Team operation near the town of Lubango in Angola.
When the different Army units started recruiting among the junior leader candidates at Oudtshoorn in October of 1978, I carefully considered my options. I was told outright by my colleagues that joining the Recces was not an option. They were the real killing machines – professional soldiers who had a different attitude to life. Back then I was skinny, with a pimpled baby-face, and looked much younger than I was. I wouldn’t fit, they told me.
A wonderful opportunity, which turned out to be my greatest break in life, presented itself when a recruitment team from 31 Battalion, a Bushman unit based in the Western Caprivi, visited the Infantry School. The unit also happened to have a very successful reconnaissance wing that was responsible for tactical reconnaissance in small groups, while the regular companies would deploy in the offensive search-and-destroy mode.
Frannie du Toit, the fierce-looking lieutenant from the recruiting team, made up my mind for me when he said that I would have it all in one – reconnaissance operations with the Bushmen and living right there in the Caprivi bush. The next three years at 31 Battalion would be the finest time of my career.
While the operations might have been of a tactical nature and not conducted at the professional level I later got to know as a Special Forces operator, that period was formative in many respects. I had to dodge some bullets, and I saw death for the first time. I saw people not capable of handling the pressures of combat, but I also met many who were. I worked with a number of outstanding soldiers who made a lasting impression on me. And, most importantly, I was exposed to numerous missions and, albeit by trial and error, developed a unique concept for conducting reconnaissance operations.
Part 2
The Bushmen
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“You can do anything with enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is the sparkle in your eyes, the swing in your gait. It is the grip of your hand, the irresistible surge of your will, the energy to execute your ideas. Enthusiasts are fighters. They have fortitude. They have staying qualities. Enthusiasm is at the bottom of all progress. With it there is accomplishment. Without it there are only alibis ...”
– Henry Ford (1863-1947)
1
Into the Unknown
IN NOVEMBER 1978 a C-130 military transport aircraft carried two groups of adventurous youngsters to the theatre of war. One group had volunteered for 32 Battalion, a unit of ex-FNLA soldiers founded by Colonel Jan Breytenbach and moulded into an all-black South African combat unit; and then there was my group, which was headed for 31 Battalion at the military town of Omega in the Caprivi.
Operational area
Led by white officers and a mix of white and Bushman non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 31 Battalion had been formed by Colonel Delville Linford, one of those rare characters who did things in an utterly unorthodox style – and got away with it. Although I never met him, since he had already left the unit when I arrived, his photos were everywhere and his influence was still tangible.
We were a mixed group of candidate officers (COs) and lance corporals fresh from the Infantry School. Upon arrival at Rundu we boarded a Kwêvoël (a 10-ton truck with a mine-protected cab) for the journey to Omega. It turned out to be an unforgettable experience. Everyone was somewhat scared of what lay ahead. We sat on top of our kit and watched the bush rushing past. Piled up against the cab were bags of maize. From the rush of air a fine maize dust constantly sifted down on us. Suddenly a thunderstorm broke – typical summer weather in the Caprivi, as we were soon to discover during operations in the bush. But it was not long before the sun broke through the clouds and our clothes started to dry on our bodies – with the maize still sticking to our clothes and faces. We were delivered to Omega as a Kwêvoël-load of freshly baked bread – walking rather stiffly and smelling like a bakery!
Captain Frans “Gor-Gor” Gunther introduced us to 31 Battalion and put us through a brief initiation. He was an impressive character with an overpowering personality and an equally dominating moustache. Rumour had it that the sides of his moustache would droop if he was in a bad mood but stand out firmly if he was happy with your performance. I had the good fortune never to see the great moustache drooping. Over the next three years I would have the pleasure of deploying with my recce team along with Frans Gunther’s C Company.
After the weeklong introduction to the base, candidates for the reconnaissance wing were separated from those who would join the regular companies. While the latter attended an induction course to learn how to handle their Bushman platoons in counterinsurgency warfare, eighteen of us went on selection for the recce wing.
In the mid-1970s the need for a tactical reconnaissance capability led to the formation of reconnaissance platoons at the infantry units permanently based in the operational area of the Border War. At the time, 31 and 32 battalions were the first to deploy tactical recce teams into Zambia and Angola, with the aim of locating SWAPO bases situated across the border in what were believed by SWAPO to be “safe” areas.
Initially, the tactical recce wings were trained in minor tactics by instructors from the Reconnaissance Regiments, and conducted recce missions in the tactical sphere of operations, many of them prior to attacks or raids against enemy bases and infrastructure. Over a ten-year period, roughly from 1976 to 1986, the reconnaissance wings took a lot of weight off the Reconnaissance Commandos by conducting special operations for sectors 10, 20 and 70 in the operational area.3 This allowed Special Forces the freedom to operate in the strategic environment.
Although there was never a clear-cut distinction between tactical and strategic deployments, it was generally accepted that the tactical recce wings would operate in the direct areas of responsibility of the sectoral commands, at the time stretching as far as 60 km into Angola and Zambia. Yet there were numerous exceptions to this general rule. Many Special Forces missions were in fact conducted in what was considered the tactical sphere, as was the case with pseudo-guerrilla operations carried out by 51 Reconnaissance Commando on both sides of the South West Africa–Angola border.
Textbook definitions of the time described strategic reconnaissance as operations in which a team operated independently, with no direct support from air or land resources. The information gained from the mission would also not automatically lead to a follow-up action by own forces, but would have an effect on the strategic outcome of the war. Tactical reconnaissance missions were, however, seen to be conducted in the tactical sphere of operations, within range of air- or land-based support, while the outcome would always be an immediate action by own forces.
The modus operandi of the tactical reconnaissance platoons varied from unit to unit. A recce patrol leading the advance in front of a fighting force would often be armed and ready for combat, thus a sizable number of four or six operators would be the order of the day. For a recce on a SWAPO base, a patrol would consist of no more than four men. This number was reduced to two if penetration of the facility was required. Often, even in the early days, the sparse undergrowth and the nature of the terrain would preclude the use of bigger teams, so by the late 1970s the concept of small teams had already been tentatively applied by the tactical recce wings.
The selection for the recce wing turned out to be the toughest experience of my life so far. Selection started with a week’s PT course at the base, from 05:00 in the morning until late at night. The idea of the PT sessions was supposedly to get us fit and ready for the bush phase, but it just managed to make us dog-tired, as we were still adjusting to the hot and humid weather of the Caprivi. Then we were
