of Philosophy Supplement, vol. 28, 1990, pp. 223–37.
8J. C. Nyiri, ‘Wittgenstein 1929–31: The Turning Back’, in Stuart Shanker (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments (Vol. 4), London: Routledge, 1986.
9Wittgenstein, On Certainty.
10R. G. Brice, Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014.
11See R. Eldridge, Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997; and R. Eldridge, ‘Wittgenstein and the Conversation of Justice’, in Cressida Heyes (ed.), The Grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 117–28.
12A. Crary, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought’, in Alice Crary and Rupert Read (eds), The New Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 141.
13K. Butler, T. Eagleton, and D. Jarman, Wittgenstein: The Terry Eagleton Script, the Derek Jarman Film, London: BFI, 1993.
14T. Eagleton, Saints and Scholars, London: Futura, 1987.
15T. Eagleton, Materialism, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017.
16P. S. Churchland and C. L. Suhler, ‘Control: Conscious and Otherwise’, Trends in Cognitive Science, vol. 13, no. 8, 2009.
17H. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
18Wittgenstein, On Certainty.
19P. Hutchinson, R. Read, and W. Sharrock, There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
20J. Dupré, ‘Social Science: City Centre or Leafy Suburb’, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, May 2016.
21Baghramian, Relativism.
22H. J. Glock, ‘Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability’, in John Preston (ed.), Wittgenstein and Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
23C. Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
24G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1957].
25P. Winch, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4), pp. 307–24, 1964.
26P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1990 [1958].
27R. Gaita (ed.), Value & Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch, London: Routledge, 1990.
28P. Hutchinson, R. Read, and W. Sharrock, There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science, Abingdon: Ashgate, 2008.
29R. Teichmann, The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
30P. O’Connor, Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life: Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008.
31C. Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory: The View from Somewhere, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
32M. Temelini, Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
33F. Douglass’s ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?’ is available at https://www.thenation.com/article/what-slave-fourth-july-frederick-douglass/ (accessed 26 May 2018) and is discussed on pp. 132–36 of O’Connor’s Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life.
34O’Connor, Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life, pp. 158–68.
35V. Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
36O’Connor recommends that we ‘create a moral epistemology that is consistent with much recent work in feminist epistemologies (resisting its reduction or assimilation to an overly scientistic model’ (Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life, p. 5).
37L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, New York: Harper & Row, 1958, p. 18.
38Held recommends that we should ‘proceed not solely on a case-by-case basis (requires some level of generality)’ (cited on p. 5 of Peg O’Connor’s Morality and Our Complicated Forms of Life).
39O’Connor, Morality and Our Complicated Forms of Life, pp. 22–23. On p. 59 she says that ‘neither realism nor antirealism is tenable as a description of the world and their weaknesses trace back to a shared presupposition’.
40O’Connor discusses moral epistemology in chapter 6 of Morality and Our Complicated Forms
