Originally a symbol of the Norwegian quest for independence at the beginning of the twentieth century, general disarmament and political development had reduced the once-imposing naval force almost to insignificance, with a severe lack of qualified officers and NCOs. Nevertheless, Commanding Admiral Henry Diesen on 28 August 1939, with the consent of the government, issued orders to prepare for recommissioning the ships of the naval reserve.39 Staff officers were drafted and coastguard stations, naval air bases and communication centres were manned. By the end of September, all ships fit for commissioning were in service, including two panserships and nine submarines; the only vessels that could be considered anything like a tactical reserve. The ships had been well looked after during storage and most were found to be in acceptable condition.
The pansership Eidsvold passing Stavanger in the autumn of 1939 on her way to northern Norway. Norge and Eidsvold were armoured cruisers or coast defence ships of some 4,200-ton displacement. They were elegant, well-designed vessels with good sea-keeping abilities – and obsolete in every conceivable manner. (Ingrid Willoch)
By 8 April 1940, 121 vessels were in commission by the RNN, of which fifty-three were chartered auxiliaries and nine unarmed support vessels.40 Of the fifty-nine naval ships, nineteen had been launched after WWI, while seventeen were of pre-1900 vintage. Some 5,200 naval officers and men were in service onboard or onshore. Of these, 3,565 were sailors and 237 drafted officers, the rest professional officers and NCOs from the pre-war navy. The latter was a highly qualified cadre with much experience at sea; there were just not enough of them. Some NCOs were given temporary rank after brief officer courses and sent to serve on the auxiliaries, thus leaving holes in the ranks and disrupting well-exercised routines and relationships onboard the more modern ships.
During the 1933 reorganisation of the armed forces, the Naval Defence Force (Sjøforsvaret) was established, consisting of the Navy (Marinen), the Coastal Artillery (Kystartilleriet), the Naval Air Arm (Marinens Flyvevåben) and the Coastguard (Kystvakten). The coast was subdivided into three sea defence districts (SDD), in turn sub-divided into sea defence sectors (SDS). Each district was led by a sea defence commander based in Horten, Bergen or Tromsø respectively, reporting to the commanding admiral. The commanders of the coastal forts were subordinate to the relevant sea defence commander, as were the aircraft of the Naval Air Arm. Only the staff functions of commanding admiral and the supreme sea defence command were left in Oslo. The navy had advocated this organisation for a long time as it was considered critical to have an efficient co-ordination between the forts and the ships at sea. The practical side of the co-ordination was never tested, though, leading to a serious neglect of the landside defence of the forts.
The British Legation in Oslo summed up the situation of the RNN in the annual report on Norway in 1936: ‘Promotion is extremely slow; material is largely out of date, money is very scarce.’41 It was undoubtedly correct at the time, but progress had been made since, and ten new ships were launched between 1936 and 1939.
The coastal forts were among the most potent weapons of the Norwegian defences – if adequately manned. When designed in the 1890s, the coastal artillery was state of the art with concentrated firepower through strategically placed guns, larger than those on most ships, supplemented by lighter guns, mines and torpedoes. By 1940 they were obsolete, in spite of having been well maintained. Accuracy was fair if a reasonably trained crew handled the guns as fire control and range-finding systems had been modernised, but rate of fire was slow and upgraded ammunition in limited supply.
From 1900 to 1940, the speed of the naval ships had almost doubled and an intruder, originally expected to be in the firing zone for fifteen to twenty minutes, would be through in five to ten minutes. With reloading taking up to three minutes for the heavy guns, it would require optimum conditions for more than a few shots to be fired – unless mines or torpedoes could slow down the intruder. Early warning was essential and the commanders had to be determined to open fire at first sight. Plans for moving some of the batteries to a more forward position and to establish additional minefields existed, but had not been initiated.42
Commanding Admiral Diesen considered the navy more important than the coastal artillery for the Neutrality Watch and the latter was given low priority during the mobilisation. Stationary guns were of little use for escort purposes, and since both parties appeared to respect Norwegian neutrality, aggressive intrusions in force were not anticipated. Less than three thousand officers and ratings were drafted to the coastal artillery, around one-third of the full roll. There was a general shortage of officers, in particular sergeants and sub-lieutenants, which meant there had to be a strict prioritisation of which guns and batteries to man. Test firing of the larger guns with full-calibre ammunition was usually not allowed and neither guns nor men were prepared for extended firing, all the more so as the technical personnel needed for sustained live firing were no longer available. With an unfortunate short-sightedness, all the youngest and most recently trained ratings were drafted first. Thus, by the spring of 1940, a good number of the gunners had done their tour and been replaced, either by older men, trained up to twenty years earlier, or by youngsters, totally new to military life. At some forts, the crew had only been at their guns for a few days when the alarm sounded in the small hours of 9 April. A large number of guns, searchlights, torpedo batteries and A/A defences remained unmanned. No minefields were laid.
The Norwegian Army was subdivided into six ‘district commands’ or divisions. Each division had one field-brigade with one artillery and two or three infantry regiments to be mobilised in an emergency. In September 1939, four battalions were drafted in southern Norway in addition to one artillery unit and half a dozen local companies. It was intended that the men should serve for two months before being replaced. This kept the division staffs preoccupied with the rotations and limited the time available to prepare for a full mobilisation. In mid-November, Commanding General Kristian Laake requested permission from the Ministry of Defence to draft cavalry, artillery and engineer units, totalling some 7,300 men, for extended training and exercises and to bolster the Neutrality Watch during the winter. This was declined, but after some argument, he was allowed to draft one battalion from each artillery regiment on a rotational basis. The post-war Parliamentary Investigating Committee found the Norwegian defences in 1939 ‘extremely weak [and] poorly equipped to protect our nation, to say nothing of making an efficient effort in open war’.43 Still, it is worth noting that Brigadier Vale, the British military attaché to Norway in 1937, reported from observing a week of exercises with the 6th Division that the soldiers, in spite of limited number of training days, appeared ‘competent in weapon handling and physically very fit’.44
In 1939 both the Naval Air Arm and the Army Air Force were small and neither was equipped to handle the demands of the Neutrality Watch. Disagreement on the organisation of the air forces and types of aircraft needed had seriously delayed necessary renewals, and only some thirty-five naval aircraft were available, spread in small groups around the coast. By 9 April, wear and tear had reduced the number of operational aircraft to twenty-eight, and of these, only the six He115s taken into service during the summer of 1939 had any real combat value. Apart from a handful of Gloster Gladiator bi-planes and small Caproni bombers, the Army Air Force faired no better. Only the airfields at Kjeller-Oslo and Værnes-Trondheim were properly staffed and equipped. Sola-Stavanger, Fornebu-Oslo and Kjevik-Kristiansand were civilian airfields where the air force at best was seen as a guest.
Contrary to Quisling’s claims, an alliance between Norway and Britain was never even close to reality, in spite of the British chartering of the Norwegian merchant fleet and the signing of a war trade agreement in March.45 The concept of war was repulsive to Norwegian Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold and for him it was an absolute that Norway should be neutral. International issues had for years been handled by Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, who had masterminded Norwegian foreign policy since the coming to power of the Labour Party in 1935. Now he took it upon himself to steer Norway outside the war.
Koht
