Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen
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We remain convinced that strengthening, renewing, and promoting democratic institutions worldwide is a fundamental mission of the United States. This means championing U.S. and Western values whenever and wherever we can—through means such as the Voice of America—and providing far more robust assistance to democratic groups around the world while imposing tough penalties and sanctions on antidemocratic forces. Despite recent setbacks, the democratic ideal remains strong around the world, and the United States makes a profound mistake when it fails to promote democratic institutions globally to its utmost capacity. This diffidence is not only wrongheaded; it also carries ominous implications for our influence and authority around the world. It may be that democratic institutions are being tested in ways we never expected them to be. But it is the institutions and the politicians that are failing, not the democratic ideal or democratic values. If anything, those values become more essential in the face of autocracy, authoritarianism, and repression—as made clear by the courage and resolve of freedom-seeking people in Istanbul, Kiev, and Moscow, and around the Middle East. Exasperated with the Obama administration’s failures, some are tempted to look to 2016 for a change in the American approach. And yet, a crisis-ridden world will not cooperate with our desire to sit out until better leadership arrives. Two more years in the current climate is too long to wait. Somehow, the United States must regain a clear sense of foreign-policy mission. In our view, this mission means reassuming American preeminence—in our defense capabilities, in our stewardship of Western alliances, and in our articulation of democratic values. The longer we delay in righting our course, the more difficult the task will be.
These truths are gaining acceptance across the American political spectrum. In May 2014, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave a commencement address at Georgetown. Gates said that the United States remains the country that the world looks to for advancement of the cause of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Yet, at a time of growing threats around the globe, we have degraded our defense capabilities severely. As Gates reminded his listeners, “soft” power means little without hard power to back it up. The Economist, always a fair and nuanced critic of the president, has made a similar point: “Credibility is about reassurance as well as the use of force. Credibility is also easily lost and hard to rebuild.” Arguing that Obama has been an “inattentive friend” to American allies, the magazine also invoked his Syrian retreat to underline that he had “broken the cardinal rule of superpower deterrence: You must keep your word.”80
Obama has often defended his approach by pointing to the growing isolationist sentiments of the American electorate. Polls do show such leanings, as they have for years, but the case for engagement remains compelling—and needs only a president who can make the public argument for it. Indeed, in an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll in which respondents voiced isolationist sentiments, 55 percent nonetheless agreed that it was important for the U.S. to project an “image of strength.”81 In our view, this suggests that isolationist sentiment is only skin-deep. We believe that, recent discouragements aside, most Americans still identify with assertion over accommodation—and with standing up for our principles, our values, and our broader interests.
This should not be confused with advocacy of endless war or of an overly intrusive United States. Rather, what we must do is offer credible deterrence again. As this book went to press, the Justice Department announced the indictment of five officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for violations of cyber security. The charges are almost certainly symbolic—Beijing isn’t going to extradite these gentlemen to Washington for a trial—and more important, they are incomplete. We made no mention of going after government officials or Chinese businesses that enable and facilitate these hackers. However, at least the charges suggest accountability, recognition, and acknowledgment; all are essential if America is to grasp what it faces and begin fighting back.
In this book, we have outlined a bold and multifaceted set of initiatives the U.S. should implement if we are to begin restoring our place in the world as the bulwark of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Yet no matter how many good ideas are offered, strong leadership remains essential. The Obama administration has been hesitant, halting, and hamstrung.
This simply must change. Unless the United States rebuilds a robust defense, clearly asserts its interests and values, assures its allies, and offers unapologetic leadership, we will fail. And our failure will carry with it a huge price: the collapse of the post–World War II international architecture. To avoid such a scenario, the United States—still the world’s only “indispensable nation”—must reassume its rightful role as the world’s only superpower.
Superpowers, as Robert Kagan wrote recently, “Don’t get to retire.”82
Time is short, but it is not too late—yet.
Preface to the Paperback Edition
Authors’ note: We are writing this updated preface to the new edition of The Russia-China Axis, now titled “Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America,” in early summer 2015—at a time when events around the world only strengthen our convictions about the arguments we make in this book. What follows is a brief overview of what has occurred since the book’s first edition appeared last year.
One year ago, when we published The Russia-China Axis, we felt strongly that we had written a book compelling in its analysis, accurate in its appraisal, and prescient in its warning that the United States was at mounting risk from a new, anti-Western alliance between Moscow and Beijing. We believed that the new Russia-China partnership, across every international front, spelled enormous risk for the United States and the Western democracies, and we tried to sound the alarm that the West, especially America, has shown no strategy and no will to take it on. In our view, the United States and its allies are at greater risk than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
A year later, at the risk of sounding immodest, we can only say: We were right.
Across every front, Russia and China continue on the march. The Russians changed the borders of Europe for the first time since World War II, with their illegal annexation of Crimea, and they are poised to destabilize and possibly even annex substantial additional parts of Eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as large parts of the Arctic, appear to be next on Putin’s hit list. Moscow is increasing its defense budget exponentially and upgrading its nuclear arsenal, and sending the message regularly to Washington and the European capitals that it is ready to confront us. Even as the Obama administration has tried to celebrate its ill-considered nuclear agreement with Iran, for example, Russian president Vladimir Putin has sold Tehran a missile-defense system that will fortify the Iranians against retaliatory attacks should they violate the agreement’s terms—an inevitability, to those who see the regime’s intentions clearly. Even more alarming has been Russia’s escalating military involvement in Syria, where it has deployed troops and heavy weapons to provide support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are pursuing outright expansionism in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where they are flouting international law and making brazen claims that, if conceded, would put one of the world’s primary shipping lanes almost entirely under Chinese direction. Beijing is also engaging in a massive military buildup—especially of its naval forces—and is aggressively upgrading its nuclear posture. And Beijing continues to tolerate a nuclear North Korea, arguably putting the world at risk.
Russia and China are adept practitioners of the dark arts of cyber warfare. Both countries have been implicated in recent years in major attacks against American targets. And both Beijing and Moscow have moved boldly—and with distressing