stay inshore were dismissed as uncertain and weather-dependent. On 29 March Raeder discussed the issue with Hitler in private. He must have had some good arguments, as the Führer accepted that all destroyers could return from Narvik. At Trondheim he was firm: some destroyers should remain. A couple of days later, the SKL obliged, concluding that ‘The Kriegsmarine has a commitment to protect the troops also after disembarkation and it may become necessary to leave some ships behind . . . until the army can no longer be hindered by Norwegian naval forces from fulfilling their task.’
After the invasion, the iron-ore traffic from Narvik would no longer be protected by Norwegian neutrality and a sustainable defence of the Norwegian coast would require a significant reorganisation of the Kriegsmarine’s resources. The larger ships would be needed elsewhere and available forces would be limited to smaller vessels and U-boats. As many of the Norwegian ships as possible would have to be captured intact and pressed into service, however obsolete. It was to be expected that transit of ore through Narvik would cease until the Norwegian sea lanes had been secured by minefields, coastal batteries and air patrols. This would take time, perhaps several months. To handle matters after the invasion, Admiral Hermann Boehm was designated ‘commanding admiral Norway’: Raeder’s direct representative, with headquarters in Oslo. Reporting to him, would be ‘admiral south coast’ in Kristiansand, Konteradmiral Otto Schenk, and ‘admiral west coast’ in Bergen, Vizeadmiral Otto von Schrader; the port commanders in Trondheim, Narvik and Stavanger reporting to the latter. These officers and their staffs were to become involved in the final stages of the planning and would be onboard the invasion vessels to take charge from day one.30
Göring and his Chief of Staff, General Jeschonneck, were annoyed over the downgrading of the Luftwaffe in Operation Weserübung, claiming they had been kept in the dark.31 Never one for co-operation or sharing of influence, Göring feared that the subordination of Luftwaffe units to an overall operational command would threaten his authority. Antiaircraft (A/A) units, airfield engineers, staff and maintenance personnel would be flown into Norway and Denmark as soon as the airfields were secured and there was no way the Luftwaffe could accept losing control over these, he argued. Hitler eventually gave in and on 4 March accepted the placing of all aircraft and personnel under the operational control of the X Fliegerkorps, which remained under Luftwaffe command.
Commander of X Fliegerkorps, the 48-year-old Generalleutnant Hans Ferdinand Geisler, and his Chief of Staff, Major Martin Harlinghausen, were called to Berlin on 5 March and, in a meeting with Göring and Jeschonneck, informed of their involvement in Weserübung. In addition to transport of troops and equipment, X Fliegerkorps was to provide direct support for the landings as well as reconnaissance and offensive capacity against intervening Allied naval forces. Geisler was instructed to co-operate with von Falkenhorst and the Kriegsmarine, but he should not report to any of them. To meet its tasks, the X Fliegerkorps would be temporarily strengthened with additional bomber, long-distance fighter and reconnaissance units, supplementing the two permanent bomber wings, KG 26 and KG 30, so far mainly tasked with anti-shipping operations in the North Sea.32 During March, 500 Junkers Ju52/3m aircraft were gathered for the sole purpose of Operation Weserübung. Oberst Carl-August von Gablenz, a former Lufthansa manager and transport specialist was appointed to oversee the establishment and tactical operation of the transport units. The aircraft and pilots were assembled at airfields in the north while Geisler and his staff moved into Hotel Esplanade in Hamburg. The top floor of the six-storey building was discreetly emptied of all guests, but otherwise the hotel was run as usual to avoid drawing any attention to the arrangement. Maps, communication equipment and files were brought in and Geisler, Harlinghausen, von Gablenz and their staffs settled down to plan the huge task.33
The greatest weakness of Operation Weserübung, besides the lack of enforced co-operation between the services, was the absence of contingencies. There was no indepth assessment of the accuracy of the assumption of Norwegian acceptance of the invasion. Neither was there any fallback if things did not evolve as planned – other than application of brute force. The political and administrative aspects of the invasion and subsequent occupation were nowhere near as well considered as the military, largely because few outside the OKW and the Weserübung staff had knowledge of the operation being planned at all.34 Apart from the initial XXI Corps staff, the OKW and parts of the SKL, knowledge of Operation Weserübung was kept on a strictly need-to-know basis. Division commanders, staff officers and naval and air group commanders were informed individually at the latest possible moment – and with details only of the part of the operation they were to be involved in.35 This would benefit security but was detrimental to any joint doctrine or training prior to the operation.
A draft note on the administration of the occupied areas was issued by Oberst Warlimont in late February and appears to have been accepted without much discussion. A key element in the draft was to secure military control of Norway with minimal disturbance of the existing administration. Hitler believed King Haakon could be persuaded to legalise the occupation through a convincing show of force and it was considered particularly important that he remained in Oslo. Government, civil administration and police should continue as unaffected as possible, provided there was collaboration. The radio would be taken over by German personnel, while press loyal to the new regime could continue as before; the people should be won over through propaganda. Political parties and the Parliament – the Storting – would be ignored and eliminated as soon as possible. If the government would not co-operate, they would be removed and replaced with ministers open to accept the new situation. The same would apply to local authorities outside Oslo.
All communication with the Norwegian government should be through Curt Bräuer, the German minister in Oslo. Von Falkenhorst and his men should focus on the military tasks of the occupation and suppress any activity directed against Germany. When Raeder queried the political development in Norway following the occupation, von Falkenhorst and Keitel reassured him that the Führer would handle this and they, as soldiers, need not worry. Von Falkenhorst assured Raeder it would be feasible to collaborate with Foreign Minister Koht, a statement Raeder later referred to as ‘politically naive’.36
Neutrality Watch
The news of the German attack on Poland was received with anxious apprehension in Norway. The empathy with Poland and anger with Germany was virtually unanimous, but there was also a general feeling that this was not Norway’s war. During the afternoon of 1 September, the Norwegian government issued a declaration of neutrality. When Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later, the neutrality was extended to cover this conflict as well. An immediate freeze of all prices was decided while petrol, coal and some imported provisions were rationed. The government advised that people followed a careful lifestyle and asserted there would be no shortage of basic goods as long as nobody started hoarding. Private use of cars, motorcycles and boats was limited for a while, and the demand for horses and bicycles rose sharply. During September the situation stabilised and the war seemed far away, even if the newspapers often carried stories of death and dramatic rescues at sea. Between September 1939 and April 1940, fifty-five Norwegian merchant ships were sunk outside Norwegian territory, almost exclusively the result of German activities; 393 Norwegian sailors perished in these actions.
There was broad political agreement to limit the mobilisation of the Norwegian defences. The cost had been astronomical during 1914–18 and it was felt it would be better to keep a reasonable coastal defence and only mobilise fully if a crisis developed. Last time, no real threat to Norwegian territory had developed and few believed it would be different now. Consequently, the navy was given the first-line task of maintaining a Neutrality Watch, focusing on escort and patrol duties. The neutrality was to be vigilant but passive; prepared to handle ‘occasional violations’. Force should be used with discretion except in the case of alien warships seeking to enter a restricted area or krigshavn, where all means should be applied after due warning.37 In support, the air forces of the army and navy were mobilised whereas only a limited part of the coastal artillery was set up.38
The Royal Norwegian Navy (RNN) of 1939 was by no
