Ibid.
99. B. P. Singh Roy. Parliamentary Government in India, p. 243.
100. Whyte, Sir Frederick. India: A Bird’s Eye View, p. 131.
101. Vide address of the Viceroy on 11th September, 1939, L. A. Deb., 1939 p. 431.
102. L.A. Deb., 1938, p. 664.
103. H.L. Deb., 1939 (Vol. II), p. 214.
104. Vide L.A. Deb., 11th to 13th, 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th November, 1940.
105. Leader, 15th November 1940. Also Modern Review, December 1940, pp. 85–86.
106. Modern Review, July 1940, p. 16 (Notes).
107. Sir Frederick James.The Indian Legislature in War-time, Asiatic Review, July 1945.
108. Sir Frederick James. op cit.
109. An elaborate account of the “Quit India” movement is given in Govind Shah’s 42 Rebellion.
110. Vide L.A. Deb., from 15th to 17th and 18th September, 1942.
111. Sir Frederick James. op cit.
112. L.A. Deb., 1943, p. 265.
113. See also Chapter IX.
114. L.A. Deb., 1946, p. 167.
115. Ibid.
| 33 →
NATURE OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS
Prior to the introduction of the 1919 Government of India Reforms, the electoral franchise had been awfully restricted: in the Indian Legislative Council, 18 elected members spoke for different interest groups and 9 represented, however remotely, the people as a whole.1 The largest constituency which returned a member directly to the Indian Legislative Council did not exceed 650 persons and most of these constituencies were decidedly smaller.2 The non-official members of the legislative body in each province constituted an electoral body to elect its representatives to the central legislative council. The average number of votes in those electoral outfits was only 22, while in one case the actual number was 9.3 Montagu was convinced of the need for a broad-based franchise; but he was not yet ready for any radical extension of the electorate. In his recommendation he said that the franchise enlargement should be determined with an appreciation of the practical difficulties than to any a priori consideration.4 He had his share of misgivings of a sudden “breakdown of the (administrative) machinery” under the presumed burden unleashed by the “sudden extension of franchise.”5 Eventually, a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Southborough to investigate the franchise issues and make necessary recommendations.
The Franchise Committee (Southborough) had its own part of wavering in expanding the electorate. Evidently, one main niggle to a more stretched ← 33 | 34 → franchise was the serious load it would impose on the administrative agency dealing with elections.6 The Committee was also worried about the “great strain” which an extended franchise would entail on the large number of inexperienced electors.7 Finally, the Committee proposed an indirect election for all general and commercial seats of the Legislative Assembly by the members of the Provincial Legislative Councils.8 The recommendations of the Committee are summarized in the Table I.
Only three types of constituencies i.e., European Commerce, Indian Commerce and landholders were allowed to elect representatives directly by the electors. For the Council of State also, the Committee recommended indirect election by the same electors for the Legislative Assembly except for two European Commerce constituencies. The Committee was aware of the obvious shortcomings of indirect elections. It hoped that in future the indirect election would be superseded by direct method but at that moment they saw “no alternative but to face the shortcomings inherent in the indirect system.”9 The Joint Select Committee of Parliament, however, did not accept that recommendation for indirect election,10 and at last, the Electoral Rules made under the Government of India Act, 1919, provided for direct elections to the Central Legislature. Eventually, the size of the electorate was indeed much wider compared to the original recommendations by the Southborough Committee.11
Table I. Recommendations of the Electoral Size by the Franchise Committee (Southborough).
This Table has been taken from the Report of the Franchise Committee (Southborough), 1919. Para. 34. ← 34 | 35 →
Table II. Summary of Legislative Assembly Elections From 1920 to 1945.12
Table III. Summary of Council of State Elections From 1920 to 1930.13
One striking feature of the electoral system under the 1919 Act was the bewildering variety of electoral qualifications which were based on:
(I) community
(II) residence and
a. ownership or occupation of a building or
b. assessment to or payment of income tax or
c. assessment to or payment of municipal or cantonment rates or taxes or local cesses or
d. the holding of land, or
e. Membership of a local body.
But there was no uniformity in respect to any of these qualifications: the variety of qualifications was laid down in detail in Schedule II of the Legislative Assembly Electoral Rules and Regulations. Without narrating the full details of the diverse electoral qualifications, certain features can be discussed. ← 35 | 36 → The authors of the M/C Report possibly felt that in a country like India, owing to unequal distribution of population and wealth, an array of diverse electoral rules was inevitable.14 The Southborough Committee too did not seek “uniformity” in the voters’ property qualifications in all the provinces.15 Norms in Muhammadan constituencies were different from those of non-Muhammadan constituencies: education and property qualifications in the Muslim constituencies were generally lower than those of the other constituencies because of the Muslim community’s relative backwardness. Property qualifications in the landholders’ constituencies were the highest. Residence qualification was not obligatory in European constituencies; every person registered on the electoral roll of a constituency was entitled to vote at an election of a member or members for that constituency.16 But no person could be registered as an elector in more than one constituency and consequently no person could vote at any general election in more than one general constituency.17
Qualifications
