no longer exist. A defense which allows an enemy to consolidate his approach without hindrance will lose. A defense which makes no effective effort to destroy the lines of supplies and communications of the enemy will lose.
An effective defense . . . requires the equipment to attack an aggressor on his route before he can establish strong bases within the territory of American vital interests.18
Meanwhile, the first request from abroad for the Navy’s “surplus” World War I destroyers had come from Norway as early as January. The President had told the Norwegians that the Navy had “none to spare” because of the requirements of the Neutrality Patrol, adding that such a sale would be illegal and he preferred the American Republics to “have first call” on any U.S. ships that became available.19 In the spring, Latin American nations sought the old ships, but there were none readily available, and in some cases the need seemed dubious; in the Uruguayan Navy, three admirals and assorted lesser brass presided over but one venerable gunboat and several tugs and dispatch boats, and were thought to pine for more imposing commands.20
Up until April the British Admiralty had ordered only about $2½ million worth of naval equipment—mostly torpedo boat engines and degaussing wire. In May, Prime Minister Churchill requested forty or fifty of the old destroyers, but the President replied that a transfer of warships would require an act of Congress, which did not appear politically possible. In June, despite objections in the Navy, the President did try to switch a number of motor torpedo boats and sub chasers under construction for the Navy to the British, under the dubious sanction of the general laws regarding modification of contracts. However, Congress intervened, condemned the illegality of the project and, while the President bandaged his burned fingers, added a section to a naval bill prohibiting the transfer of naval equipment unless the CNO certified it not essential to the defense of the United States.21
The President was reluctant to part with the destroyers until he was more sure of British survival. He told Ickes on 5 June that the four-stackers would not “be of any use” to the British because they were old and lacked firepower, especially antiaircraft weapons. He explained that he was reluctant “to enrage Hitler” to so little purpose, noting cogently: “We cannot tell the turn that the war will take, and there is no use endangering ourselves unless we can achieve some results for the Allies.”22
However, British destroyer losses in the Dunkirk evacuation and the entry of Italy into the war, opening a Mediterranean theater, increased British need. Churchill reasoned that fright was the mother of generosity, observing to Lothian that he had “no intention of relieving the United States from any well-grounded anxieties” concerning its peril should a defeated Britain be forced to surrender its fleet into Nazi hands. But to sound too strident a note of pessimism would discourage American aid. The Prime Minister was able to adopt the appropriate tone of stern determination to carry on and pointed reminders that it might not be possible to do so without help.23
When the President ascertained from Admiral Ghormley and Captain Kirk in London that the British, still in possession of command of the seas and building up their air power, were hale and determined,24 he became more amenable to the British entreaties. His only worry was the prospect of domestic opposition. As he dryly told the Cabinet, it would be difficult for Admiral Stark to certify the ships useless when over a hundred of them were either serving with the Atlantic Squadron or being reconditioned for service! Ben Cohen, an assistant to the President, argued that a transfer of destroyers would not contravene the congressional prohibition because, by helping to sustain England, it would in the long run strengthen, not weaken, American defenses. The President was unimpressed with this line of reasoning, maintaining that Congress was “in no mood . . . to allow any form of sale.” He asked Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to consider the feasibility of selling destroyers to Canada for exclusive use in the Western Hemisphere, thus releasing other warships for duty elsewhere, but no one was enamored of this obvious subterfuge.25
On 1 August, Knox met with Lothian and found the Englishman “almost tearful in his pleas for help and help quickly.” The American Navy had long been interested in obtaining bases in the Caribbean, and during the thirties the question had become linked with that of the Allied World War I debts, so there were suggestions now that the needed bases should be seized in payment for the debts. Indeed, in late May, Lothian had recommended that his government lease base sites in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad to the United States. The Royal Navy, wishing to reduce still further the number of its warships in the western Atlantic, was favorably inclined, but the British Cabinet rejected the suggestion because of the paucity of American aid up until then. Now, Knox raised the possibility of trading the destroyers for the bases.26
On 2 August, Knox broached his idea to the Cabinet. The President seemed enthusiastic, although he and Secretary of State Hull were worried about Congress. Roosevelt then sounded the British out on the proposal; he also requested “positive assurances” that the British fleet would be sent to North America and not surrendered or scuttled in the event Great Britain were to be overrun by a Nazi invasion. But the British response was discouraging. While willing to let American ships and planes use facilities at their New World bases, they did not wish to lease British territory outright. They requested 96 destroyers, 20 motor torpedo boats, and ample Navy dive bombers; also, Churchill was unwilling to give the assurances asked for by the President for fear of lowering morale by suggesting Britain’s defeat and, perhaps, from a desire not to permit the Americans to feel too secure.
The President deemed the British response “entirely unsatisfactory.” He pointed out the limited quantity of American ships and planes and argued that Churchill’s remarks concerning the Royal Navy would merely involve a repetition of prior public statements. He said that he was willing to use the bases as the British thought best, but insisted on an understanding that the United States had the right to lease or purchase the territory in event of sudden necessity, such as an Axis attack on the Western Hemisphere.
The Prime Minister resented having to pawn portions of the Empire, so he decided that appearances would best be served by leasing the base sites as gifts, independent of the destroyer transfer, to avoid the sordid idea of a “deal.” However, the President’s needs were the reverse. How could Admiral Stark certify the ships as surplus unless they were bartered for something of greater value? On a scratchy transatlantic telephone, Churchill complained, “Empires just don’t bargain.” And Attorney General Robert H. Jackson responded, “Well, Republics do.”
Hull thought the British were “crawfishing”; but they legitimately feared future bickering over the size of the bases if the Americans were allowed a “blank cheque.” The Americans, impressed with the need for speed, could not understand the slowness of the British in coming to agreement; every moment of delay augmented the peril to both nations. The British Cabinet, save for the Colonial Secretary, favored the transaction, and a compromise was swiftly reached whereby two of the sites were given as gifts and the others handed over in exchange for the American warships. The President, fearful of entrusting the transfer to congressional debate, and impressed by the time factor, authorized the transaction by executive decree.27
The U.S. Navy, which felt that it could not spare so much as a “row-boat” for the British in light of its own myriad deficiencies, was presented with a fait accompli. But the bad news about the loss of the destroyers was mitigated by the acquisition of the long cherished and vitally needed Atlantic and Caribbean bases. Admiral Stark eagerly approved the transaction, and reaction in the service was generally favorable, although restrained.28 One enthusiastic officer said, “. . . we have made a fine deal but the British Government will probably go bankrupt trying to keep those boats in oil.”29
Critics joked that the President had the constitutional prerogative to “dispose” the fleet, not “dispose of” it, and to many people the Attorney General’s legal brief on behalf of the transfer seemed strained, yet the transaction was so patently in the national interest
