of the 1920s. Wittgenstein’s philosophical work cannot be claimed by conservatives or socialists as their own but it can be used to untangle philosophical problems in the work of a great variety of political philosophers.
In Chapter 4 I turn to liberalism. The question of whether Wittgenstein was a liberal philosopher has received less attention than the question of whether he was a conservative philosopher but, as Robert Greenleaf Brice has recently argued, there are hints of liberalism in some of his remarks,10 and some philosophers, like Richard Eldridge, have argued that a kind of liberalism follows from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.11 Richard Rorty has also drawn liberal conclusions from a philosophical viewpoint which draws on Wittgenstein’s work and Alice Crary has suggested that the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are ‘reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy’.12 In the fourth chapter I argue both that Wittgenstein was not a liberal and that his philosophy does not imply a liberal viewpoint. The authors discussed in the chapter do not demonstrate that any broad ideological conclusions follow from Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks.
In Chapter 5 I look at the relationship between Wittgensteinian philosophy and Marxist philosophy, focusing on the work of two English Marxists: Perry Anderson and Alex Callinicos. Both of them have produced excellent work in political theory, cultural theory, and philosophy. However, they have both misinterpreted the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I argue that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is not in tension with Marxist philosophy in the ways that they suggest and that Wittgenstein did not make the errors attributed to him by Anderson and Callinicos. Marxists would benefit from taking Wittgenstein’s work more seriously because it would help them to see the nature of epistemological and metaphysical problems more clearly and would complement and enrich their own accounts of philosophical confusion. One political implication of Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks that I identify in the chapter is that we can get rid of philosophical problems by changing society, by making changes to our practical life.
The sixth chapter focuses on the work of another Marxist, the cultural theorist Terry Eagleton. The influence of Wittgenstein’s work on Eagleton’s oeuvre is clearer than in the case of Anderson and Callinicos. He wrote the script for a film about Wittgenstein’s life and work,13 wrote a novel which included Wittgenstein as a character,14 and his work in literary theory and cultural theory more generally is clearly indebted to Wittgenstein to at least some extent. His recent book Materialism combined insights from Marx and Wittgenstein (as well as the work of other philosophers, such as Nietzsche).15 In the chapter about Eagleton I look at his article ‘Wittgenstein’s Friends’ and argue that his account of Wittgenstein there is flawed. His criticisms of Wittgenstein do not hit their target. I then go on to look at his more recent book about materialism and suggest that Eagleton also misrepresents Wittgenstein’s work there.
The final two chapters form the third part of the book and they look at applications of Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks to particular problems that have arisen in the work of political philosophers: the problem of freedom of the will (including problems about self-control and responsibility) and problems concerning justice.
In the seventh chapter I argue that Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks about psychological concepts as well as his remarks about philosophical methodology can help to dissolve conceptual problems that are clearly relevant to political philosophy. My focus in that chapter will be on Patricia Churchland and Christopher Suhler’s paper ‘Control: Conscious and Otherwise’,16 where they formulate what they think of as a neurobiological account of control. They do so in an attempt to tackle problems about the extent to which we ought to hold people responsible in cases where they are not conscious of the way in which circumstances affect their choices. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that empirical research shows that circumstances have such a large impact on people’s choices that we ought to say that a person’s control over what they do in many cases is very limited. Given the lack of control we ought not to hold people responsible for their actions to the extent that we do. This is known as the ‘Frail Control’ hypothesis and Churchland and Suhler think that their account of control undermines it.
The debate clearly has implications concerning questions of justice in society – implications concerning the way in which we ought to hold people accountable for the things they do. It is also clearly a version of old problems about freedom of the will. Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks can help clarify the terms in which the debate is conducted and to untangle some of the conceptual confusions involved. Churchland and Suhler are right to challenge the Frail Control hypothesis and some of their conclusions are correct. However, the arguments they use to get to their conclusions are confused in various ways. The aim of the seventh chapter is to suggest that Wittgenstein’s remarks can help us to dissolve confusions surrounding problems about freedom of the will – help us to achieve clarity. A better understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy can help us achieve a better understanding of political philosophy.
The eighth and final chapter is focused on the question of justice. In the first half of the chapter I look at ways in which we might get clearer about the concept ‘justice’ and I use insights gleaned from Hanna Pitkin’s Wittgenstein and Justice17 in doing that. In the second half of the chapter I look at whether Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks imply that we should adopt a particular conception of justice and I argue that although his remarks do not imply that we should accept a particular conception of justice his remarks do nonetheless imply that we should reject certain conceptions of justice for making unwarranted assumptions or for having confused conceptions of practical rationality.
Within Chapter 8 I also look at some remarks that Wittgenstein made in On Certainty18
0.2How Is This Book Different to Other Books about Wittgenstein and Social Science?
There are already several book-length discussions of Wittgenstein’s relation to social and political theory. In this part of the introduction I would like to make clear where my own work differs from other book-length treatments of these questions. One obvious difference between the work in this book and earlier treatments of the topic, such as Hanna Pitkin’s Wittgenstein and Justice, John W. Danford’s Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, and Susan Easton’s Humanist Marxism and Wittgensteinian Social Philosophy, is that much of the work discussed here has been written in the past two decades. For example, in the first chapter, about social science, I discuss recent work from Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read, Wes Sharrock,19 and John Dupré.
