in R. Vinten, ‘Review of “Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory” by Leonidas Tsilipakos’, Nordic Wittgenstein Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 2015.
16See F. R. Leavis, ‘Luddites? Or, There Is Only One Culture’, in Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow (with an introduction by Stefan Collini), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 103.
17Ibid., pp. 101, 106.
18Ibid., p. 103.
19In one of the remarks published in Culture and Value Wittgenstein says,
Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is only a means to this end and not an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings. So I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs. (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 7)
20Leavis and Wittgenstein were briefly friends (see R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, London: Vintage, 1991, pp. 42, 272, 278–79, 569; and also F. R. Leavis, ‘Memories of Wittgenstein’, in Recollections of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 50–67).
21M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 357.
22‘Scientific Reduction’, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/, accessed 29 August 2016.
23F. Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, London: Touchstone, 1995, p. 3.
24Ibid., p. 7.
25This is what is known as ‘classical reductionism’, and the classic formulation of it is Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam’s ‘The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’, in H. Feigl et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
26See, e.g. C. Blakemore, The Mind Machine, London: BBC Publications, 1988, pp. 270–72.
27However, it is worth noting that one can be a materialist without being a reductionist and one can be a reductionist without being a materialist. Berkeley, an idealist, thought that everything reduces to minds and ideas.
28This will be discussed in the following section.
29Bennett and Hacker Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, p. 358.
30Bennett and Hacker’s discussion of materialism leans on John Dupré’s discussion of materialism in The Disorder of Things. Dupré discusses and rejects several versions of materialism in his chapter on reduction and materialism (J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 89–94).
31See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §149.
32Ibid., §150.
33Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, pp. 360–61.
34See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §281: ‘Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.’
35Dupré, The Disorder of Things, 107–20.
36Ibid., pp. 121–45.
37Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, p. 18.
38Ibid.
39P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge, p. 60.
40Ibid., p. 62.
41D. Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60, no. 23, 1963, pp. 685–700.
42See, e.g. G. D’Oro and C. Sandis, Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; and J. Tanney, Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.
43Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §225.
44Winch, Idea of a Social Science, p. 84.
45Ibid., p. 87.
46Ibid., p. 88.
47Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, p. 685.
48Ibid., p. 691.
49Ibid., p. 691.
50Ibid., p. 692.
