first time prepared an analysis of South Africa’s altered security situation. The paper identified three threat factors, namely, the ideology of racial equality, the growth of black nationalism and the Soviet Union’s plans for world domination.[1] This was the first time that the USSR and communism were identified as threats to South Africa’s security.
A new security strategy
The SADF accordingly readied itself for both conventional and counterinsurgency warfare. As the 1969 Defence White Paper explained: “Although an unconventional threat already exists in the form of terrorism, the possibility of a conventional attack is not excluded.”[2] This approach was based on a new threat analysis developed by the SADF the previous year. The conventional threats foreseen involved a communist invasion or an invasion under the banner of the UN or the OAU – similar to the Korean War – to wrest SWA from South African control. It was also thought that the Rhodesian question could generate a conventional invasion of the Republic. In the eyes of the SADF strategists, the threat of unconventional war would become acute if the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia fell.[3] They feared that, if SWA were conquered, the possibility existed that the victors could see such an operation as “just one phase in a campaign to ‘liberate’ the other white areas as well”.[4] The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the failure of Operation Savannah brought the threat much closer to home. It was against this background that South African strategists took a good look at the ideas of the French general André Beaufre (1902–1975).
Beaufre served in Algeria during that territory’s war of independence (1954–1962), and based his ideas on counterrevolutionary strategy on the insights he gained there. Although the French won virtually every tactical encounter with the rebels, Beaufre ascribed their defeat to the fact that they could not win over the hearts and minds of the Algerian people. They could not offer the vision of a better future under French rule than an independent Algeria under the rebels. Therefore, he reasoned, the state’s strategic objective in a counterinsurgency war should be
[t]o deprive the enemy of his trump cards. There are two facets to this; we must first maintain and increase our prestige, not merely by showing we have adequate force available but also by showing the future we hold out has possibilities; secondly by thoroughgoing reforms we must cut the ground from under the feet of the malcontents.[5]
The answer, according to Beaufre, was a “total strategy”, of which the “use of military force is only part of the action. The action is total and it must prepare, assist and exploit the results expected from military operations by suitable operations in the psychological, political, economic and diplomatic fields.”[6]
Beaufre also coined the term “total onslaught”, which was later often misunderstood. He did not mean that the onslaught was total in its intensity, but in its breadth. It was total in the sense that it was waged in all fields of life – military, political, diplomatic, economic, religious, cultural, sporting and so on – which was why a “total onslaught” could be countered only by a “total strategy”. The answering total strategy is also not total in its intensity, but rather refers to an overarching vision and programme, to which all aspects of government policy (including military action) have to be tailored.
Another point, which became relevant in the Border War context, was Beaufre’s discussion of the offensive and defensive approach, where he refined ideas developed by Von Clausewitz.[7] The defensive, Beaufre reasoned, “consists of accepting the enemy initiative and rejecting the political arrangement proposed. This attitude can be maintained for a certain length of time but as a rule it does not bring the argument to an end: a defensive attitude cannot lead to any political solution.” The defensive, he continued, “can only pay if it leads sooner or later to a resumption of the initiative, in other words to some offensive action. A counter-offensive is essential if submission to the will of the opponent is to be avoided” (Beaufre’s emphasis).[8]
It will become clear how Beaufre’s thoughts on the twin elements of initiative and counteroffensive were translated into action by the South African government’s security strategy and the SADF’s military strategy. Beaufre visited South Africa in 1974 at the invitation of the South African military attaché in Paris, and even gave a lecture at the Defence Staff College.[9] Under his influence, the Chief of the SADF (and later Minister of Defence), General Magnus Malan, analysed the communist “total onslaught” as being waged against four power bases: political/diplomatic, economic, social/psychological and security.[10] Malan believed that the answer to this total onslaught was a “total strategy” such as Beaufre proposed. As far as could be established, the first reference to a total strategy was made in the Defence White Paper of 1973, but it was mentioned only in passing.[11] Two years later, the idea started to take root and a more elaborate analysis followed.[12] In 1977, then Defence Minister PW Botha tabled a White Paper in which he identified the Soviet Union as the major culprit in the Angolan and South West African conflict, claiming that South Africa is “involved in a war”:
It is therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary . . . [it] is the combined responsibility of all government departments. This can be taken further – it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every population group.[13]
The total strategy was thus defined as “the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure.”[14]
One should not be surprised that it took until 1977 for the government to come up with a coherent and coordinated response to what it perceived as the total onslaught against it. The catalyst was the role of the USSR and Cuba in Angola in the preceding two years. If these two powers had not intervened in 1975, it is likely that the wars and bloodshed up to 1990 would have been much more limited than they eventually were.
On 4 March 1980, the government accepted a top-secret policy document, informally known as the Green Book, in which the total strategy was explained.[15] The threat, according to the document, came primarily from the Soviet Union, which would use “proxy forces” (in other words, the Cubans, SWAPO and the ANC/SACP) against the Republic. This threat was so serious that it could “totally destroy” the country.
The document gave details of policies to be followed on constitutional, social and economic terrain. This followed closely the policy of the Botha government, which was to reform apartheid and to give blacks a stake in the battle against “communist imperialism”. The main pillars of apartheid were not really questioned. On the contrary, although the human rights of black South Africans were recognised in theory, this had to be exercised through the so-called black homelands. White rule over “white” South Africa had to be safeguarded.
As far as security matters were concerned, a growth in ANC terrorist activity was expected. To combat the threat, South Africa needed to establish a “constellation” of friendly neighbouring states. If this succeeded, the threat of a conventional invasion of the country could be contained to the area north of 10° South. If not, the threat could move southwards to South Africa’s neighbours. The document foresaw that South Africa would
ensure its national security through coordinated offensive pro-active behaviour on all power bases in the strategic and tactic areas. It does not imply that the RSA is striving for aggression against any state or group or is planning any territorial expansion, but if any threat rises from wherever against the RSA, the necessary defensive or pre-emptive operations will have to be conducted against those threats.
Moreover, the prestige of “resistance
