of grammar. What that means is that I will provide explanations of the meaning of terms that are causing confusion (such as, e.g. ‘reasons’, ‘explanations’, ‘consciousness’, ‘control’, ‘justice’) and discuss how those terms are related to other terms (other terms that are etymologically related, other terms that belong to the same family, or terms as they are used in specifically philosophical (as opposed to ordinary) life). If those explanations are successful then the upshot should be enhanced understanding.
Why is it important to do all of this? I think it is important because the kind of scientism5 that Wittgenstein criticised is still rife in social philosophy and the social sciences. Philosophers and social scientists are still confused about the nature of their subjects. There is still confusion about the nature of explanations in social studies. Social scientists still attempt to bring methodologies and standards from the natural sciences into the social sciences where they are not always appropriate (see Chapter 1). And philosophers and social scientists still think that greater precision can be achieved by trying to redefine psychological expressions in terms from natural science, particularly neurophysiology (see Chapter 6). Producing confused work in social philosophy and the social sciences is time-consuming and that time would be better spent if the questions asked were formulated clearly and answered in terms that we can understand. Of course, the confusion of ‘theorists’ can also spread to the audiences who read the work. It is also worth getting clear about the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy so that we can see clearly that it does not support a particular ideological standpoint but that it can be used to clear away confusions in ideological work in political theory.
0.1Overview of the Contents of the Chapters
In order to answer the question of whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy has social and political implications it is best to first get clear about what Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is and to get clear about where Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy stands in relation to other disciplines. This helps us to achieve some clarity about the import that his philosophy might have for social science and politics.
To that end, in the first chapter I discuss the issue of reductionism – whether social sciences are reducible to natural sciences – and I conclude that they are not reducible to natural sciences. I also distinguish explanations in terms of reasons (which are particularly prominent in social sciences) from explanations in terms of causes (which are more prominent in natural sciences). Having distinguished reasons from causes I go on to look at the question of methodology. I will argue that there are a great variety of methodologies we might use in our various inquiries, some of which are particularly appropriate to social sciences and others which are particularly appropriate to natural sciences. The question of progress also needs to be addressed. Why is it that enormous progress has been made in the natural sciences and yet philosophers are still discussing many of the same questions as the ancient Greeks and social scientists seem incapable of resolving deep disagreements?
My answer will be that the considerations about reductionism, reasons, and methodology tell us that the different disciplines have different subject matters, different forms of explanation (and description), and so they have very different standards by which we might judge their progress. Disciplines like psychology and philosophy have made some progress but the nature of progress in each of these disciplines is very different to the nature of progress in the natural sciences. I will conclude that philosophy, as Wittgenstein conceived it, is quite a different kind of discipline to either social scientific disciplines or the natural sciences but I also want to make clear that philosophy has something to say to other disciplines – that social scientists and natural scientists are susceptible to philosophical confusions that affect their endeavours. Philosophy aims at clearing up grammatical confusions. It enriches our understanding, whereas cognitive disciplines, such as the natural and social sciences, add to our stock of knowledge. But in order to add to our stock of knowledge the cognitive disciplines must achieve clarity about the concepts they are using and must achieve some clarity about how it is that we are to understand their objects (we must try to understand the concepts and practices of those we are studying). We can point to differences between philosophy and the social and natural sciences but those differences are not so great that philosophy is just irrelevant to the cognitive disciplines. Issues of sense and understanding are clearly very important in the social sciences.
In the second chapter I examine various questions about relativism. I ask whether it is a serious objection to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy that he subscribed to some form of relativism. I use Maria Baghramian’s taxonomy of the different forms of relativism to look at various forms of relativism and assess them.6 I argue that ontological relativism, alethic relativism, and some forms of cognitive relativism are implausible, and also that they cannot be attributed to Wittgenstein. A more plausible form of relativism is conceptual relativism and it is reasonable to describe Wittgenstein as a conceptual relativist. This chapter responds to some of his critics, who claim that Wittgenstein’s philosophy implies implausible forms of relativism. My conclusion is that Wittgenstein is a kind of relativist but that the fact that he is a kind of relativist does not undermine his philosophical views.
The form of relativism Wittgenstein adopts does not obviously commit him to any particular ideological stance (and I will argue in the following chapters that Wittgenstein was not a conservative, a liberal, or a socialist). However, I will argue in the final chapter that his conceptual relativism would lead him to reject transcendental theories of justice such as Rawls’s theory, and Peter Winch has argued convincingly that Wittgenstein’s conception of practical rationality (which is connected to his conceptual relativism) would lead him to reject traditional accounts of the relationship between rationality and authority, such as Hobbes’s view (and Rawls’s too).7 So, a Wittgensteinian take on philosophy reveals confusions in quite a lot of what has gone by the name of ‘political theory’ but does not commit Wittgenstein to a full-blown ideology or theory himself. That is not to say that the impact of Wittgensteinian philosophy on political philosophy has to be a wholly negative one – destroying houses of cards. There is a positive aspect to Wittgensteinian philosophy which is that it can aid our understanding of things like practical rationality, authority, and justice. Improved understanding will likely lead to the construction of better political theories.
The chapters on social sciences and relativism form the first part of the book where I am trying to get clear about Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and its relationships to other disciplines. In the second part of the book I look at political ideologies and ask whether Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks imply that he was committed to a particular ideological stance.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to conservatism and I focus particularly on the most prominent conservative interpretation of Wittgenstein which has been presented by J. C. Nyiri. He has argued in a series of papers that Ludwig Wittgenstein is a conservative philosopher. In ‘Wittgenstein 1929–31: The Turning Back’8 Nyiri cites Wittgenstein’s admiration for Grillparzer as well as overtly philosophical passages from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty9 in support of that thesis. I argue, in opposition to Nyiri, that we should separate Wittgenstein’s political remarks from his philosophical remarks and that nothing Wittgenstein says in his philosophical work obviously implies a conservative viewpoint, or any other kind of political viewpoint (which is not to say that no conclusions whatsoever about political theory follow from Wittgenstein’s remarks). In his philosophical work Wittgenstein was concerned with untangling conceptual confusions rather than with putting forward a political viewpoint and the two kinds of activities are quite different. There is, however, some evidence of elements of conservatism in the stances that Wittgenstein took on political issues, although there is also some evidence of sympathy for left-wing views, particularly during the
