incident, which he to a large extent orchestrated himself. Following this, he argued emphatically that the alleged Norwegian inability to protect its own waters from German trespassing should be used to lay one or more minefields in Norwegian territorial water forthwith, ‘to prevent similar episodes’. This would not ‘prejudice the larger operation’, he held, but might – quite to the contrary – ‘succeed in provoking Germany into imprudent action, which would open the door for us’. Invading Norway on a large scale against Norwegian acceptance, Churchill warned, would be a ‘grave error’. Even a few shots between Norwegian and British forces ‘would be a most unfortunate affair’, but minor violations at carefully selected sites could be performed without confrontations with the Norwegian Navy. His arguments were not accepted by the Cabinet this time either, but he did receive support to start preparations for mining, should it be decided later. Hence the Admiralty was ordered to be prepared for operations in Norwegian waters, which, ‘being minor and innocent may be called Wilfred’.
According to General Ironside, the army was not ready for a ‘hurried action’ and would not be so until mid-March. ‘This [mining] project of the First Lord will accelerate any contemplated German actions in Scandinavia,’ he held with some frustration. ‘We must be absolutely clear that once we land a Force in Scandinavia, we are committed to a war there. . . . The expedition itself may be small to begin with, but will grow to be a major effort.’ On 29 February Chamberlain concluded that, in spite of Altmark, he could ‘not advise the War Cabinet to take action in Norwegian territorial waters for the present’. Any mining would have to be deferred ‘and its execution reconsidered as the situation developed’. In a letter to Ambassador Corbin on the same day, it was explained that the War Cabinet did not think mining or any other minor naval actions offered ‘advantages sufficient to offset the disadvantages on moral ground . . . but rather to make difficult . . . the plan for sending help to Finland’ as it would inevitably make Norway and Sweden hostile to the Allies.80
By the beginning of February the Russians had renewed their attacks on the Finnish defences on the Karelian Isthmus with new units and improved tactics. The brave Finns were tiring and could not hope to sustain the resistance for long. After a few weeks, the Russians were approaching the ‘Mannerheim Line’, the final defences before Helsinki. In an attempt to avoid a disaster, Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim advised his government to opt for peace while still maintaining an impression in the Kremlin that an Allied intervention was an option.81
French impatience with what was considered British indecision was made well known through the embassy in London. Admiral Auphan later wrote: ‘It’s a little cynical to say so, but no one really hoped to stop the Soviet army and save Finland. The idea was to use the pretext of such an operation to lay our hands on the Swedish iron ore, and thus deny it to Germany.’ Paul Reynaud also goes a long way in his memoirs to say that an expeditionary force might never reach Finland, but still attain a major goal should it occupy the Swedish ore fields and halt the export to Germany. Seen from Paris, there were few reasons why the Allies should respect Norwegian and Swedish neutrality if this could avert a German attack on France.82
The British Cabinet eventually agreed to submit yet another memorandum to Oslo and Stockholm, informing that Allied forces were all set for despatch to Finland, requesting co-operation during the transit through Narvik and Kiruna-Gällivare. Should this cooperation lead to hostilities with Germany, other Allied forces were being prepared for ‘extensive military assistance’. The Norwegian government would be informed when British forces were prepared to land at Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger to pre-empt German intervention in western Norway. The memorandum arrived on 2 March, and when discussed by the Norwegian government that same afternoon, there were for the first time voices speaking in favour of accepting the Allied request. Nygaardsvold made it clear however, that as long as he was prime minister, ‘Norway would not voluntarily join the war.’ Nevertheless, there was a clear attitude between his ministers from this point on, that if the Allies would come, it would be vital not to end up in an open fight with British soldiers, driving Norway onto the ‘wrong side’ of the conflict. Koht tried to co-ordinate the official answer with Stockholm, but the Swedish government had already categorically rejected the request and the Norwegian refusal followed on 4 March.83
The Allied military hardly registered the rejections. Général Sylvestre-Gérard Audet and his expeditionary force were standing by in France and most things were also ready in Britain. Major-General Pierce J. Mackesy, commander of the 49th Division, was confirmed as overall land commander and Admiral Edward R. Evans as commander of the naval force.
Chamberlain made it clear to the War Cabinet on the 11th that ‘it would be fatal to abandon the expedition altogether merely because we had received diplomatic refusal from the Scandinavians to our demand for passage.’ Churchill, with fewer reservations than he had two weeks earlier, did not think the landings would be ‘vigorously opposed’ by the Norwegians, but rather ‘a matter for persuasion and cajolery’. The reward was high in his opinion:
Once ashore we should have secured a valuable prize not only in the possession of about a million and a half tons of iron ore, but also in our occupation of the harbour which would be of the greatest use for naval purposes. Even if the railway had been sabotaged, our forces should install themselves securely in the port in the hope that ultimately we might persuade the Scandinavians to give us railway facilities for a further advance.
Things suddenly accelerated. Ambassador Corbin had earlier in the day told Halifax that Prime Minister Daladier would have to consider resigning unless the issue of aid to Finland was decided positively very soon. At the end of the meeting, the War Cabinet invited the CoS to consider the details of landing in Norway and to report the next day for a final review. Also the instructions to be given to the naval and military commanders were to be presented for approval by the Cabinet. Next day, caution prevailed and the Cabinet decided that Operation Avonmouth should be confined to landings at Narvik at first. Departure should be the next day, 13 March, and if things developed satisfactorily at Narvik ‘without any appreciable use of force’, landings at Trondheim could follow immediately, the ships standing by offshore. The forces for Bergen and Stavanger were not to be despatched until further decisions by the Cabinet, in order to avoid the impression of ‘a general attack’. In Oslo, Dormer was instructed to deliver a ‘formal and urgent request’ to the Norwegian government for the passage of ‘a force of Allied troops across Norwegian territory to Finland’ as soon as the news of landings at Narvik was confirmed.84
The British commanders were informed in a meeting with the CoS and parts of the Cabinet later in the day that their objectives were to establish a force at Narvik and to render assistance to Finland, while ensuring that ‘north Swedish ore fields were denied to Germany and Russia for the longest possible period.’ The Norwegian reaction was uncertain, they were told, and the War Cabinet only wished the force to land ‘provided it could do so without serious fighting’. ‘Minor opposition’ could be accepted, even if it involved casualties; the British soldiers were only to fire back ‘as an ultimate measure of self-defence should their forces be in jeopardy’. How to recognise ‘minor opposition’ was not detailed. When the first ships reached Narvik the turn of events would depend on the reactions of the local Norwegian commanders and the Allied commanders’ interpretation of their intentions. General Ironside was certain it would be handled well:
General Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. (Author’s collection)
We are now working away at this plan, which means we must be prepared for some sort of an opposed landing. I can see our great big Scots Guards shouldering the sleepy Norwegians out of the way at 5 a.m. in the morning. It seems inconceivable the Norwegians should put up any opposition if they are in anyway surprised.85
In spite of Ironside’s optimism, Major-General Mackesy, who
