led to a mutual distrust that lasted as long as the Bushman unit existed.
However, the whole affair did have a positive outcome. All the students returned to Fort Vreeslik and did a second Minor Tactics course under the capable leadership of Lieutenant Frannie du Toit (who had recruited me for 31 Battalion) and his team of operators running the recce wing. This time we did the Minor Tactics course with the very same Bushmen who would deploy with us. We slept, ate and trained with them for another four weeks, absorbing everything they could teach us about bush warfare.
In Angola, many of these Bushman soldiers had been “Fletchas” while the majority of us were still at school. The Fletchas, or Flechas (arrows), were Portuguese Special Forces units created during the colonial war. They operated as platoon-sized subunits consisting of local tribesmen and rebel defectors who specialised in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-terrorist operations. Many of them joined the SADF after Angolan independence.
There was a wealth of information to be gained from them. Their extraordinary knowledge of the bush was especially helpful, as we soon discovered during the training and subsequently during operations. I used every opportunity to learn from the Bushmen. Our instructors’ considerable knowledge and dedication were also an inspiration. Frannie and his team were mature and professional, and guided us with great patience through the intricate paces of the course.
To this day I maintain that the minor tactics training I received during those few weeks in the remote areas of the Western Caprivi ranked among the highest-quality training ever presented in our defence force. I absorbed every single bit of information and made an effort to become one with the bush.
Frannie, in my eyes a military scholar of the first order, believed the bush provided you with everything you needed to gain the tactical advantage against an adversary – provided your eyes were open to the opportunities it offered. He encouraged me to read all the classic works of irregular warfare, including F Spencer Chapman’s The Jungle is Neutral, a book that would guide our thinking and in a certain sense become the recce wing’s doctrine for the years that I served at 31 Battalion.
2
Bush Baptism
IN SEPTEMBER 1978 the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 435, which provided for a cessation of hostilities on South West Africa’s borders with Angola and Zambia. The South African forces in the area had to be reduced to 1 500 over a period of three months, and elections would be held, overseen by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, or UNTAG. A demilitarised zone was to be introduced, but this never transpired because SWAPO continued its incursions into South West Africa.
Operational sectors
As a young candidate officer fresh from Infantry School, I was oblivious to all of this. My focus was strictly on proving myself capable of leading a reconnaissance team into the bush.
An attack by SWAPO on Katima Mulilo on 23 August 1978 began a new phase in the conflict, this time between South Africa and Zambia. Katima Mulilo was the headquarters of Sector 70, which was in charge of operations in Eastern Caprivi. In a standoff bombardment using 122 mm rockets, ten South African soldiers were killed when a rocket penetrated a barrack room.
The South African forces reacted swiftly with cross-border raids by three combat teams. By the time the South Africans arrived at their targets, SWAPO had already vacated the guerrilla camps and no significant military successes could be claimed. But the message to Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and SWAPO was clear and simple: don’t mess with us.
During 1979, a series of well-planned cross-border operations into southwestern Zambia proved more successful. The reconnaissance wing of 31 Battalion played a prominent role in locating enemy bases and leading forces in to their targets.
At the time, the National Party government considered Zambia as a communist ally in the so-called total onslaught against South Africa. While the country maintained reasonably good trade relations with South Africa, it was under pressure from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to support the liberation movements, including SWAPO and the ANC.
South Africa put much pressure on Zambia, via the UN, not to support SWAPO or provide a safe haven for its cadres. Consequently, the frequency and intensity of SADF operations against SWAPO into Zambia increased. The Zambian National Defence Force (ZNDF) inadvertently became involved, since SWAPO utilised the ZNDF’s logistical supply lines and often established their bases close to ZNDF deployments. The result was that the Zambian government began to pressure SWAPO to stop its activities in the southwestern parts of the country, since the South African Defence Force was causing a lot of trouble for them. The Zambian government also increased its pressure on South Africa, via the UN, to conclude peace talks with SWAPO.
My first deployment with the 31 Battalion recce wing was meant to be a daring little venture into southwestern Zambia to try and capture a SWAPO official on the road between Sesheke and Luso along the Zambezi River. This was early in February 1979. At the time, SWAPO was very active between the Kwando and Zambezi rivers in this corner of Zambia, and the area served as a transition and staging point for cadres moving to the front in Angola. It was an excellent training area for a guerrilla force. The terrain was quite similar to that of the operational areas in southern Angola and northern Namibia (Ovamboland). Up to that point the southwestern corner of Zambia was considered safe by SWAPO, since regular South African forces had not been operating across the border into Zambia.
Our mission was to ambush a SWAPO vehicle along the road and bring back a senior cadre alive for questioning. The ultimate purpose would be to determine the position of SWAPO deployments in the Zambian theatre of operations. Three of us were to form one early-warning group further north along the road, while another group of three would deploy south of the ambush site. The main force, the ambush party, consisting of Frannie du Toit and eleven guys, Bushmen and white operators paired off, deployed at a tactically suitable position between the two early-warning groups. They would be ready to spring the ambush once either group reported the approach of the SWAPO vehicle.
One thing stands out from those few days: I have never been so wet and so miserable for such a long time. We were using mostly SWAPO equipment, because the deployment was meant to be non-traceable, and of course the SWAPO kit would provide a measure of deception if we were spotted by an adversary. We only had ponchos that barely covered our bodies. From day one I was soaking wet – and stayed like that for the rest of the time. We could not move an inch in the early-warning position and could only shiver to stay warm. Making coffee or warming up food wasn’t an option, as our hide was literally two metres from the road.
The operation was terminated because the ambush party was compromised by a member of the local population (or LP, as they were referred to) who stumbled onto their position and ran away before anyone could react. We had to rush back to a predetermined RV and anti-track to ensure that our tracks were not discovered and followed back to the border. It was quite a relief when the deployment was called off. I would certainly be better prepared next time!
Once the team had regrouped at the RV, Frannie called me and asked whether I could lead the team back to the exfiltration point. I was eager to prove myself in the bush and I didn’t hesitate a moment. Through the lush vegetation of the African bush and over a distance of 30 km, I managed to navigate to the exact point where we needed to cross the border to re-enter the Caprivi. Although this was a small feat, it gave me great confidence in my abilities, and it convinced Frannie that I was capable enough to be deployed with him.
Of the many valuable lessons learned during this operation, one was that the success of counterinsurgency operations had to be measured
