that if part of a force is surrounded the true way to rescue it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would have been placed between two fires, and it would have been impossible for him to capture the schooners. As it was, the British commander had attacked a superior force in weather that just suited it, and yet had captured two of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond a few shot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in no way decisive. All next day, the 11th, the fleets were in sight of one another, the British to windward, but neither attempted to renew the engagement. The wind grew heavier, and the villainous little American schooners showed such strong tendencies to upset, that two had to run into Niagara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake to Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks, and that same evening proceeded up the lake again.
The advantage in this action had been entirely with the British, but it is simple nonsense to say, as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive predominance, which we maintained until the end of the war." 231 This "decisive" battle left the Americans just as much in command of the lake as the British; and even this very questionable "predominance" lasted but six weeks, after which the British squadron was blockaded in port most of the time. The action has a parallel in that fought on the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve.232 The two fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured two ships, when both sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other the next day without either renewing the action. "A victory therefore it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor a 'brilliant' victory." 233 This is exactly the criticism that should be passed on Sir James Lucas Yeo's action of the 10th of August.
From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets were on the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his letters his surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid of meeting him "though so much superior in force." The facts are of course difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; and that the party to leeward generally made off. The Americans had been re-inforced by the Sylph schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically her armament would make her formidable; but practically her guns were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she was converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.
On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range, in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; the Americans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one midshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay. One of their brigs, the Melville, received a shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns had to be run in on one side and out on the other. Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay. 234 James says that "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet; but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended." This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his account is supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, 235 which says: "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully avoided doing." In other words Yeo did not steer for but away from Chauncy. Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it is only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not. Of course in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a great advantage. He had present 10 vessels; the Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy told but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was much disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so much superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellous admission of how little able he was to make good use of even what he had. He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close action. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (not a carronade being fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long 18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpable incompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie—substitute all his long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long 12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of shot. The odds were thus more than two to one against the British in any case; and their commander's lack of resource made them still greater. But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results.
The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When the squadrons were still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, with their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and edged down toward them, the Pike ahead, towing the Asp; the Tompkins, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next; the Madison next, being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the Sylph, with another schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, Commodore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain William Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line. They opened with their starboard guns as soon as they came round. When the Pike was a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of the British line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre.
The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph, neither having cast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and Tompkins. The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But already the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's main-top-mast and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he could on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail after her. The retreat of the commodore was most ably covered by the Royal George, under Captain Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on the lake. He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes. The Madison and Sylph, having the schooners in tow, could not overtake the British ships, though the Sylph opened a distant fire; the Pike kept on after them, but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished, 236 when the enemy were running into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape would have been impossible. The Tompkins had lost her foremast, and the Pike her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowsprit and main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not be used. Among the British ships, the Wolfe lost her main-top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the Royal George her foretop-mast; both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to the report of the British officers captured in the transports a few days afterward.
As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer published accounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the action was not made public. Brenton merely alludes
