expression ‘moral understandings’. For another account, see N. Venturinha, ‘Moral Epistemology, Interpersonal Indeterminacy and Enactivism’, in Jesús Padilla Gálvez (ed.), Action, Decision-Making and Forms of Life, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, pp. 109–20.
41For example, A. J. Ayer claims that sentences expressing moral judgements ‘are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable’ (Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover, 1952, pp. 108–9), and John Mackie famously claimed that ‘value statements cannot be either true or false’ (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Penguin, 1977, p. 25).
42See chapter 7 of Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life, pp. 137–68.
43For my own take on J. L. Mackie’s antirealism see R. Vinten, ‘Mackie’s Error Theory: A Wittgensteinian Critique’, Kínesis, vol. 7, no. 13, 2015, pp. 30–47.
44O’Connor, Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life, p. 146.
45Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory, 2009.
46Ibid., pp. 25, 178.
47Ibid., p. 13.
48Ibid., p. 26.
49Ibid., p. 29.
50Ibid., p. 29.
51Ibid., p. 39.
52Ibid., p. 2.
53Ibid., p. 17
54Ibid., p. 37. Similarly, on p. 48 Robinson talks about ‘the demise of the pretense of a God’s-eye point of view in Wittgenstein’s world’ and on p. 160 he says that ‘Wittgenstein and, more famously, Beckett, work from a street-level where no God’s-eye point of view is possible, though we may find ourselves waiting for it’.
55Ibid., p. 160.
56Ibid., p. 171.
57Ibid., pp. 49–50.
58Ibid., p. 50.
59Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §109.
60Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory, p. 26.
61Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §103.
62Ibid., §109.
63Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.111. In remark 4.1121 Wittgenstein also says that psychology is no closer to philosophy than any other natural science.
64Ibid., 4.112.
65Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, p. 18.
66Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §109.
67Ibid., PPF xii.
68I should acknowledge here that there is some foundation in Wittgenstein’s work for understanding his philosophy as being therapeutic and that Wittgenstein is sometimes interpreted in this light. For example, in The Big Typescript Wittgenstein describes his philosophical approach as analogous to psychoanalysis (433e) and in Philosophical Investigations, §133, Wittgenstein compares philosophical methods to therapies. However, I think too much can be made of the comparison with psychoanalysis or with therapy. Peter Hacker makes this case well in his response to Gordon Baker’s late interpretation of Wittgenstein (see ‘Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein’, in Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela (eds), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
69Ibid., §109.
70P. M. S. Hacker gives an excellent account of the nature of philosophy and contrasts it with other disciplines in his ‘Philosophy: Contribution Not to Human Knowledge but to Human Understanding’, which has been published in a collection of his essays – Wittgenstein: Comparisons & Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
71Such as S. Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Oxford: Clarendon, 1979; and S. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
72I will discuss Pitkin’s work in my chapter on justice. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice.
73J. W. Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
74Crary and Read, The New Wittgenstein.
75Temelini also categorizes other contributors to Heyes’s volume The Grammar of Politics as democratic/liberal Wittgensteinians. Heyes, The Grammar of Politics.
76See,
