time. Had SWAPO learnt its lesson?) The position was, as the crow flies, about 180 km north of the border, but, with winding sandy tracks along which the army would advance, the distance would in fact be about 260 km.[21]
The idea was that Combat Group 61 would lead the way across the border towards Chifufua, with Combat Group 10 in its wake. By noon on 10 June, the attackers were meant to be in place. After an aerial bombardment by the SAAF and a follow-up by 61 Mech’s artillery, the South Africans would move in from the east and advance through the complex. It was expected that the enemy would not stand and fight, but would immediately flee westwards. The two parachute companies from Combat Group 61 would be choppered in on the western side to act as stopper groups. Afterwards, the focus of the attack would shift eastwards to the Ionde complex, with four positions and 700 men.[22] And while the assault on Smokeshell took place, Combat Group 10 would take on Mulola, to the south.[23]
Of course, General Constand Viljoen again insisted on being part of the operation, and accompanied Commandant Dippenaar in his command Ratel. As at Cassinga, this would cause discomfort in certain quarters.
The Battle of Smokeshell
The SADF went to considerable lengths to keep PLAN from learning that another big cross-border operation was on the way. The units earmarked for the operation spent approximately ten days before Smokeshell either doing highly visible exercises or counterinsurgency operations in Ovamboland to mislead the enemy.
The SAAF had learnt from Operation Reindeer that air support had to be adequate. For Sceptic, a strong force, consisting of 18 Mirage F1AZ fighter-bombers and 4 Buccaneer and 4 Canberra bombers, was sent to South West Africa. For security reasons – the SAAF feared that people living around Waterkloof Air Force Base, just outside Pretoria, could inform “unfriendly” embassies who could in turn warn Angola and SWAPO about the activity– the aircraft flew there separately and mostly by a roundabout route via Upington.
This makes it all the more difficult to understand why the air force immediately announced its presence in the operational area by attacking both SWAPO’s Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre at Lubango and, of all places, Smokeshell itself on 7 June, and again on 9 June, the day before the ground attack. Apparently, they caused little damage.[24] It is not known what SWAPO deduced from this, but it seems a strange way to keep your enemy in the dark about your intentions.
The troops started moving from their bases early on 8 June. The convoy was an impressive sight. When the first vehicles reached Eenhana for a fuel refill, the last ones were just about to leave Omuthiya, the starting point.[25] But, as the previous operations also illustrated, the planned march tempo was too ambitious, thanks to the dense bush and sandy ground. The Eland armoured cars led the way, followed by the Ratels and then the G-2 Magirus Deutz gun tractors. By the time the big tractors were on the move, the tracks had been ploughed up by the Elands and Ratels, with the result that engines overheated, some guns broke loose due to metal fatigue, and delay after delay tested people’s tempers. Mulemba, already secured and prepared as a temporary base by Van Graan’s Combat Group 54, was reached on the evening of 9 June.[26]
Early the next day, the force moved out again for the 130-km advance to Smokeshell, with Combat Group 61 in a huge convoy of 151 vehicles. The troops were tense, but hyped up. As often happens in battles, things had already started to go wrong. At Mulemba, helicopters were supposed to pick up the paratroop stopper groups and deliver them to their designated areas west of Smokeshell. But someone had forgotten to organise fuel for the Pumas at Mulemba, which meant an important part of Dippenaar’s battle plan could not be executed.
Nevertheless, by 13h15 the rest of the force was in place, the teams all having reported “Ek’s hier!” (I’m here!). The SAAF’s strike force was present in full strength. Their attack was meant to stun the defenders so that they would offer no or little resistance. However, this raises the question of why the air attack started at 08h00, while the ground attack began only at 12h00, giving the guerrillas ample time to recover. It made no sense, as some of the officers present themselves observed. At any rate, the attack was a failure, with the bombs falling in an empty area to no effect, apart from warning SWAPO that something was brewing.
At 13h15 Dippenaar gave the order: “Laat waai!” (Let rip!) The artillery was supposed to start firing now, but there was only silence. The battery, under the command of Major Tobias Vermaak, was not yet in position. And, when the big guns finally started thundering, their bombardment, like that of the air force, had little effect. In the middle and north of the complex, SWAPO had already evacuated the identified positions or had moved its defence to alternative positions. The bunkers could be destroyed only by a direct hit.
For the assault, Dippenaar had divided his force into six combined-arms combat teams with mechanised and motorised infantry and 90-mm gun support:
• Team 1 (A Company, mechanised infantry, supported by Ratel 90s and mortars), under Major Paul Fouché;
• Team 2 (B Company, mechanised infantry, also supported by Ratel 90s and mortars), under Captain Louis Harmse;
• Team 3 (C Squadron, Eland 90 armoured cars with a support infantry platoon), under Captain Jakes Jacobs;
• Team 4 (parabat company with three stopper groups), under Captain Mac Alexander;
• Team 5 (parabat company with three stopper groups), under Captain Piet Nel;
• Team 6 (reserve), under Major Jab Swart.
The main effort, consisting of Teams 1, 2 and 3, would be launched from west to east, while Teams 4 and 5 were supposed to act as stopper groups on the western side when the insurgents started fleeing. In effect, they were out of the fight due to the aviation fuel blunder. The Elands of Combat Team 3 would be in the north, with Team 1 in the middle and Team 2 in the south. Team 2 would also be supported by 61 Mech’s mortar and Ratel 90 antitank platoons.
The attacks by Teams 1 and 3 went like clockwork. Very little resistance was encountered, the defenders – apparently with PLAN commander Dimo Hamaambo among them – having already fled. The question has to be asked whether the SAAF attacks of 7 and 9 June, as well as the early-morning attack on 10 June, were responsible for this. The attackers moved quickly through the complex. Team 1 found it exceedingly difficult to navigate in the dense bush, and after a while found themselves about 800 m north of where they were supposed to be. Team 3 was exactly on target. Both teams found several abandoned anti-aircraft guns. A few skirmishes with fleeing SWAPO fighters ensued, and six of them were killed.
In the south, things went horribly wrong for Team 2. After apparently surprising some SWAPO members at lunch, the team advanced rapidly before making contact with aggressive defences at a previously unknown position. As dictated by mechanised infantry tactical doctrine, Captain Harmse divided his force into a fire support group (a troop of Ratel 90s, a mortar platoon, and a mechanised infantry platoon) and an assault group (two mechanised infantry platoons). He also requested – and got – artillery support. But the support group, once again, walked straight into an anti-aircraft gun position, so that neither the mortar platoon nor the Ratel 90 troop could support the assault group as they were supposed to; they had to fight hard for their own survival. The Ratel 90s even had to use their main guns in close-quarters combat – as little as 30 m at times – and trampled several defenders under their big wheels, while the mortarists had to fight as ordinary infantry.
Meanwhile, the assault group advanced further, not fully realising what was happening to their mates in the support group. SWAPO soldiers were seen running all over the place. As Corporal Gareth Rutherford wrote shortly afterwards, “[t]his was exciting. This
