aspires to apprehend the deity or one of the intellects, there subsists this great veil interposed between the two . . . we are separated by a veil from God.158
The corporeal nature is strongly articulated in GP III: 8 through 12: “all passing-away and corruption or deficiency are due solely to matter.”159 His negative view of matter informs his view of sin. Maimonides is explicit about the connection between matter and sin: “every living being dies and becomes ill solely because of its matter and not because of its form. All man’s acts of disobedience and sins are consequent upon his matter and not upon his form, whereas all his virtues are consequent upon his form.”160
Given his skepticism related to human nature, Maimonides fears that without following the commandments, humans can become perpetually swept by their evil inclinations. In GP III: 27, Maimonides states that the Mosaic Law (commandments) in its entirety brings the Jewish people both perfection of the soul and perfections of the body which will result in the world’s “perpetual preservation.”161 Perpetual preservation, however, is reserved only for this world and human “corporeal preservation” will last only “for a certain duration.” Maimonides complicates the idea of “eternal existence” by imbuing it with political significance. In GP III: 51, he argues that human preservation results from human welfare in terms of political association. Human happiness (or their state of felicity) depends on the soul’s perfection and is independent of “the genus of bodily pleasures.”162 Yet, in some instances, despite the bodily deterioration, an old age can ensure intellectual perfection and Maimonides states: “The result is that when a perfect man is stricken with years and approaches death, this apprehension [of intelligibles] increases very powerfully.”163 Ostensibly, Maimonides continues to view human perfection in terms of a non-corporeal, intellectual pleasure. Yet, given Maimonides’ view of human limitations, scholars still debate whether Maimonides did truly believe in the possibility of human perfection in terms of attainment of metaphysical knowledge.164
Throughout these discussions, we note the tension between solitude and politico-religious involvement, whereupon Maimonides feels a strong pull to be actively involved in the affairs of his community despite longing for solitary contemplations. The same tension is observed in Maimonides’ Eight Chapters in chapter 5 when he presents solitude and contemplation as most conducive to the ultimate goal of knowledge of God: “If a man sets this notion (i.e., knowledge of God) as his goal, he will discontinue many of his actions and generally diminish his conversations.” Trying to navigate between involvement and abstaining from it, he positions the middle way (the doctrine of the mean) as most natural to humans. In his words, “it is necessary to aim at the mean in actions and not depart from it toward one of the two extremes.”165
How to deal with human tendency for any harmful behavior and the propensity for exercising the extremes? For Maimonides, the doctrine of the mean is a corrective for any excessive approaches. It serves to balance the Jewish view of morality, which favors extreme piety, with the Greek approach of moderation, and hence, once again, links the Jewish tradition with Greek philosophy. Precisely because of his aim to unite these two traditions, Maimonides defines a pious man (hasid) as a virtuous man. While, in general, the pious man in the Jewish tradition is conceived of as someone who goes beyond what is required by the commandments, here Maimonides defines a pious man in terms of moderation and argues that he “weigh[s] all his actions with a view to this mean.”166 The principle of moderation ensures balance: “when the body gets out of equilibrium, we look to which side it inclines in becoming unbalanced, and then oppose it with its contrary until it returns to equilibrium.”167 Maintaining this equilibrium is similar to upholding moral habits: when the soul becomes “sick,” its treatment “must follow the same course in treating it as in the medical treatment for bodies.”168 We already discussed Maimonides’ unfavorable view of matter, how does Maimonides conceive of the human soul?
Maimonides’ Views of Human Body and Human Soul
Maimonides’ views of human body are borne out of his view of human psycho-physical constitution. Since there is no counterpart that deals with the issue of the body and the soul in the Jewish tradition, Maimonides follows the Aristotelian model but gives it a specifically Jewish “twist.” He shadows Aristotle’s articulation of the soul’s five faculties (nutritive, sentient, imaginative, appetitive, and rational) and in Eight Chapters strongly asserts that despite the soul’s five faculties, it is a “single soul.”169 The soul, he argues, possesses moral habits and in order to cultivate these virtues, the soul should be treated similarly to the way a physician cures the body. Whereas the physician needs to know all the parts of the body, the “physician of the soul” should likewise be well aware of all the faculties of the soul. The most important faculty of the soul is rationality. According to Maimonides, all parts of the soul, but the intellect, are “like matter,” “the intellect is [soul’s] form.”170 Given the absence of any philosophical definition of the soul in the Jewish tradition, Maimonides invokes Solomon’s statement that “Indeed, without knowledge a soul is not good.”171 By referring to this statement, he connects the intellect (rational part of the soul) to overall human perfection and implicitly links Greek philosophy’s focus on the attainment of intellectual knowledge with a similar focus within the Jewish tradition.
We note that in the Guide, Maimonides relates welfare of the body to the multitude, whereas the perfection of the soul he attributes to the capable individual’s ultimate perfection. Despite his negative views of the body, he admits that only when the body attains its perfection (i.e., health, well-being), one can strive for the ultimate perfection: “to become rational in actu” or “to have an intellect in actu.”172 Perfection of the welfare of the soul is geared toward formation of correct opinions “corresponding to [human] respective capacity.”173 The welfare of the soul (intellectual perfection) presents a qualitatively higher value that any other perfection and does not appear to be directly related to any moral qualities. We recall that in GP I: 34 Maimonides posits that to attain human perfection requires “to train [oneself] at first in the art of logic, then in the mathematical sciences according to the proper order, then in the natural sciences, and after that in the divine sciences.”174
Maimonides’ struggle between solitary pursuits and the politico-religious involvement sheds some light on his view of the pursuits of the masses as well. In his opinion, the welfare of the soul, which often results from solitary pursuits, relates to the perfection of the elite, whereas the welfare of the body relates to the multitude. His own experience led him to recognize, however, that one cannot lead a solitary existence and achieve the perfection of the body (the welfare of the body). It entails having protection, a shelter, food, and other necessities that ensure one’s proper physical functioning. Given that man’s nature, following Aristotle, is political,175 bodily perfection can only be attained through man’s political association often at the expense of solitary pursuits. The welfare of the body becomes connected to one’s political association and is further linked to the well-being and well-functioning of the state. In order to improve human life, “the abolition of [humans’] wronging each other” and “useful for life in society so that the affairs of the city may be ordered.”176 Preventing humans’ wronging each other and ensuing human peaceful coexistence are predicated on following the commandments. Nonetheless, Maimonides provocatively posits that certain matters are “only for a few solitary individuals of a very special sort, not for the multitude.”177
Maimonides challenges the idea of extreme piety and oscillates between favoring a more moderate approach178 and the rejection of it. In the Commentary to Mishnah Avot, chapter 5: VII, Maimonides defines a “wise” man as someone who perfected both moral and intellectual virtues. Specifically, Maimonides posits that the wise man has seven virtues: four moral virtues and three intellectual virtues. The moral virtues are exhibited in one’s humble behavior such as not speaking before someone who is greater in wisdom; not interrupting; and being capable
