say best what needs to be said. Again, in A Preface to Paradise Lost, he highlights the difference between primary epic (like the works of Homer) and secondary epic (as in Virgil and Milton) as means at least as important to the authors as their matter. Furthermore, Lewis chose science fiction as a means to write romantic literature, especially that form that seeks to stir up longing for a place, ultimately for heaven. He felt he needed to go to the extraterrestrial when writing in a world where most of its farthest reaches had already been explored. Even when writing autobiography, Lewis has purposes for using that literary form as a kind of testimonial apologetic, and the form itself helps him to select, economically, what is necessary for inclusion and what is necessary to leave out. This matter of literary form for what one wants to say is something Alistair McGrath failed to realize when writing his recent biography of Lewis.
18 Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 166.
19 Lewis, 13–14.
20 Lewis, 17–18.
21 Lewis, 4.
22 Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955), 198.
23 Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 157.
24 Lewis, 122.
25 Lewis, 176.
26 Lewis, 195.
27 Lewis, 179.
28 Lewis, 197.
29 Lewis, 198–99.
30 Lewis, 234.
31 Lewis, 236
32 Lewis, 242.
33 Lewis, 237.
34 Lewis, 242.
35 Lewis, 259.
36 Lewis, 255.
37 Lewis, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, “Neoplatonism in Spenser’s Poetry” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 149. This article was written by Lewis as a hybrid between a book review and an essay. It is as if Lewis was engaged in conversation with Robert Ellrodt’s Neoplatonism in the poetry of Spenser. Ellrodt’s thesis is that Spenser is not a Neoplatonist, as some have accused, due to the influence of the Cambridge Neoplatonists who held forth while Spenser was associated with that University. Lewis agrees, for the most part, with Ellrodt, and supports his argument. Lewis argues that Spenser cannot be accused of Neoplatonism, for fruition of sexual desire was “either repudiated or coldly conceded” (p. 151) by the Neoplatonists. Spenser has a far more robust view of sex and speaks of it as only properly understood in marriage; and for him this would mean a marriage between one man and one woman. To conceive of this any other way would have been unthinkable for Spenser. It is important to note that Lewis not only supports Ellrodt, but also Spenser.
38 Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 304.
39 Lewis, 300.
40 Lewis, 316.
41 Lewis, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, 162.
42 Lewis, The Horse and His Boy (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1961), 199.
Chapter 2 Civil Debate in an Age of polarity
The Personal Heresy
The Personal Heresy is a debate between C. S. Lewis and E. M. W. Tillyard, who was the Master of Jesus College at Cambridge University. Both were interested in Milton’s Paradise Lost. Tillyard had already published a critical work on Milton. Lewis’s book A Preface to Paradise Lost was still to come. Lewis took issue with an underlying assumption Tillyard made, that is, that Milton’s Paradise Lost was primarily about the state of the author’s mind when he wrote the book.
Lewis disagreed and wrote a critical essay in opposition, publishing it in Essays and Studies, a literary journal. The following year, Tillyard responded in the same journal. The next year, Lewis responded again to Tillyard. The fact that the debate was recognized as worthy of note to occupy space in three successive years of journal publications is no small matter. And, the debate was intriguing enough that Tillyard and Lewis decided to continue it, each responding to the other, until a book could be published containing the entire conversation. The Personal Heresy is of great significance for all who are interested in Milton. Even more, it is significant for all who are interested in learning the art of thinking through a matter where understanding can be honed and sharpened by positive engagement with others with whom we might disagree.
Behind Lewis’s Challenge to Tillyard
Lewis possessed certain assumptions that drove his challenge to Tillyard’s work. Lewis was an objectivist, which means he believed that there are knowers (or subjects) capable of knowing. Furthermore, there are knowable objects (material objects, or objects of thought set apart by definition and developed in an inferentially coherent way). He does not deny the importance of a subject in the quest to understand, but for understanding to occur properly, the object at hand is paramount. Truth is not reality; truth is what one thinks about reality when thinking accurately about it. The object provides a necessary plumb line by which the subjective assessment might be measured and affirmed or by which assertions might be falsified. Without respect for objects—either material or conceptual—subjective judgments become anarchistic. In such cases, one is reduced to what Lewis called subjectivism. This occurs when the self projects onto the world, seeking to shape reality to fit its whims and predilections, rather than respond to reality with all of its complexity.
Lewis believed objectivity was possible through accurate responses to reality in matters of reason, emotion, and volition. A proper response is just only when it renders to reality its due. In cases of literary analysis, one must provide a proper response to the text if a judgment is to have merit. Due to the limits of human perception, a collective assessment of a literary text has the potential to increase the level of discovery. The give and take of debate—properly engaged, with a constant appeal to a text—could bring greater clarity and a more nuanced assessment. This was the context behind Lewis’s challenge to Tillyard.
The Essence of the Debate
We come now to Tillyard’s work on Milton, and what specifically led Lewis to enter into the debate as it is preserved in The Personal Heresy. As we’ve said, Tillyard wrote that Paradise Lost was about the state of Milton’s mind at the time he wrote the poem.43 Lewis said that Milton’s work was actually about the content of the story Milton wanted to tell. It was a story about creation, the nature and fall of man, and the story of redemption. Therefore, it was not at all about the state of the author’s mind.44 Lewis argued that an attempt to analyze the author’s mind would be an exercise in unverifiable judgments. It would likely amount to nothing more than the critic’s own projection onto the author, rather than an analysis of the text itself. Such criticism of the author’s mind, which is not present, removes the discussion away from the text, which is present. Attention is diverted from the objective and directed toward the hypothetical. Lewis asserts that criticism must be about texts themselves if a critic’s judgment is ever to be validated or rendered invalid.
