Jannie Geldenhuys was following the progress on radio, there were a few tense minutes until they heard Viljoen was unhurt. This did not stop Geldenhuys from joining Serfontein’s combat group just the next day!
In his detailed report, Dippenaar mentions that Viljoen, with “his inexhaustibility and activity was at that stage my biggest worry. The best I can describe General Viljoen is undoubtedly like an ant, because whenever there was a chance, he walked about, looked at equipment and talked to the soldiers. At no stage did he interfere with my command, although, from time to time and when asked, he gave his opinion.”[35]
By early afternoon on 13 June, the Smokeshell complex was completely free of SWAPO and in South African possession. Altogether, 267 bodies of PLAN fighters were found and buried, while 10 anti-aircraft guns and huge quantities of ammunition were also taken. Because of the length of the operation, it was judged that the insurgents had evacuated their bases at Ionde and that it would be unnecessary to attack that as well. Then 61 Mech moved back to the base area at Mulemba, where the following day the troops crowded every available radio to listen to the rugby Test between the Springboks and the visiting British Lions. Their day was made when the Boks trounced the Lions 26–9, which made up somewhat for the traumatic battle of four days before.
According to Geldenhuys, a pattern developed during Operation Sceptic that would be repeated later. “Firstly, an ants’ nest is kicked open and the ants scatter. Secondly, there is a search around the nest for ants. Smokeshell was the ants’ nest. Most cadres swarmed out in little groups to seek refuge at their other nests, or bases. Then a combination of area operations, follow-ups, and search-and-destroy operations were launched to locate and destroy them.”[36]
It is not necessary to follow the operations of the next few days in detail. Suffice to say that the South Africans stormed various PLAN bases, but found them empty, hurriedly evacuated after the huge clash at Smokeshell.[37] In the course of these operations, Chris Serfontein and Combat Group 10 also clashed with SWAPO’s so-called mechanised brigade north of Xangongo. Apparently, Serfontein came across the enemy rearguard and immediately attacked with two companies, assisted by some SAAF Impalas and mortar fire. Jannie Geldenhuys, who was present, relates that there wasn’t really a true fight, as SWAPO immediately broke and fled. Many documents, as well as 76-mm guns and other war materiel, were captured and taken back to South West Africa.[38]
But, on the way back to SWA, something happened to Serfontein’s Combat Group 10 that would be an ominous harbinger of what lay ahead. The plan was for the force to move through the village of Mongua, where it would meet up with Dippenaar’s force and return home. What Serfontein did not know was that a company-size mechanised FAPLA force was concentrated there. It appears that the Angolans were as surprised as the South African advance party (travelling in Buffels) when the two parties unexpectedly bumped into each other, but both recovered quickly. The Angolans charged with three BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, but the South Africans knocked them out in quick succession. Serfontein immediately sent a reinforcement company to the front, and together they counterattacked. An air strike with Mirages followed, and the Angolans fled.[39]
The fight itself was not that remarkable; the South Africans reacted rapidly to an unexpected situation and came out on top. This would happen countless times in the future. What made this fight especially noteworthy is that this was the first time that the SADF and FAPLA had clashed while the South Africans were fighting SWAPO. Given the circumstances, one gets the impression that it was purely incidental – there was no deliberate attempt by FAPLA to intervene in the war between the SADF and PLAN. Nevertheless, a line had been crossed, and within a relatively short time the South Africans would find it more and more difficult to fight against PLAN without coming up against FAPLA as well.
Conclusion
Operation Sceptic, especially the Battle of Smokeshell, was an important development in the Border War. Its predecessors, operations Reindeer, Rekstok and Saffraan, had been limited in scope and time. Sceptic evolved into a much longer operation, during which PLAN was hunted deep within its own rear areas in Angola for about three weeks. Apart from Savannah, this was the biggest and longest operation the SADF had been involved in since 1945.
Another difference from the Battle of Cassinga was that the result at Smokeshell was never really in doubt, in spite of the sudden setback Combat Team 2 suffered in the south of the complex. Although the troops of 61 Mech were highly trained and motivated, they had seen no action before the battle, yet they acquitted themselves well. The members of Louis Harmse’s Combat Team 2 in particular would be understandably haunted by their experience for decades to come, but even in the face of death they did what they had to do – they attacked the enemy and defeated him.
Nevertheless, Operation Sceptic laid bare a number of deficiencies in the SADF that had to be remedied. These are addressed below.
Intelligence: Several officers were not satisfied with the intelligence they received about the Smokeshell complex. According to Commandant Dippenaar, there “remained uncertainty about the nature of the target”. For instance, even though he knew Smokeshell consisted of 13 bases, it was unclear what “the composition of the enemy” was in each complex.[40] The biggest factor at the time was whether the enemy was dug in or not. The battle plan was based on information that there were only shallow foxholes. The fact that this information was wrong was directly responsible for the problems encountered by Combat Team 2.
The army and SAAF: During this operation the coordination between the SAAF and the army was less than optimal. Firstly, the air attacks in the preceding days either would have warned SWAPO of a planned attack or would have encouraged an evacuation as a precaution against further attacks. Secondly, on the day of the attack on Smokeshell the air attacks were not properly coordinated with the ground assault. Given that the ground forces would reach Smokeshell only later that day, what was the advantage of an early-morning attack? It only gave PLAN time to recover their wits and either prepare for the expected assault or melt away into the dense bush. Reflecting on the battle, Paul Fouché quite correctly wrote in his report: “Air support must be followed up immediately with an attack.”[41] Louis Harmse and Jakes Jacobs also criticised the coordination between the air force and the army.[42]
Underestimating your enemy: In his war diary, Commandant Dippenaar states that intelligence had indicated that PLAN would not stand and fight, and that the leaders would flee first.[43] It is true that the defenders of the northern parts of the complex had fled before the attack started, but many of those in the south stood fast and fought courageously. Combat Team 2’s attack, with the Ratels’ 20-mm guns rattling and the Ratel 90s spewing death and destruction, must have been very frightening. Yet eyewitness accounts tell of SWAPO cadres fighting to the death, spraying the South Africans with deadly fire from 14,5-mm and 23-mm anti-aircraft guns.
In a comment reminiscent of Cassinga, eyewitness Chris de Klerk explained how SWAPO kept at it: “When you shot one terr behind his gun, another jumped in, and if you shoot him another jumps up. If you shot one it didn’t mean the weapon didn’t work any more – they jumped like rabbits out of those holes, and carried on shooting at you.”[44]
It is never a good policy to underestimate your enemy.
Navigation: The terrain in and around Smokeshell was flat and featureless, while dense bush restricted sight and faint paths made navigation difficult. Several times, both during the advance and at the target itself, the South Africans lost their way and floundered about. Once, an SAAF spotter plane guided them back to where they had to be; at other times, they only had a general idea of where they were. This would prove to be an issue for the duration of the war. Only in 1983/1984 did the artillery get a primitive kind of navigation system, along the lines of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which took about 75 minutes to set up.[45]
Equipment:
