take weeks before his largely untrained troops were at full strength. No roads existed into the mountains and the only connection from the coast to Lapland was the singletrack railway. This was electrified and there were few if any diesel or steam engines if the electricity was cut. Destruction of rolling stock and demolition of tunnels and overhangs would further hamper transportation eastwards. German retaliation could easily escalate beyond Allied capacity. The operation had all the prospects of becoming a dismal failure by having to turn back in the face of Norwegian opposition or worse, a quagmire of growing liability. Still, the embarkation of the British expeditionary force began in the morning of the 13th.
Meanwhile, the Finnish government decided the Allied offer of large-scale support was unrealistic and authorised its negotiators in Moscow to sign an armistice on 12 March 1940, to become effective the following day. Around midday on the 13th the news of the ceasefire in Finland broke and Chamberlain issued orders to suspend the expedition that afternoon.
In the War Cabinet the next day, the expedition was officially cancelled and orders for disembarkation of the soldiers issued. Churchill argued that the primary goal of the expedition, the Lapland ore fields, remained and insisted the landings at Narvik should still go ahead, lest Russia should seize the opportunity and ‘make her way to the Atlantic’. Ironside urged the Cabinet to keep the force assembled. Both were overruled by an obviously relieved Chamberlain. The majority of the troops were disbanded and sent to France, against the protests of the Daladier government, who still hoped for a second front. The French warships and transports, which had been ready in Brest and Cherbourg, were released and sent to the Mediterranean, while the legionnaires and Alpine troops returned to their billets. Only some twelve thousand special forces – British, French and Polish – were retained in northern Britain, ‘in case minor actions against the oretransport should become necessary’.86
Operation Wilfred and Plan R4
In France, there was great bitterness over the Winter War and the government’s inability to help the Finns. On 19 March, Daladier lost a vote in the Parliament and his administration folded. The new government, formed two days later by the 62-year-old Paul Reynaud, predictably took an aggressive stance, eagerly supported by Général Gamelin. Reynaud wrote to the British Cabinet, stressing the need for a military initiative and proposed to intercept German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, if necessary through occupation of strategic points on the coast. It was also suggested that a ‘decisive operation’ was launched in the Baltic, the Caspian or the Black Sea, with the aim of cutting Germany’s petroleum supplies and ‘paralysing the whole Soviet economy’. The note arrived in London on 26 March and created a storm of frustration, not least with Chamberlain, who read it as a direct criticism of his conduct of the war. In the Cabinet on the following day, there was broad agreement that the war should be fought neither in the Balkans nor in the Black Sea. On the other hand, a continued crisis in the French government would be disruptive and was to be avoided, even at the cost of Norwegian neutrality.87
In early March, preparations for Operation Royal Marine – the laying of floating mines in German rivers and estuaries to disrupt commercial traffic – were reported to be near completion. The War Cabinet found the concept interesting, but it had, so far, been rejected by the French government for fear of retribution. In London on 28 March, at the first meeting of the Supreme War Council since Reynaud took over, Chamberlain strongly advocated Royal Marine, while brushing lightly over Reynaud’s repeated proposals for the Balkans. During the ensuing debate, which at times was quite heated, the British delegation vetoed any actions that could draw Russia into the war. The French were still sceptical about Royal Marine, but after some bargaining agreed to consider the concept – provided it was tied to a simultaneous mining of the Norwegian Leads. Chamberlain accepted this, as he expected it might draw attention away from the infringement of Norwegian neutrality. He did insist, though, that the Norwegian government should receive a warning a few days ahead of any mining.
It was agreed that by 1 April, diplomatic warnings should be submitted to Norway and Sweden, stating the Allies reserved the right to stop the German iron-ore traffic. Three days later, mining in German waterways would commence, followed by Norwegian waters on the 5th. One minefield would be laid in the approaches to Vestfjorden north of Bodø and one off Stadtlandet, south of Ålesund. A third area off Bud between Molde and Kristiansund would be declared dangerous, but no mines would be laid. Confrontation with Norwegian naval forces was to be avoided, but if the mines were swept they should be relaid. Parts of the Home Fleet would be available for protection of the minelayers, just in case. Churchill’s Operation Wilfred was finally on. Lawrence Collier wrote after the war that the intention was to ‘stop German misuse of Norwegian neutrality’. Before the meeting, however, Halifax told Ambassador Corbin that in British opinion, German violations of Norwegian territory had been neither numerous nor well documented lately and now that spring was approaching and opening the Baltic, actions in Norway would only have a ‘small interference with Germany’s import’.88
The British decision-making process at this stage became imprecise and ambiguous. General Ironside and Général Gamelin met after the meeting, and the next day the British War Cabinet almost casually added ‘a British brigade and a French contingent [to be] sent to Narvik to clear the port and advance to the Swedish frontier in case of German countermeasures to the mining’. Plan R4, as the operation was called, would be activated when the Germans took the bait and ‘set foot on Norwegian soil, or there was clear evidence they intend to do so’ – although what evidence of German action was needed was not specified. Landings at Narvik alone made little sense to the CoS and part of the plans from two weeks earlier were put forward again while efforts were initiated to try to reassemble as much as possible of the dispersed Stratford and Avonmouth forces. Troops for southern Sweden were no longer available. This operation would be confined to Norway and, if necessary, Lapland.
Two separate but linked interventions were thus being prepared: the mining and the landing of Allied soldiers in Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. The laying of mines was not subject to Norwegian consent and when the landings were added so casually, the political safety valve, which had been a prerequisite for the War Cabinet so far, was lost. The CoS concluded that ‘All preparations should be made for the despatch of at least one British battalion at the same time as the laying of the minefield, to be followed by the remainder of the force at the earliest possible date.’ Within parts of the military it appears Plan R4 was expected to go ahead without waiting for the Germans. Churchill told the War Cabinet on 29 March that it was necessary ‘to continue in a state of readiness to despatch a light force to Narvik and possibly . . . Stavanger’, but added that he ‘personally doubted whether the Germans would land a force in Scandinavia’. He probably kept the issue low-key on purporse so as not to raise objections and postpone Operation Wilfred once more. It is noteworthy that in the early morning of 31 March Vice Admiral Cunningham of 1st Cruiser Squadron was notified by the Admiralty that Plan R4 would be ‘put into operation [and] also Stratford, probably 3rd April’. Less than two weeks after they had been saved by the Finnish capitulation, Chamberlain and Halifax had lost control of events again. This time, they would not regain it.
General Ironside commented in a note to the CoS and the War Cabinet that ‘The projected operation in Scandinavia [has] a different political background from that . . . in early March when similar operations were contemplated.’ Apprehensively, he added: ‘From this beginning, we cannot foresee what may develop,’ and advised them to ‘have in hand a reserve’, pending German reactions, including plans for ‘the withdrawal of two to three divisions from France’.
On the request of the War Cabinet, the CoS issued a memorandum on 31 March, assessing various German reactions. The most that could be envisaged by the CoS was that Berlin might establish air and naval bases in southern Norway in order to take control of the minefields and attack British naval and air bases. Increased intelligence to detect German countermoves would be initiated, even if it were recognised that this might not be so easy.89
On 8 April, the British Military
