in the late 1970s, he – together with Ep van Lill and André Kruger – “developed the training systems, training programmes, training doctrine and aides-memoire for mechanised infantry”. They tested their ideas in battle simulation exercises at De Brug and Schmidtsdrif, and even involved the air force in order to experiment with the “evolving tactical and operational mobile warfare concepts – one of these being the comfortable utilisation of air support with the close coordination of indirect fire support and ground manoeuvre”. He also writes, “We taught our combat leaders situational awareness, thinking one step ahead, fast moving action, leading from the front, quick orders and smoothly attacking from the line of advance.”[52]
A new structure and new equipment
Operation Savannah had mixed consequences for the SADF. In Willem Steenkamp’s words: “For the South Africans – short of men, short of equipment, their defence force still struggling to wrench itself free from the decades of neglect that had followed World War II – the situation was immensely worrying.”[53] Yet it was the army’s first experience of mobile warfare in the southern African bush, and as such created a laboratory where the new doctrine could be tested.
One of the most important consequences of Operation Savannah was that it showed the inadequacy of the South African weaponry. Magnus Malan lamented the country’s lack of “comparable firepower”: “It was a shock to compare the obsolete weaponry of the Defence Force with those of the enemy. This shortcoming needed urgent rectification,” he wrote in his memoirs.[54] The need for an infantry fighting vehicle to replace the obsolete Saracen armoured personnel carrier had been identified by 1968,[55] but development really took off in the wake of Operation Savannah.
The fact is that the motorised infantry’s main vehicles – Unimog and Bedford trucks – were too soft for the harsh African terrain. A proper infantry fighting vehicle was necessary in order to transform the motorised infantry into mechanised infantry. The four-wheeled Eland armoured cars also found it difficult to move everywhere – the setback at Ebo occurred partly as a result of this deficiency.[56] The army had very little with which to counter Soviet-supplied T-34 and T-54/55 tanks used by FAPLA and the Cubans; the Eland’s low-pressure 90-mm gun did not have the necessary penetrative capacity. The Second World War-vintage G-2 140-mm (5,5-inch) gun used by the artillery had a range somewhat shorter than the enemy equivalent – 18 km versus 23 km – while the BM-21 (“Stalin organ”) tactical rocket system used by the Cubans was greatly worrying. The need for something similar in the SADF was identified.[57]
A re-equipment programme had started in 1974, but Operation Savannah emphasised the need for rapid action. One of the first breakthroughs was the development of the Ratel IFV. Three years after the prototype saw the light of day, in 1974, the Minister of Defence reported to Parliament that the Ratel had been “successfully industrialised”.[58]
The significance of the Ratel can hardly be exaggerated.[59] It was the single most important weapon system in the execution of cross-border operations in Angola. With its six wheels, later equipped with “flat-run” tyres, the Ratel was the army’s most mobile vehicle in the bush throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The infantry fighting version was equipped with a rapid-firing 20-mm gun, able to fire both armour-piercing and high-explosive ammunition, and the gunner was able to switch instantly between the two types. It had space for a section of infantry, who could either stand with their upper bodies out of hatches on top or shoot out of portholes in the side of the vehicle.
The infantry could therefore enter the battlefield in an armoured vehicle that had a formidable fighting capability in its own right. When needed, the section could jump out within seconds and fight further on foot. Not only did the Ratel give the infantry a hitherto unheard-of degree of mobility, but it also enabled the troops to enter battles relatively fresh – at any rate, compared with soldiers who had to walk long distances carrying heavy packs to reach the front. Furthermore, the Ratel gave protection against small-arms fire, although not against the formidable Soviet-supplied 23-mm anti-aircraft gun, with which both SWAPO and FAPLA were equipped.
There were various models of the Ratel. Apart from the above-mentioned Ratel 20, there was one with a 90-mm gun, which was basically the Eland 90’s turret on top of the Ratel chassis. This model was utilised as an armoured car and as an antitank weapon, and even at times successfully took on the Soviet T-54/55 tank, although its gun was not really up to the task. Against infantry or lightly armoured targets, it was very useful. In close-quarters fighting, as against the T-54/55, its main protection was its formidable mobility, although the lack of a stabilised gun somewhat mitigated this (the Ratel had to stop each time if it wanted to fire accurately, giving up the protection its mobility offered). One could, of course, reason that the dense bush of southern Angola itself acted as a kind of protection, because firing distances were often as little as 30 m. The bush was, in effect, “neutral”, as it protected both SWAPO and the Angolans as well as the SADF forces. The decisive factor here was reaction speed. This improved only through intensive training, a field in which the SADF was vastly superior to its adversaries.
Then there was the Ratel Command, which was specially equipped as a mobile headquarters and armed with a 12,7-mm machine gun. Another model became a mobile 81-mm mortar platform, and later on even an antitank missile model was developed. Taking everything into account, the Ratel was probably the best and most flexible weapon system in the army’s arsenal, one without which its operations in Angola would have been impossible.
The Ratel was only the second IFV in the world. The first was the Soviet BMP-1, which entered service in 1969. After the BMP-1 and the Ratel, several other countries followed suit, including the US, which developed the Bradley, the British the Warrior and the Germans the Marder.[60] In this regard, the Ratel was a real trailblazer.
To utilise the Ratel, a new breed of infantryman was needed. Hitherto, the South African army had deployed either light or motorised infantry. The new doctrine saw the introduction of mechanised infantry. In January 1977, the Bloemfontein-based 1 SA Infantry, with Joep Joubert in command, was tasked as the training unit for all mechanised infantry. While on deployment in Ovamboland, Joubert had evaluated the possibility of establishing a permanent mechanised combat group in the operational area, and his recommendations led to the formation of Battle Group Juliet, under the command of Commandant Frank Bestbier. At the beginning of 1979, it evolved into 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, which was a totally new kind of animal.[61] Known simply as 61 Mech, the unit consisted of two mechanised infantry companies and an armoured car squadron, as well as its own organic artillery battery, antitank platoon, mortar platoon and combat engineer troop.[62] It became arguably the most experienced conventional warfare unit in the army.
Another weapon system that was a direct result of the lessons learnt in Operation Savannah was the medium G-5 gun (155 mm) and its self-propelled model, the G-6, which replaced the obsolete G-2. The development of the G-5 weapons system started in 1977.[63] The first series production began in 1982, and the G-5/G-6 was continually improved. These guns had a range of 39 km, which is unsurpassed even today.[64] (The range has since been improved to an astounding 75 km.)[65] The BM-21 “Stalin organ” was copied and improved in the form of the Valkiri 127-mm multi-launched rocket system. With its improved artillery, the army became able to shell any opponent accurately and from a distance, without the enemy’s being able to counter it.
The lack of a proper anti-aircraft system remained a problem. The Cactus missile system was designed for base protection and fared badly in the bush. The only interim system was the Ystervark – a simple 20-mm rapid-firing gun mounted on the back of a lorry. It was hardly adequate for use against MiG-21s or MiG-23s.
All of this was supplemented with the Olifant Mk 1 main battle tank, which was a drastic modernisation of the old Centurion. The petrol engine was replaced with an adapted Caterpillar diesel engine and a new stabilised 105-mm gun was installed, together with additional armour. The Olifant would form an important fist in the final phase of the war, and was designed as the answer to the Soviet T-62 tank, which was
