation Plymouth would secure a defence of southern Sweden. Four to five divisions, including five French and one or two Polish battalions would be deployed in Narvik–Lapland–Luleå, while five additional battalions would occupy Trondheim and Bergen (from where railway lines necessary for transport of heavy material connected eastward) and would be prepared to protect these ports against German attacks.79 A front line was envisaged from Bergen via Oslo to Stockholm, south of which German air attacks would be fierce. Stavanger would be occupied temporarily and in the event that superior German forces attempted to take control of the airfield and the city’s port, both should be demolished before a withdrawal towards Bergen.
In all, a hundred thousand British and fifty thousand French/Polish troops with naval and air support would be deployed under overall British command. Two or three brigades were all that would end up in Finland, where they would remain near the railway in the north to avoid getting too close to the Russians or being cut off by a likely German intervention when the Gulf of Bothnia unfroze. The ultimate goal for the Allied planners was the Norwegian west coast and the Swedish iron ore, not aid to Finland. The secretary of state for war, Oliver Stanley, warned the Cabinet on 18 February that the ‘whole affair was in danger of becoming unmanageable’, as with a commitment of this scale Britain would ‘not be able to send any more troops to France until well into the summer’. Chamberlain expressed concern over this ‘new and somewhat disturbing [information], which had not before been brought to the notice of the War Cabinet’, but left it at that.
Churchill also had second thoughts for a while; partly on moral grounds, partly from seeing the size of the Scandinavian
