the winter. This was clearly spelled out by the MEW to the British War Cabinet in early December in their report, which concluded that ‘The principal argument therefore put forward by the First Lord in favour of action in Norwegian waters [is] invalid.’67
Between 7 and 13 December 1939, the Greek freighter Garoufalia and the British Deptford and Thomas Walton were sunk off the Norwegian coast. Investigations by the RNN could not exclude drifting mines as the causes of the shipwrecks, but circumstantial evidence indicated that they had been torpedoed. Commanding Admiral Diesen stated it could not be said with absolute certainty the Thomas Walton had been inside the three-mile limit, whereas Garoufalia most likely and Deptford definitely had been. Actually, the culprit in all three cases was the German submarine U38 under the command of Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Liebe.68
Seizing the moment, Churchill submitted a new memorandum to the War Cabinet on the 16th, arguing that,
. . . the effectual stoppage of the Norwegian ore supplies to Germany ranks as a major offensive operation of war . . . If Germany can be cut from all Swedish ore supplies from now onwards till the end of 1940 a blow will have been struck at her war-making capacity equal to a first-class victory in the field or from the air, and without any serious sacrifice of life . . . British control of the Norwegian coast-line is a strategic objective of first-class importance.69
Internal pressure in France made the Daladier government almost desperate for diversionary measures away from a potentially new Western Front and on 19 December, the French delegation to the Allied Supreme War Council proposed to send a corps d’expedition to Norway, officially to help Finland, but also to take control of the Swedish ore deposits as well as the export sites in Narvik and Luleå. Daladier argued that depriving Germany of the ore might lead to a swift victory; failing to act might prolong the war by several years.
The French proposal was discussed in the War Cabinet on the 22nd, by which time the CoS had also submitted their report on stoppage of Swedish iron ore. The CoS had found the question complicated. Stationing a naval force in Vestfjorden would be most effective, but run a high risk of clashing with the Norwegian navy. Laying of mines would have fewer risks, but supposedly be less effective. Churchill enthusiastically reiterated the proposed naval intervention from his memorandum of the week before and urged ‘taking the first step of interrupting supplies from Narvik after such preliminary diplomatic negotiations as might be necessary’. Foreign Secretary Halifax, rather less excited, felt the consequences of limited actions in Norwegian waters were unpredictable; isolated landings in the Narvik area would be welcomed by neither Norway nor Sweden and could compromise the larger project of stopping all Nordic supplies to Germany. Severing the iron ore from Narvik alone was of ‘little importance’, he held; ‘the key to the whole problem [being] the stoppage of supplies from Luleå’. Prime Minister Chamberlain concluded there were two distinct projects for Scandinavia: the ‘smaller scheme’, halting the traffic from Narvik, through mines or naval patrols, and the ‘larger project’, securing the ore-fields proper, severing all supplies of ore to Germany. The latter, which undoubtedly had French support, would require ‘the good will of both Norway and Sweden’, and diplomatic pressure was the most he was prepared to apply at the moment. Still, the CoS was ‘invited to give further consideration to all the military implications of a policy aimed at stopping the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany’.
On 27 December, the War Cabinet discussed the Scandinavian issue again, now with firm conclusions from the Admiralty that the three merchant ships had been torpedoed inside Norwegian territory. Norwegian authorities, though not directly to blame in the opinion of the Admiralty, had been unable to prevent this, and ‘steps to stop the German traffic from Narvik down the Norwegian coast’ were advised. This time the War Cabinet concurred. Before any operations were initiated, though, Oslo and Stockholm should be informed that they could count on Allied help, should they undertake to assist Finland, followed by a notice to Norway that Britain was planning to send warships to intercept the German traffic. Meanwhile, the CoS was instructed to finish their report on the military implications of severing the iron ore from Sweden to Germany, while the War Office should ‘continue preparations with a view to the ultimate despatch of a force to Narvik’.70
The Swedish and Norwegian ministers in London were that same day called to the Foreign Office and given aide-mémoires informing them that His Majesty’s and the French government were disposed to give ‘all the indirect assistance in their power’ to Finland and were at present assessing how this could be done in the most efficient manner. The two countries were requested to grant consent for the transit of equipment and ‘technicians’, in return the Allies would be willing to discuss protection against the consequences of such permission. The Norwegian answer came over New Year: Norway would be pleased to assist in any aid to Finland, including transit of material ‘. . . without any military attendance’ and transit of a ‘technical mission to Finland . . . granted that such technicists will travel . . . in their private capacity’. The note concluded that ‘the Norwegian government was grateful for the offer of an assurance for the preservation of the integrity and independence of Norway’, but did not ‘at the present moment wish to have this assurance more precisely defined’.71 The Swedish answer was identical.
In the meantime, on 31 December, the CoS reported to the War Cabinet that – provided it was ascertained that Germany would be adversely affected by an interruption of the Lapland ore – despatching an expedition to Scandinavia could be worthwhile. It was underlined that this would represent a ‘fundamental change’ in British policy and a shift to ‘offensive operations, which might well prove decisive’. Provided the security of France was not compromised, the strategy of operating in Scandinavia was considered ‘sound’, but an expedition inland from Narvik, in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition, would not be feasible. Concluding, the CoS advised against any minor naval projects until the larger project was ready in March, as this might trigger a major German offensive, which could not be forestalled.
Initial plans for the expedition, assuming Norwegian and Swedish co-operation, were presented to the War Cabinet and their advisers on 2 January and discussed thoroughly in the following days. The significance of the Swedish iron ore for the long-term German ability to wage war was generally agreed and few doubted that severing the supply through Narvik would provoke a response from Berlin. What kind of response was unclear, but besides direct action in Sweden, a likely retaliation would be to seize bases in southern Norway, probably between Kristiansand and Stavanger. A move on Oslo was considered less probable, as this would be a much larger operation and most likely to be met with Norwegian opposition. German bases on the Norwegian west coast would be a most serious threat to British control of the North Sea and it might be difficult to dislodge them once established. Hence, forestalling a German intervention in Norway would be essential. Norwegian reactions to an unprovoked Allied intrusion were largely expected to be symbolic.
Churchill was not convinced the Germans would react in force at all and repeatedly urged immediate action to ‘see what happened’, adding that British naval forces were standing by and ready to seize German ore ships coming out of Narvik. Chamberlain wished to gauge the Norwegian reactions through political means, and the delivery of a second, stronger memorandum to the Norwegian government was agreed. Meanwhile, the CoS should give further consideration to the consequences of a German occupation of southern Norway and how this could be avoided – including pre-emptive occupation of Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim.72
Eric Colban, Norwegian ambassador in London. (Topfoto/Scanpix)
On Saturday 6 January, Halifax called Minister Colban to his office again, handing him a memorandum expressing dire concern by His Majesty’s government over the recent ‘flagrant violation of Norwegian territorial waters by German naval forces’. The British government, Halifax said, would in the near future be
