mentioning the eventuality of a violation of [Norwegian] neutrality, Hitler worked himself into a frenzy.’
When Quisling had left, Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, chief of the operations office at OKW, was instructed to start a low-key investigation ‘with the smallest of staffs’ into how Norway could be occupied ‘should it become necessary’. Several meetings were held over the next few days regarding Norway. Quisling, Hagelin and Scheidt participated in some and apparently received repeated promise of support. Unprecedentedly, Quisling was invited back to the Reichskanzlei on the 18th. This time, Hitler was virtually the only one to speak. He restated his absolute preference for a neutral Norway, but stressed that unless the neutrality was strictly enforced, he would be required to take appropriate measures, securing German interests. British landings in Norway were totally unacceptable and would have to be pre-empted. Finally, Hitler underlined the confidentiality of their meetings but indicated that Quisling would be consulted should a pre-emptive intervention become necessary. There was no mention of any plans for a coup.9
Quisling’s skewed description of the situation in Norway was at best a product of his imagination, but his assessment of the alleged political situation in Norway made an impression in the Reichskanzlei. Hitler was already frustrated by the growing anti-German sentiment in Scandinavia, and the Norwegian’s account of a Jewish-influenced Anglo-Norwegian alliance conspiring for offensive operations made sense to him; it was far from reality, but it had the right ingredients. Used by internal German forces protecting their own interests, Quisling had authenticated previous warnings of Allied intentions in Scandinavia and events were about to take a new direction.10
Neither the German Embassy in Oslo nor the Foreign Office in Berlin had been involved in Quisling’s visit to Germany and when Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop learned that Quisling had met with Hitler he became rather disturbed. The German minister in Oslo, Curt Bräuer, confirmed that Quisling had exaggerated his leverage in Norway and vastly overstated the number of his followers and their political and military influence. Bräuer affirmed that Quisling’s sympathies were national-socialistic and pro-German enough, but his politics could not be taken seriously. In Bräuer’s opinion, openly siding with Quisling and his party would at best be a waste of resources and could very well harm German interests. ‘Nasjonal Samling has no influence in this country and probably never will,’ he concluded, adding that there were no indications that Quisling had support among Norwegian officers. As far as could be judged by the embassy, the officers were loyal to the government, which was really making an effort to enforce the country’s neutrality. The OKW frowned on the prospect of an operation that would depend on support from Norwegian confidants – not to mention the difficulties of maintaining security.11 ‘Quisling has no one behind him,’ army Chief of Staff Generaloberst Halder remarked laconically in his diary. Hitler listened for once and it was decided that even if Scheidt went to Oslo, he should keep the Norwegian ‘Führer’ at arm’s length and, above all, not involve him in any planning.12
Hence, Quisling would have no further involvement in the ensuing preparations for the invasion of Norway, although he took all he had been promised at face value and went home, trusting plans were being developed in Germany that would eventually put him in power in Norway. It is doubtful if Quisling realised he had been sidelined, and that neither he nor his coup figured in the German plans. He stood alone in his treachery and nobody except Hagelin was fully involved.13
After attending a Führer conference on 1 January 1940, Halder wrote in his diary: ‘It is in our interest that Norway remains neutral. We must be prepared to change our view on this, however, should England threaten Norway’s neutrality. The Führer has instructed Jodl to have a report made on the issue.’14 The plan for an intervention in Scandinavia was but a contingency at this stage, only to be activated against a clear British threat. As no such threat was substantiated, focus remained in the West, but wheels had been set in motion.
The initial sketch of the plan, ‘Studie Nord’, was completed by OKW during the second week of January. The Luftwaffe and army staffs were preoccupied with the attack on France and showed little interest when asked to comment. Raeder, on the other hand, ordered the Naval High Command (Seekriegsleitung – SKL), to assess Studie Nord properly and prepare constructive feedback. This they did, concluding that continued Norwegian neutrality was to the advantage of Germany and a British presence could not be tolerated. Still, pre-emptive plans would have to be developed – just in case. On 27 January, Hitler instructed the OKW to set up a special staff – Sonderstab Weserübung – to develop plans for such an operation. Kapitän zur See Theodor Krancke was given the task of leading the work, which commenced on 5 February, based largely on an updated version of SKL’s comments and feedback to Studie Nord.15 Knowledge of Weserübung was to be restricted and the ‘issue of Norway should not leave the hands of the OKW’. Two basic principles emerged when the Sonderstab set down to work. First, an occupation of bases in southern Norway alone was pointless and would be difficult to uphold; Trondheim and Narvik would have to be occupied, as well as the sea lanes along the coast, to secure the transport of iron ore. Secondly, occupation of at least parts of Denmark would be necessary in order to secure sustainable connections to Norway across the Skagerrak and to prevent Allied access to the Baltic. Air bases in northern Jylland would also facilitate anti-shipping operations and reconnaissance in the North Sea.16
Shortly before midnight on 16 February 1940, Captain Philip Vian, on Churchill’s orders, took the British destroyer Cossack into Norwegian territorial waters at Jøssingfjord, south of Stavanger. In spite of protests from Norwegian naval vessels, he attacked and boarded the German tanker Altmark. During the ensuing skirmish, 299 British sailors captured in the South Atlantic by the raider Admiral Graf Spee were liberated from Altmark while eight German sailors were killed. This was at the height of the ‘phoney war’ and the incident created headlines all over the world. General Jodl wrote in his diary that Hitler was furious about the lack of opposition from Germans and Norwegians alike: ‘No opposition, no British losses!’ The Royal Navy had humiliated Germany and the Norwegians had been unable – or unwilling – to defend their neutrality against the British intruders. Rosenberg wrote: ‘Downright stupid of Churchill. This confirms Quisling was right. I saw the Führer today and . . . there is nothing left of his determination to preserve Nordic neutrality.’
Commissioned in 1938, the 10,698-GRT Altmark belonged to a class of fleet auxiliaries, an integral part of the Kriegsmarine’s merchant warfare. On her way home from the South Atlantic, where she had supported the Graf Spee, she was driven into Jøssingfjord south of Stavanger by British destroyers in the afternoon of 16 February 1940. During the night, Captain(D) Philip Vian of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla took Cossack into the fjord in spite of Norwegian protests and after a short gunfight liberated 299 British sailors, captured by Graf Spee. Eight German sailors were killed. (Author’s collection)
The day after the boarding of Altmark, Admiral Raeder was told by an angry Hitler that as Norway ‘was no longer able to maintain its neutrality’, the planning of Operation Weserübung was to be intensified immediately. The time had come to take control of events rather than just prepare for an eventuality. Raeder, uncomfortable with the sudden hurry, advised caution. In another meeting with Hitler a few days later, he argued that maintaining Norwegian neutrality was probably the best way to protect the vital ore transport along the Norwegian Leads. A German intervention would inevitably result in the traffic being threatened by the Royal Navy, and protecting the 1,400-mile coastline would be very difficult, requiring U-boats, aircraft and surface vessels not readily available. On the other hand, a British occupation of Norway would be totally unacceptable, all the more so as Allied forces in Norway, in Raeder’s opinion, would put pressure on Sweden and threaten the main ore traffic through the Baltic. Hitler agreed: Norway must not fall into British hands. Germany would have to act, whatever the cost. A sense of urgency pulsed through the OKW. ‘The Führer is pushing the preparations
