for uranium enrichment and will allow the Iranians to keep inspectors from visiting sites such as Parchin, where it is believed they are researching detonators that would convert nuclear fuel into nuclear bombs.65 The West’s deal-making has been not just incompetent, but destructive: In the process of making these craven attempts to put a good face on the Iranian situation, we have managed to alienate Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Abandoned hope for any Israeli–Palestinian peace deal is another price paid for our misadventures.
We’re not doing much better reassuring our Asian allies, all of whom have felt the brunt, one way or another, of Chinese assertiveness. Obama’s April 2014 Asian tour was meant to placate Japan and the Philippines, but he was subdued in his assurances, lest he offend Beijing. “President Obama obviously wants to avoid any appearances that this is part of a new Cold War with China,” said Mark Thompson, director of the Southeast Asia Research Centre at City University of Hong Kong. “But this is a tricky balancing act because this is increasingly how the U.S.’s traditional allies that he is visiting are viewing things.”66 Thus the Philippines welcomed an agreement that would allow base access to American warships, planes, and troops for the first time since 1992, when the U.S. gave up its bases on the archipelago. But even this is hardly a warm embrace: We’re using Philippine bases, not reopening our own. The message seems to be, “We do need you, but only on our terms.” The Americans were quick to say that the decision had nothing to do with China, but most observers saw through that disclaimer.
Perhaps the most anxious Asian ally is Japan, which has found itself increasingly in Chinese crosshairs—and worried about whether Washington will really be there if trouble breaks out. In a press conference with Obama, Prime Minister Abe was less than enthusiastic about the alliance. Abe said: “We want to make this a peaceful region which values laws, and in doing this, strengthening of our bilateral alliance is extremely important. On this point, I fully trust President Obama.”67 But Abe has rapidly built up Japan’s military, seeking to “make Japan a more equal partner with the U.S. in policing Asia”—hardly a sign of confidence in America’s ability to keep the peace.68 He is also building a web of security and defense relationships with other Asian states, independent of U.S.-led initiatives, because he lacks faith in America’s willingness to use its alliances against China.
Most worryingly of all, Abe is reaching out not only to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam but also to Russia. Looking at the China-Russia gas deal as a model, members of Abe’s party are pushing for a $6 billion pipeline that would supply Japan with Russian gas. The new pipeline would make Japan dependent on Russia for nearly a fifth of its annual supply.69 Putin will probably travel to Russia in the fall of 2014, and Abe hopes that the two countries can sign a peace deal that would normalize relations for the first time since World War II.70 If the deal comes off, it would mark a potentially tectonic shift in the Pacific power balance.
Finally, in Europe, uneasiness about American commitments is rampant. Obama’s humiliation on Syria has left European leaders wondering if he has a bottom line on anything, and our key allies increasingly doubt the strength and future of the NATO alliance—as their reaction to the crisis in Ukraine shows. The British refuse to go along with sanctions against Putin, looking to “protect the City of London’s hold on dirty Russian money.”71 The German business establishment is more interested in protecting billions in trade and energy business with Moscow than in saving Ukraine. And perhaps most notoriously, the French are dismissing American concerns about their plans to go forward with sale of Mistral-class warships to Russia. For France, the decision makes good economic sense for its struggling shipbuilding industry, but the costs to the world could be enormous: The Mistrals will give Moscow capabilities it has never possessed before. If it had had Mistrals in 2008, Russian naval chief Vladimir Vysotsky said, Moscow would have won its war against Georgia in “40 minutes.”72 And France isn’t just selling Russia the warships; it’s also training hundreds of Russian naval personnel to operate them. Put simply, a NATO ally is actively assisting Russia to beef up its military capabilities, even as NATO countries in Eastern Europe prepare for more Russian aggression.73 U.S. objections have done nothing to dissuade the French; one imagines that, in an earlier time, American disapproval might have meant something.
So withered has the American reputation become in Europe that the continent’s far-right parties, which won big in parliamentary elections in May 2014, celebrate Putin as their political inspiration. Aymeric Chauprade, for example, of France’s National Front, calls Russia “the hope of the world against new totalitarianism.”74 The National Front’s Marine Le Pen said of Putin: “He’s aware we are defending common values.” When asked what values specifically, Le Pen replied: “The Christian heritage of European civilization.”75 Nigel Farage, the leader of Britain’s far-right party, UKIP, says that he admires Putin most among world leaders. Greece’s Golden Dawn party, Austria’s Freedom Party, and Hungary’s Jobbik also strongly prefer Putin to an America they frequently denounce. One might dismiss this fact if these parties had remained marginal, as they were only a few years ago. Now, their appeal and influence are growing.
INDISPENSABLE NATION, DISPOSABLE LEADERSHIP
On May 28, 2014, President Obama delivered the commencement speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, attempting—yet again—to lay out a clear and decisive foreign-policy vision and answer the mounting chorus of critics. And, superficially at least, he succeeded. He declared that “America must always lead,” spoke of his devotion to American exceptionalism, called America the “indispensable nation”—a phrase first coined by Madeleine Albright—and pledged support for our allies and for the cause of democracy. But notwithstanding the rhetoric, the speech offered no clear mandate for action, no clear framework for a strong and committed American presence in the world. Peel away the rhetoric, and the message was retrenchment and abandonment of responsibility.
When even the New York Times judges that the speech “did not match the hype, was largely uninspiring, lacked strategic sweep, and is unlikely to quiet his detractors, on the right or the left,”76 it’s a safe bet that the speech failed. The Financial Times joined the chorus of critics: “There was precious little to convince U.S. allies that Mr Obama is ready to step up his diplomatic agenda a gear or two.” Indeed, Obama’s omissions were glaring, with “barely a mention of how he would deal with China’s maritime boldness, nor of Russia’s neo-imperialist boundary-setting,” the paper added. “He did not mention the foundering trade negotiations in the Pacific and across the Atlantic.”77 And so on.
The speech failed because, at heart, it was defeatist; and in this, it reflected clearly on its author. Despite his occasional clarion calls to American greatness, Obama’s dominant tone was one of paring back the traditional post–World War II mission of the United States in the world. Where we have been, for 70 years, the world’s lead actor in protecting democratic governments, adjudicating disputes, and putting teeth into UN resolutions, Obama would have us walk back from this into a much narrower definition of American capabilities, interests, and options. He offers nothing that will dissuade our allies from their growing conviction that they cannot count on a paralyzed United States. John Bolton put it well when he wrote that Obama “has somehow managed to combine the worst features of isolationism and multilateralism.”78 Indeed, a president so committed to multilateralism that he won’t act alone—even with compelling reasons to do so—is a president willing to hamstring American power, in a world in which other actors (such as Russia and China) feel no such compulsion to ask for permission. No wonder that, barely a week after the president’s speech, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, gave a speech of his own in Tehran—under a banner reading “America cannot do a damn thing”—in which he proclaimed that Obama has “renounced the idea of any military actions” against Iran.79
Traditionally, when a great issue has come to the fore demanding American action, American presidents have spoken to the world in clear and unequivocal language—saying, in effect, “We will
