Shinran, who interpreted (or in some cases translated) the words of his Seven Patriarchs in a slightly different vein than intended by them, Maimonides offered his own objections to some of the views of the sages but also to the views of those whom he called his “teachers.” Similar to Shinran, who introduced a radically new religious thought, but never aimed to destroy Tendai Buddhism, Maimonides’ aim was to transform in order to ensure continuous survival rather than to destroy Jewish thought and tradition. As discussed above, in some cases, it required the ability to compromise without yet betraying one’s tradition.
Like Shinran, Maimonides did not have any institutional support that could have helped him to legitimize the transformations he envisioned. Neither did Maimonides claim any divine inspiration nor, contrary to Shinran, did he back up his claims by directly referring to the thinkers before him. In his introduction to the third part of his magnum opus titled Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides writes: “I followed conjectures and supposition; no divine revelation has come to me to teach me that the intention in the matter in question was such and such, nor did I receive what I believe in these matters from a teacher.”114
Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (GP), was written entirely in Egypt between 1185 and 1190. The term “perplexed” connotes those who hesitate between the conflicting claims of philosophy and religion.115 In this work, Maimonides sought to help those “perplexed” to integrate religion and philosophy: to achieve a full knowledge of philosophical truths without giving up the observance of religious commandments.116 In GP I: 71, Maimonides spells out the components of his own philosophy in relation to the Jewish heritage, both biblical and Talmudic. Being well versed in Islamic philosophy and theology, Maimonides positions himself against the approach exercised by the Islamic theologians. In addition to objecting to the anti-philosophical position of the Kalām theologians,117 one of his other major objections is the mutakallimūn118 articulation of imagination since, in his view, they mistake imagination for intellect: “follow the imagination and call it intellect.”119 Instead Maimonides argues for a “demonstrative method as to which there is no disagreement in any respect.”120 Maimonides’ skeptical approach to imagination testifies to Aristotle’s influence. Imagination more closely relates to sense perception than to abstract thinking.121 Maimonides’ approach to imagination has no analogy in Shinran’s thought since Maimonides aims to prevent the occurrence of anthropomorphism.122 Maimonides’ discomfort with any occurrence of anthropomorphism leads him to link imagination to “the evil impulse.”123 since it can result in perceiving Separate Intellect (angels) as having bodies. Yet, Maimonides straddles between Aristotelian skepticism124 and a more positive outlook of imagination. He exhibits a slightly less skeptical approach when he discusses imagination in relation to prophecy. In that discussion, Maimonides relates imagination to the political reason as an important component of prophecy, which we will address in the subsequent part of this chapter, but first, we turn to Maimonides’ view of God.
Maimonides’ Views of God
Whereas Shinran’s views cannot be discussed outside of his view of Amida Buddha, Maimonides’ dedication to the preservation of Judaism is inextricable from his view of God. At the core of this view lies his conviction of God’s incorporeality.125 We already mentioned his concern related to the excessive dependence on imagination, which he feared can lead to anthropomorphism. The correct belief is incongruent with an anthropomorphic image of God and Maimonides affirms God’s unity and argues that having a body means having form and matter and hence being divisible and subject to affects. Recalling Shinran’s conception of Amida Buddha as a highly relational and hence an affect-driven being, Maimonides’ view of God contrasts to that of Shinran. For Maimonides, “[A]ffection is a change” and God “is not touched by change. He is not like unto any thing of all those that are other than He, nor is He comprehended together with one of these things in any definition whatever.”126 Further, multiplicity leads to the grave misconception of many gods and introduces the notion of comparability, hence relative perfection. Whereas for Shinran, as we recall, Amida’s ethical perfection extends to those who become embraced by Amida’s Primal Vow, according to Maimonides, God is absolutely perfect. Multiplicity also vitiates God’s self-sufficiency. However, since God represents perfection and, given that affection relates to some change, God cannot be discussed in terms of affection.
God’s uniqueness also adds to God’s nonaffectability and hence to the lack of relationality. In the GP I: 35, Maimonides argues for God’s absolute uniqueness and His incorporeality. Here he insists that:
there is absolutely no likeness in any respect whatever between Him and the things created by Him; that His existence has no likeness to theirs; nor His life to the life of those among them who are alive; nor again His knowledge to the knowledge of those among them who are endowed with knowledge.127
Here we can draw some parallels to Shinran who does not discuss Amida’s attributes in corporeal terms. Maimonides’ God is discussed in terms of His actions. But for Maimonides, it is God’s incompatibility with humans that leads him to state that God’s attributes represent God’s actions rather than His qualities (GP I: 51).
Moreover, for Maimonides, God “performs actions resembling the actions that in us proceed from moral qualities.”128 Yet, Maimonides reiterates that compassion and affection felt by humans (as their perceived experience of God’s grace) cannot be attributed to God since God does not experience affection. Maimonides states: “It is not He, may He be exalted, is affected and has compassion. But an action similar to that which proceeds from a father in respect to His child and that is attached to compassion, pity, and an absolute passion, proceeds from Him . . . , not because of a passion or a change.”129
In Maimonides’ view, God’s actions can be analogous to the actions of a strict father130 who retains a strong intellectual differentiation between himself and his child and hence retains an unsurpassable distance. This type of a relationship does not produce reciprocity since, while God brings humans into existence and governs them, humans do not have any claims upon God. When the circumstances require, God exhibits not only His grace but also His jealousy, anger, and wrath. These actions do not result from any passions experienced by God, but are the outcome necessitated by the actions of those who transgress and deserve to be punished. Both God’s support and judgment are not emotional but are articulated through the commandments. Maimonides states that there are six positive and four negative commandments in the Torah starting with the principle commandments of “I am the Lord thy God” (Exodus 20:2) and “Thou shalt have no other gods before me” (20:3). These principle commandments exemplify the positive commandment to both love and fear God. Maimonides refers to love of God in terms of human contemplation of God’s works.
Contrary to Shinran’s view of Amida Buddha who does not encompass fear, Maimonides’ love of God is conjoined with the fear of God. Rather than personal recognition of one’s wickedness and imperfection that leads one to become embraced by Amida, it is the recognition of God’s perfection that guides the human sense of imperfection. God’s intelligence, incomparable to human intelligence, confirms God’s perfect unity by functioning as a self-recognizing entity:
The Holy One recognizes His own verity and knows it as it really is, and does not know it with an intelligence outside Himself as [humans] do; for [humans] and [human] intelligence are not one. But the Blessed Creator, He and His understanding and existence are one, in every aspect of His unity.131
Since God can only be discussed in equivocal terms, Maimonides builds his doctrine of negation which is based on the premise that humans can only know what God is NOT.132 Maimonides’ negative theology not only negates God’s corporeality but also denies “His having a likeness to created things and of His being subject to affections.”133 Maimonides’ conception of God is summarized under the rubric of “demythologizing” rabbinic
