which Adolf Hitler embarked twenty years later” (Prior and Wilson, “Review Article,” 325). On the topicality of Fischer and the “Hamburg school” of historiography, see Berghahn, “Ostimperium und Weltpolitik.” For an overview of the various scholarly interpretations of the September program, see Mombauer, Origins, 132–33, a book that also provides a concise survey of the general state of research into the causes of World War I.
52. Geiss, Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 72.
53. Ibid., 75.
54. Ibid., 77.
55. Ibid., 83.
56. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews, 286.
57. Wehler, “Von den ‘Reichsfeinden,’” 197.
58. See, for example, Geiss, Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 49; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 141; Oldenburg, Der deutsche Ostmarkenverein, 225–27.
59. Geiss, Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 91–96.
60. Quoted in ibid., 147.
61. Wehler, “Von den ‘Reichsfeinden,’” 191; Rutherford, “Race, Space, and the Polish Question,” 51.
62. Rosenthal, German and Pole, 41.
63. Forgus, “German Nationality Policies,” 107.
64. Seckendorf, “Kulturelle Deutschtumspflege,” 116.
65. Sharp, “Genie That Would Not Go Back,” 10–11. Similarly Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 60; Hobsbawm, Nationen, 132–33.
66. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System,” 1314.
67. On the minorities agreements, see, for example, Riga and Kennedy, “Tolerant Majorities”; on Poland, see Fink, “Minorities Question.” For a contemporaneous view, see Woolsey, “Rights of Minorities.”
68. Sharp, “Genie That Would Not Go Back,” 9.
69. Mazower, Dark Continent, 41.
70. Kotowski, Polens Politik, 197.
71. Peukert, Weimarer Republik, 201.
72. Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 218.
73. Quoted in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Deutsche und Polen, 28.
74. Quoted in Haar, “Leipziger Stiftung,” 379.
75. Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 269–71, 314–15, and 409–12. On Stresemann’s past in the Pan-German League, see ibid., 52–54.
76. Wagner, “Weimarer Republik,” 41.
77. Schramm, “Kurswechsel,” 31.
78. Hoensch, “Deutschland, Polen und die Großmächte,” 20 and 10.
79. See Puchert, Wirtschaftskrieg.
80. Quoted in Zorn, Nach Ostland, 48.
81. Hoensch, “Deutschland, Polen und die Großmächte,” 23.
82. This rather narrowly defined limitation of the minority treaties did not prevent post-1945 Polish historians from also sharing the interwar Polish government’s view that these treaties offered the great powers an opportunity “to interfere in the internal affairs of new states . . . under the pretext of acting in the interest of minorities residing in those states” (Czapliński, “Protection of Minorities,” 126).
83. Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities, x. See also Mazower, Dark Continent, 53–54, and 57; Sharp, “Genie That Would Not Go Back,” 25.
84. Quoted in Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 228.
85. Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 62.
86. Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 228.
87. Jansen and Weckbecker, Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz, 22.
88. Quoted in Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 212.
89. Hauser, “Deutsche Minderheit,” 68.
90. Kotowski, Polens Politik, 197.
91. Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 50–53. See also Trevisiol, Einbürgerungspraxis, 187–88.
92. Blanke, “German Minority,” 88.
93. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 580. See also Hauser, “Deutsche Minderheit,” 67.
94. Fiedor, “Attitude of German Right-Wing Organizations,” 248; Hauser, “Deutsche Minderheit,” 69; Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 13.
95. Winkler soon became one of the central figures in ethnopolicy circles and would implement the economic plundering of Poland during the Nazi occupation as head of the Main Trust Office for the East (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, see Rosenkötter, Treuhandpolitik; Dingell, Zur Tätigkeit).
96. Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 16.
97. Ibid., 21.
98. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 93.
99. These six regions were Posen and Pomerelia (ca. 342,000 Germans in 1926), Upper Silesia (ca. 300,000), Bielsko-Biała (ca. 30,000), Central Poland (ca. 350,000), Volhynia (47,000–60,000), and Galicia (ca. 60,000)—Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 582. Such figures were highly contested. For example, in Poland’s official census of 1931, persons counting toward the German minority were numbered at only 254,522 for Central Poland and 91,207 for Upper Silesia combined with Cieszyn Silesia (Hauser, “Deutsche Minderheit in Polen,” 87).
100. For an overview of German minority associations in Upper Silesia, see Greiner and Kaczmarek, “Vereinsaktivitäten”; on the ethnic conflicts in Łódź, see, for example, Kossert, “Protestantismus in Lodz,” 89; on the German Workers’ Party, see Kotowski, Polens Politik, 16–17; Hauser, “Deutsche Minderheit,” 73.
101. Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 27.
102. Ibid.
103. Hoensch, “Deutschland, Polen und die Großmächte,” 20.
104. Jansen and Weckbecker, Der Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz, 14.
105. Wynot, “Polish Germans,” 30.
106. Ibid. The ownership situation was similar in the part of Upper Silesia that fell to Poland, with more than 55 percent of heavy industry still in German hands by 1939 (Kaczmarek, “Deutsche wirtschaftliche Penetration,” 260).
107. Wynot, “Polish Germans,” 51.
108. Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 67.
109. Ibid., 96.
110.
