Frontpage
Special Counter Intelligence in World War II Europe
By Keith Ellison ©2015, Revised ©2017
Preface
I began my research into Special Counter Intelligence Units over 25 years ago, and was fortunate enough at that time to be able to correspond with several former X-2/OSS officers who had served in the American units in France. Work prevented me from finishing my research until now – though, in truth, I will probably never stop looking into this intriguing subject. I served with the British Army Intelligence Corps, and following that I worked for both the British Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Nothing in the following pages is offered as the official view of the current British government or any of its departments. In the following pages I will try to set out the history, role and organization of the SCI units, though I will first give some background to the intelligence environment which helped create and develop them.
Special Counter Intelligence Units (SCIUs or SCI Units are terms also used throughout this book) were devised by MI6’s Section V, its Counter Espionage arm, in order to penetrate the enemy intelligence services in the Field. They were aided in this by MI6’s control of ULTRA, and in particular, a sub-set of decryptions known as ISOS and ISK, which will be defined further in the following chapters. MI6 had this control because the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park was subordinated to the Intelligence Service. Section V expanded rapidly from 1940, as the implications and possibilities became more apparent following the successful breaking of Abwehr ciphers. In addition to using cipher, the Germans also used service jargon and codenames for officers, agents, operations and equipment. Section V officers in neutral countries were able to confirm and help further interpret the deciphered messages. Once military operations were in planning for North Africa and Europe, MI6 recognized the need for a military field unit which could act on sensitive ISOS information and begin penetrating the GIS using both double agents and Controlled Enemy Agents (CEAs) – most of the latter being agents using wireless transmitter (W/T) sets for communication with their German handlers.
It must be remembered when considering the actions of intelligence agencies - and the people who work for them - that each agency has it own goals and priorities. While Allied agencies can often work closely together towards a common goal, their own training and mission will inject a degree of competition into any liaison relationship – even between agencies working for the same country.
I was reminded of this important point when reading an excellent dissertation by Brett Lintott (“Confidence Men – The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45”, Graduate Dept of History, University of Toronto, 2015). As A Force – a deception organization set up in 1940-41 by Col Dudley Clarke in Cairo – became more influential in military operations in that region, it began to dominate SIME (Security Intelligence Middle East – the local Security Agency) in prioritizing the use of double agents and CEAs. As a consequence, when operations expanded into Italy, they expected the SCI officers to likewise give way – which, thanks to A Force’s control of the Deception Committees, was mainly the case. But the SCIU was primarily intended as a penetration organization, not simply a means for facilitating deception. In Western Europe, where it was decided early on that CEAs could be used only for tactical rather than strategic deception, there was more scope for the SCIUs to operate in their true roles. MI5, which at the time had a surplus of trained CI officers being underused in the UK, was hoping to expand its role in CI outside the official remit of Britain and its possessions. It was ironic that the “senior” British SCI Units (104 and 106 SCIUs), mostly staffed with MI5 officers whose role was to advise on and run deception cases, found that their roles were curtailed by the arbitrary decision of SHAEF G Ops B Sub-Section to restrict major deception operations to non-continental double agents/controlled enemy agents (DAs/CEAs). Most of the successful penetration work in Northwest Europe was therefore completed by OSS/X-2 units, guided, in some cases, by 104 SCIU.
I have tried to keep this work concise and to concentrate as much as possible on the organization, personnel and casework of the SI(b) and SCI Units as they developed. Their evolution into CCUs and SSU/X-2 in the post-war period is mentioned, but solely to show that these units continued, even after their initial mission (the penetration and destruction of the GIS) was completed, and to give some indication of their new targets as the Cold War developed.
I have not so far been able to research in the published archives for documents covering SI(b)/SCI Units in Greece, which seemed more an area for SIME operations than anyone else. I did find one reference to SILO (Security Intelligence Liaison Office, a subordinate office of SIME, based in Bari) using SI(b) as cover for deployment into Greece. Since Greece and the Balkans are a topic deserving consideration in their own right, I have therefore not addressed GIS or Allied activity there, except where the GIS used Athens as a base for operations into the Middle East for the CHEESE case.
The following lists explain items which have occasionally been mentioned or duplicated in the text, but are given here as a quick reference guide, and are not exhaustive. First is a list of MI6 code numbers used to delineate MI6 representatives in Stations abroad, and the countries where they were situated, as given by the UK’s National Archives website; in the book “Triplex”, by Nigel West and Oleg Tsarov, (Yale University Press, 2009) and in “The Secret Wireless War” by Geoffry Pidgeon, (UPSO 2003). Next is a List of Specialist Terms, Codenames and Abbreviations; after this is a list of Codenames of Military Operations and Deception Plans. Finally there is a short Note on References and Sources. At the end of the book I have provided a number of appendices which contain documents relating to the development and use of the SCI organization, and provides some details on many of the double agents and CEAs who had a part in the story of Allied deception and penetration of the enemy’s intelligence services.
Finally, my thanks to Mr Lintott for providing me with a copy of his dissertation; to Sultana Press of Fullerton, California, who provided me with a copy of Captain Akeley P Quirk’s book “Recollections of World War II – OSS SCI Unit 6th Army Group (US) 1944-1945”, 1981; and to my wife, for letting me follow this obsession/project for so long without divorcing me.
Keith Ellison, 2015
Information that comes from the UK’s National Archives is Crown copyright, reproduced in accordance with the Open Government Licence for Public Sector Information - see http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government.
Illustrations
Chapter 4
Diagram – The Invasion of Italy (Based on Official Fifth Army History Pt 1 – From Activation to the Fall of Naples, 5 Jan-6 Oct 1943).
Diagram - Salerno Landings (Based on Official Fifth Army History Pt 1 – From Activation to the Fall of Naples, 5 Jan – 6 Oct 1943).
Chapter 8
Captain (later Major) John Bertram Oakes, Inf. (Source: RG 226, Entry 224, Box 566, NARA).
Chapter 10
SCI Laissez-Passer Photo of Rene Florentz @ FLOWER (Source: RG 226, Entry 210, Box 315, WN 13045, NARA).
MI6 Country Designations
11000 Representative handling 11-Land Bulgaria
12000 Representative handling 12-Land Germany
13000
