Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 132. See also Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 202.
113. Funding for this region totaling 37.5 million Reichsmarks from 1925 to 1931, it increased to 13 million for 1932, and to 16 million for 1933 (Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 145).
114. Schramm, “Kurswechsel,” 23.
115. Wollstein, “Politik des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands,” 795.
116. Quotations are from Hitler, Zweites Buch, 163. For the impact of “Lebensraum” ideology on Hitler’s worldview, see Jäckel, Hitlers Herrschaft, 29–54; Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris, 149–51 and 240–50; Smith, Ideological Origins, 83–111; Walkenhorst, Nation—Volk—Rasse, 166–72; Puschner, Völkische Bewegung, 151–55, which also looks at the importance of this thinking for ethnonational rights during the German Empire period.
117. On Haushofer and his influence on Hitler’s conception of “Lebensraum,” see H. Herwig, “Geopolitik.” For a comprehensive survey of the VDA’s history from its beginning to the 1990s, see Goldendach and Minow, Deutschtum erwache!
118. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 182.
119. Ibid., 167.
120. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 28–29.
121. Seckendorf, “Kulturelle Deutschtumspflege,” 115; also Kotowski, Polens Politik, 17.
122. Jansen and Weckbecker, Der Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz, 25. For a brief description of the Nazification of Upper Silesia’s German associations, see, for example, Greiner und Kaczmarek, “Vereinsaktivitäten,” 235.
123. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 585.
124. Niendorf, Minderheiten, 211.
125. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 586.
126. Ibid., 230.
127. Ibid., 593–94.
128. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 38–39.
129. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 243. See also Brown, “Third Reich’s Mobilization,” 133. Lorenz actually had even greater ambitions, originally pushing for the establishment of a dedicated Reich Commissariat and later wanting to become a state secretary for ethnopolitical issues (Staatssekretär für Volkstumsfragen). Therefore, Hitler’s decree (see NG-972) was actually only a partial success for him; see also Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol, 238–40.
130. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 67–68.
131. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 243–44.
132. BArch NS 19/2307, 7–9, directive from Hess, February 3, 1939.
133. Koehl, RKFDV, 97.
134. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 237.
135. Ibid., 241.
136. Koehl, “Deutsche Volksliste,” 354. See also Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 97.
137. Kotowski, Polens Politik, 348.
138. Ibid., 242–44.
139. Ibid., 247–54.
140. Leitz, Nazi Foreign Policy, 73–74.
141. Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 255.
142. Ibid., 247; see also Wollstein, “Politik des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands,” 806.
143. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 166. In those same weeks, Hitler gave three speeches to Wehrmacht officers during which he clearly expressed his desire for war (ibid., 166–67). See also Czubiński, “Poland’s Place in Nazi Plans,” 31 and 37–38.
144. Hillgruber, “Deutschland und Polen,” 54.
145. Schmidt, Außenpolitik, 341.
146. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 206 and 238.
147. Hitler’s second speech to Wehrmacht heads, August 22, 1930, L-3, reprinted in Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, ser. D, 7: 171–72.
148. Kotowski, Polens Politik, 313 and 336.
149. Ibid., 338–39; also Seckendorf, “Kulturelle Deutschtumspflege,” 132.
150. Kotowski, Polens Politik, 341. See also Szefer, “Dywersyjno-sabotażowa działalność,” 297–308 and 310–24.
151. Szefer, “Dywersyjno-sabotażowa działalność,” 335. See also Pospieszalski, “Nazi Attacks,” 111–12.
Projecting the “Lebensraum” Dystopia onto Poland
IN CONTRAST TO the invasions of Austria, the Sudetenland, the Memel territory, and finally the Czech rump state, the attack on Poland was seen by the Nazi leadership as the first step in the final battle to acquire a life-or-death necessity for the German “Volk”: new “Lebensraum” in the east. In the short time from the invasion’s start on September 1, 1939, to the taking of Warsaw on September 28, to the capitulation of the last Polish units on October 6, German goals underwent a dramatic radicalization. Despite countless discussions throughout World War I, the German Empire had not been able to bring itself to do what Nazi Germany had launched in just a few short weeks, namely the expulsion or murder of persons considered “undesirable” on political or racial grounds, the systematic registration of resident “Volksdeutsche,” and finally the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. In what would become the annexed western Polish territories, an entire population was subjected to a comprehensive selection process for the first time, wherein the first step was to register those who in any case must be rendered “harmless” or given the right to preferential treatment as potential members of the “Volksgemeinschaft” that was to be installed here.
The Genesis of the “Lebensraum” Policy during the War
Just a few weeks after Hitler had instructed the German army’s commander in chief to draw up an operational plan for waging war against Poland, the SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) also began its preparations, as it had done in earlier military campaigns. As in the invasions of Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Czech rump state, the Wehrmacht was to be followed by SS units in Poland as well, in order to help police the rearward territory and take action against political opponents.
Under the code name “Operation Tannenberg,” preparations at SD headquarters included the compilation of a proscription list known as the Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen (Special prosecution book for Poland).1 The overall coordination of this effort was taken over in early June by Werner Best, the head of the Gestapo’s Department I (administration and personnel) and Department III (counterintelligence), who was second only to Reinhard Heydrich as the most important
