When they had uttered these statements, exasperating and pitiable in the recital, before persons alarmed for themselves, exciting greater indignation in the hearers than was felt by themselves, they affirmed "that there never would be any other limit to their occupying the lands, or to their butchering the commons by usury, unless the commons were to elect one consul from among the plebeians, as a guardian of their liberty. That the tribunes of the commons were now despised, as being an office which breaks down its own power by the privilege of protest. That there could be no equality of right, where the dominion was in the hands of the one party, assistance only in that of the other. Unless the authority were shared, the commons would never enjoy an equal share in the commonwealth; nor was there any reason why any one should think it enough that plebeians were taken into account at the consular elections; unless it were made indispensable that one consul at least should be from the commons, no one would be elected. Or had they already forgotten, that when it had been determined that military tribunes should be elected rather than consuls, for this reason, that the highest honours should be opened to plebeians also, no one out of the commons was elected military tribune for forty-four years? How could they suppose, that they would voluntarily confer, when there are but two places, a share of the honour on the commons, who at the election of military tribunes used to monopolize the eight places? and that they would suffer a way to be opened to the consulship, who kept the tribuneship so long a time fenced up? That they must obtain by a law, what could not be obtained by influence at elections; and that one consulate must be set apart out of the way of contest, to which the commons may have access; since when left open to dispute it is sure ever to become the prize of the more powerful. Nor can that now be alleged, which they used formerly to boast of, that there were not among the plebeians qualified persons for curule magistracies. For, was the government conducted with less activity and less vigour, since the tribunate of Publius Licinius Calvus, who was the first plebeian elected to that office, than it was conducted during those years when no one but patricians was a military tribune? Nay, on the contrary, several patricians had been condemned after their tribuneship, no plebeian. Quæstors also, as military tribunes, began to be elected from the commons a few years before; nor had the Roman people been dissatisfied with any one of them. The consulate still remained for the attainment of the plebeians; that it was the bulwark, the prop of their liberty. If they should attain that, then that the Roman people would consider that kings were really expelled from the city, and their liberty firmly established. For from that day that every thing in which the patricians surpassed them, would flow in on the commons, power and honour, military glory, birth, nobility, valuable at present for their own enjoyment, sure to be left still more valuable to their children." When they saw such discourses favourably listened to, they publish a new proposition; that instead of two commissioners for performing religious rites, ten should be appointed; so that one half should be elected out of the commons, the other half from the patricians; and they deferred the meeting (for the discussion) of all those propositions, till the coming of that army which was besieging Velitræ.
38
The year was completed before the legions were brought back from Velitræ. Thus the question regarding the laws was suspended and deferred for the new military tribunes; for the commons re-elected the same two plebeian tribunes, because they were the proposers of the laws. Titus Quinctius, Servius Cornelius, Servius Sulpicius, Spurius Servilius, Lucius Papirius, Lucius Valerius, were elected military tribunes. Immediately at the commencement of the year the question about the laws was pushed to the extreme of contention; and when the tribes were called, nor did the protest of their colleagues prevent the proposers of the laws, the patricians being alarmed have recourse to their two last aids, to the highest authority and the highest citizen. It is resolved that a dictator be appointed: Marcus Furius Camillus is appointed, who nominates Lucius Æmilius his master of the horse. To meet so powerful a measure of their opponents, the proposers of the laws also set forth the people's cause with great determination of mind, and having convened an assembly of the people, they summon the tribes to vote. When the dictator took his seat, accompanied by a band of patricians, full of anger and of threats, and the business was going on at first with the usual contention of the plebeian tribunes, some proposing the law and others protesting against it, and though the protest was more powerful by right, still it was overpowered by the popularity of the laws themselves and of their proposers, and when the first tribes pronounced, "Be it as you propose," then Camillus says, "Since, Romans, tribunitian extravagance, not authority, sways you now, and ye are rendering the right of protest, acquired formerly by a secession of the commons, totally unavailing by the same violent conduct by which you acquired it, I, as dictator, will support the right of protest, not more for the interest of the whole commonwealth than for your sake; and by my authority I will defend your rights of protection, which have been overturned. Wherefore if Caius Licinius and Lucius Sextius give way to the protest of their colleagues, I shall not introduce a patrician magistrate into an assembly of the commons. If, in opposition to the right of protest, they will strive to saddle laws on the state as though captive, I will not suffer the tribunitian power to be destroyed by itself." When the plebeian tribunes still persisted in the matter with unabated energy and contemptuously, Camillus, being highly provoked, sent his lictors to disperse the commons; and added threats, that if they persisted he would bind down the younger men by the military oath, and would forthwith lead an army out of the city. He struck great terror into the people; by the opposition he rather inflamed than lessened the spirits of their leaders. But the matter inclining neither way, he abdicated his dictatorship, either because he had been appointed with some informality, as some have stated; or because the tribunes of the people proposed to the commons, and the commons passed it, that if Marcus Furius did any thing as dictator, he should be fined five hundred thousand asses. But both the disposition of the man himself, and the fact that Publius Manlius was immediately substituted as dictator for him, incline me to believe, that he was deterred rather by some defect in the auspices than by this unprecedented order. What could be the use of appointing him (Manlius) to manage a contest in which Camillus had been defeated? and because the following year had the same Marcus Furius dictator, who certainly would not without shame have resumed an authority which but the year before had been worsted in his hands; at the same time, because at the time when the motion about fining him is said to have been published, he could either resist this order, by which he saw himself degraded, or he could not have obstructed those others on account of which this was introduced, and throughout the whole series of disputes regarding the tribunitian and consular authority, even down to our own memory, the pre-eminence of the dictatorship was always decided.
39
Between the abdication of the former dictatorship and the new one entered on by Manlius, an assembly of the commons being held by the tribunes, as if it were an interregnum, it became evident which of the laws proposed were more grateful to the commons, which to the proposers. For they passed the bills regarding the interest and the land, rejected the one regarding the plebeian consulate. And both decisions would have been carried into effect, had not the tribunes declared that they consulted the people on all the laws collectively. Publius Manlius, dictator, then inclined the advantage to the side of the people, by naming Caius Licinius from the commons, who had been military tribune, as master of the horse. The patricians, I understand, were much displeased at this nomination, but the dictator used to excuse himself to the senate, alleging the near relationship between him and Licinius; at the same time denying that the authority of master of the horse was higher than that of consular tribune. When the elections for the appointment of plebeian tribunes were declared, Licinius and Sextius so conducted themselves, that by denying that they any longer desired a continuation of the honour, they most powerfully stimulated the commons to effectuate that which they were anxious for notwithstanding their dissimulation. "That they were now standing the ninth year as it were in battle-array against the patricians, with the greatest danger to their private interests, without any benefit to the public. That the measures published, and the entire strength of the tribunitian authority, had grown old with them; the attack was made on their propositions, first by the protest of their colleagues, then by banishing their youth to the war at Velitræ; at length the dictatorial thunder was levelled against them. That now neither
