its long-range ballistic missiles to carry Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology—nuclear-arms terminology for placing multiple warheads on a single missile. Beijing has possessed MIRV technology for years but not operationalized it until now, suggesting that its strategic calculus has changed. The upgrade might mean a doubling of the number of warheads that China could fire at an enemy. “China’s little force is slowly getting a little bigger, and its limited capabilities are slowly getting a little better,” said Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.46
It is important to recognize that China’s assertiveness here, as in other areas, is not episodic or circumstantial, but systematic. Case in point: China’s remarkably bold aggression in the South China Sea, which includes a willingness to thwart international law in constructing artificial islands and claiming sovereignty over international shipping lanes. Troubling as all that is, it’s part of a broader vision, which the Communist Party in Beijing even translated and released to the world in spring 2015: a planning document that spelled out China’s vision of building a “blue-water” navy—meaning one that can move offensively, not just defend national coastal waters.
Historically, the Chinese land forces were dominant. The country only recently built its first aircraft carrier. But the planning document makes clear that Beijing has prioritized the creation and maintenance of a world-class naval force: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests,” the document said. “It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests.”47
The focus was confirmed by Xu Guangyu, a retired Chinese major general. “As China continues to rise,” he said, “it has enormous interests around the globe that need protection, including investments, trade, energy, imports, and the surging presence of Chinese living abroad.” And for Washington’s benefit, Xu went on: “China will actively build up its military capability and deterrence, just to make sure no one dares fight with us. The United States cannot expect China to back off under pressure. It needs to know that the consequences would be unthinkable if it pushes China into a corner.”48
China is boosting its military budget by 10 percent this year alone, to $144 billion, though some observers believe that that figure is not all-inclusive. Much of the new funding is going to the naval modernization. The United States, meanwhile, oversees a navy at its smallest since the end of the Cold War.
The priorities expressed in the 2015 planning document are, in turn, a reflection of an even broader vision, what Xi has called the China Dream: a goal to become the world’s preeminent military power, surpassing the United States, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist revolution. “We must achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation,” Xi said in 2013. “We must ensure there is unity between a prosperous country and a strong military.”49
China is on the march in other areas, including massive economic and infrastructure investments in the Third World, especially Africa. Beijing forged the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, persuading more than 50 nations, including many U.S. allies, to join a venture that would rival the U.S.-dominated World Bank. And closer to home for the United States, South America now has China as it leading export destination outside Latin America, surpassing the U.S.—a sobering but little-noted fact.50 In 2012, meanwhile, Russia wrote off $20 billion in debt for several African countries, as part of its strategic push into the continent, which it sees as a lucrative export market and as a potential partner in raw-materials exports. Moscow is eager get into the race for investment in Africa, where it lost much ground after the end of the Cold War. This past spring, Russia offered to help Greece with its latest financial crisis—on the condition that the Greeks agree to route Russian oil into Europe. In economics as in everything else, Vladimir Putin plays to win.
Most troublingly, both Russia and China have taken aggressive steps to invest in and form political alliances in Latin America—traditionally America’s backyard. Not all of this is new: Russia had meddled aggressively in Latin America during the Cold War, and Putin forged a powerful alliance with Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez and has stayed close to his successor, Nicolás Maduro. Russia and Venezuela announced joint military drills in the Southern Caribbean Sea for later this year, and rumors persist that Moscow plans to sell Caracas military aircraft.51 In March 2015, Putin’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, visited Cuba, Colombia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—countries that have famously fraught relations with the United States. Nicaragua wants to buy Russian-made fighter jets—to the concern of its neighbors, Costa Rica and Honduras. One analyst said the move could spark “a small-scale arms race” in the region.52 Russia and Argentina might soon close a deal under which Moscow would lease 12 Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer aircraft to Buenos Aires in return for beef and wheat. Rumors of that deal prompted the British Defence Ministry to launch a review of air defenses on the Falkland Islands.
Russia is clearly determined to make clear to the West that it remains a global power—and not a mere “regional power,” as President Obama dismissively described it. Struggling under the Western sanctions and exclusion from the G8 after the Ukraine crisis, Russia is looking for new partners—and it tends to find them among nations already hostile to the United States. Moscow even appears ready to get involved in some long-running Latin American disputes, whether the U.S. blockade of Cuba or the Falklands–Malvinas Islands standoff between Argentina and the United Kingdom.53
China is already Latin America’s biggest creditor. Earlier this year, Xi pledged massive new direct investment commitments for Latin America, and Chinese companies announced a slew of new deals in the region. At least for now, the Chinese push seems more economic than political, but like Moscow, Beijing is doing business with the regional players most at odds with Washington: Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, which all have a harder time getting loans from Western banking institutions, especially the American-dominated World Bank. China is setting itself up as an alternative funder for Latin America. The leading beneficiary has been Venezuela, which has supplied oil to Beijing in exchange for funding for economic and infrastructure-development projects.54 Last year, Xi visited Venezuela and formally upgraded the two countries’ relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”
In the economic sphere, as in others, the United States has not kept pace with its determined adversaries, with one encouraging exception: The Obama administration has boldly pushed for passage of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal involving the United States and mostly Asian nations as well as others, including Canada—but excluding China. “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region,” the president said. “Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules.”55 He has shown this kind of vision and purpose only rarely during his presidency, however.
THE CLOUD OF WAR AND THE URGENCY OF ACTION
It has become a commonplace in recent years to observe that the American public is “tuned out” when it comes to foreign policy and that during election time foreign-policy issues—with the exception of terrorism—tend not to engage voters. Certainly there is some truth to this, and in recent years the tendency has become exacerbated by a growing distaste, at least among a portion of the voting public, for international involvement on the part of the United States. President Obama’s call to “do some nation building here at home” has resonated with Americans who rightly worry about our mounting list of domestic problems, from spiraling budget deficits and unfunded entitlement programs to failing public schools and crumbling infrastructure. It’s a time-honored American tendency to want to turn away from the problems of the world.
But if there is a single prevailing point that we wish to stress in the book you are about to read, it is that the time when Americans could afford such isolationist impulses (if we ever could) has passed. A second
